Social and economic change in the south east Northumberland coalfield from the early 18th century by Harpur, Alan
Durham E-Theses
Social and economic change in the south east
Northumberland coalﬁeld from the early 18th century
Harpur, Alan
How to cite:
Harpur, Alan (1993) Social and economic change in the south east Northumberland coalﬁeld from the early
18th century, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online:
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/5590/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oﬃce, Durham University, University Oﬃce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP





SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN THE SOUTH-
EAST NORTHUMBERLAND COALFIELD FROM THE 
EARLY 18TH CENTURY. 
ALAN HARPUR 
PRESENTED FOR THE DEGREE OF:- M. Phil. 
INSTITUTION:- UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM 
DEPARTMENT:- GEOGRAPHY 
YEAR OF SUBMISSION:- 1993. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. 
No quotation from it should be published without 
his prior written consent and information derived 
from it should be acknowledged. 
;-;,It FEB 1994 
The subject of this thesis is social and economic change in the 
south-east Northumberland coalfield. 
I. • 
A historical perspective is 
taken and class fonnation is examined from the early 18th century. 
During this early period the working class develops separately but 
under the rule of capital. Despite resistance the working class is 
contained and absorbed into the institutions of capital. 
In the inter-war period capital pursues a policy of reaction before 
elaborating new policies and setting up regional development 
organisations incorporating significant trade unionists and labour 
party members. 
While Nationalization was at first resisted the eventualo 
Nationalization of coal provided a way of restructuring the coal 
industry in the interests of capital in general. In the innnediate 
post second world war years the policy of the N.C.B., underlined in 
various planning documents, was to retain labour in the coalfields. 
However, the modernisation of the pits led to local job losses 
resulting in the development of Cramlington New Town in order to 
diversity the areas economy. 
I therefore evaluate the New Town's objectives and conclude that 
they have been met to only a limited extent. The town relying upon 
branch plants to sustain its manufacturing base. 
An analys"is of the New Town in the 1980's showing a polarisation 
between central workers and a reserve surplus with both populations 
located in separate localities. The contraction of the economic base 
in Blyth Valley differentially effecting these core and peripheral 
workers. 
Lastly, the development of Cramlington can also be seen.as class 
restructuring and I then go to the consider the relationship between 
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The focus of this thesis is social and economic change in a 
particular locality. However, I have tried to set change in a 
historical and national context. Indeed I would contend that it is 
impossible to talk about local change processes without reference to 
the past and to phenomena which transcend locality. 
As a stranger to the North Fast and coming from a place 
(Northern Ireland) with a distinct and different politics, I have had 
much learning to do. In some measure this thesis represents a first 
attempt by me to familiarise myself with unfamiliar territory. 
Inevitably this has involved description as a means to understanding. 
Much sociology and social policy traditions have concentrated on 
defining the working class and worrying about the condition of that 
class, its level of class consciousness and the implications of 
condition and consciousness for action. These are important and 
legitimate concerns but the result is the relative absence of any 
consideration of the dominant class. On the other hand when the 
working class does appear in sociology it is often in the abstract or 
in the guise of cardboard cut out ideal types. In both instances the 
working class lacks a voice. However, in trying to recover a working 
class voice we are faced with a major problem. For although leading 
actors may record their thoughts and feelings the reflections of the 
'man or woman in the street' are hardly ever sought and remain lost to 
posterity. 
In my first chapter I concentrate on the early development of a 
dominant class and its relationship to the working class. This phase 
is a story of resistance and defeats. The working class developing 
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separately but subordinately before it is contained and absorbed into 
the institutions of capital. 
In the inter-war period, which I cover in Chapter Two, capital 
attempts to escape crisis by carrying out and advocating a policy of 
lay offs together with wage and social benefit cuts. The effect of 
this being to make a bad situation worse. Consequently a new policy 
direction was sought and elaborated and finds reflection in the 
setting up of regional development organisations illlder the sway of 
capital but incorporating leading trade union and labour party 
figures. 
Chapter Three deals with aspects of modernisation concentrating 
on the politics of Nationalisation and the re-ordering of the space 
economy as revealed in planning documents. In this context 
Nationalisation is viewed as a product of class struggle but it comes 
after the defeat of the General Strike when Fabian notions of public 
ownership held dominance in the Labour Party. The form of 
Nationalisation therefore provides a mechanism for the restructuring 
of the coal industry in the interests of capital. Cramlington New 
Town only coming on to the development agenda when it was clear that 
the consequences of modernisation and efficiency in the coal industry 
would mean local job losses in South East Northumberland. 
Chapter Four examines a number of early surveys for what they 
contain about the objectives and social structure of the New Town. 
Broadly my conclusion is that the objectives of the town, as far as 
they can be ascertained, have been met to only a limited degree. From 
the beginning the town relied upon branch plants to sustain its 
manufacturing base and I provide a number of case studies together 
with census of employment figures to illustrate trends and processes 
involved. 
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Chapter Five takes the reader up to the 1980's and contains an 
analysis of Cramlington localities. What this reveals is a growing 
polarisation between central workers and the reserve surplus 
population. At the same time the 1980's saw the closure of the last 
pit in Blyth Valley. An event which I consider in all too brief 
detail. The decline of manufacturing employment provoking the County 
Council to adopt economic development policies which I find to be 
limited and contradictory. Lastly the class theme is re-opened by 
looking at the relationship between housing, class and party vote. A 
preoccupation which underpins the interviews in Chapter Six. 
As is customary at this point my thanks are due to a m.nnber of 
people for their support. Firstly to Ray Hudson for his patience and 
to David Byrne for his encouragement and for providing survey material 
which formed a basis for Chapter Five. Second, to Leo, Robin and 
Francis for their tolerance and finally to Kevin, Julie and Loreli for 
their ever open door. 
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CIJAPIER ONE 
CLASS AND CLASS FORMATION IN THE NORTHDMBERLAND COAL FIELD 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I intend to consider regional economic 
development as a process of class formation. The area I intend to 
look at is Blyth and Cramlington, now subsumed under the 
administrative unit of Blyth Valley Urban District Council and 
Northumberland County Council. Reference will also be made to other 
areas particularly Newcastle. More specifically, I will be concerned 
to identify an elite, whose ownership of capital or control over the 
use to which private capital is put, is both a source of its power and 
a factor .constituting that elite as a class as well as enabling its 
reproduction over time. 
Secondly, since I am interested in class formation as a process, an 
historical approach is essential, for as Gramsci put it; 
"It is not enough to lmow the ensemble of relations as 
they exist at any given time as a given system. They 
must be lmown genetically, in the movement of their 
formation. For each individual is the synthesis of not 
only existing relations, but of the history of these 
relations. He is a precis of all the past." (1) 
Moreover, while adopting a historical perspective I will, in the 
first instance, focus on the economic aspect of class formation 
b~cause as Poulantzas notes; 
"In the complex organisation of a class, it is the 
economic which holds the dominant role, in addition to 
determination in the last instance" (Z) 
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This is not to deny that class includes economic, political and 
ideological class practice but simply to insist that it is important 
to distinguish different features in order to analyse them. Lastly, 
the method employed to understand class formation and class interest 
has been to concentrate, in the first instance, on individuals and 
family dynasties. What is significant is their reaction to a changing 
economic and political environment which they both shape and by which 
they are shaped. It is important to co~ider concrete individuals and 
examples in order to test any general theory about capitalist 
development, the capitalist system, class formation and the 
relationship between classes. 
MASTERS OF CAPITAL 
Following the Jacobite rising of 1715 the Plessey and Newsham 
estates, of which Blyth was a part, passed to the Crown and in 1727 
they were purchased by Richard Ridley of Newcastle who took over the 
working of the Plessey pits. By 1728 the Ridleys had bought the West 
Hartford collieries so that by 1730 they commanded the whole of the 
coal trade from the Plessey and Hartford pits. At the same time they 
owned the only shipping quay at Blyth and had secured from the Bishop 
of Durham all of the beach on the south side of the River Blyth. 
The closing years of the century brought with them competition 
in the coal trade. A small colliery was opened in the vicinity of the 
Ridley workings and a shipping quay built on the north side of the 
River Blyth. The venture proved a failure and the colliery and quay 
were purchased by Sir Matthew White Ridley. 
In 1793 further competition took place with the commencement of 
a colliery on the adjoining Cowpen estate. The speculators involved 
included various Newcastle merchants. Soon after, in 1799, another 
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pit was sunk by the same consortium. The two collieries being !mown 
as Cowpen 'A' pit and Cowpen 'B' pit. 
By 1813 an agreement has been reached between the Cowpen owners 
and Sir Matthew White Ridley whereby Ridley closed his Plessey pits 
and allowed access to his Blyth shipping quay. In return the vend 
from the Cowpen collieries was increased and Sir Mat thew received a 
percentage of the profits amounting to £1800 per annum as compensation 
for closing his Plessey mines. 
The last of the Plessey pits was closed in 1813. Over the next 
ten years Sir Matthew increased his interest in the Cowpen mines so 
that by 1820 he had become sole owner of the Cowpen colliery complex, 
including eight colliery ships and the colliery farm. Competition 
still remained in the shape of the Hartley collieries but was resolved 
by an agreement over vend and prices between the Hartley owners and 
Sir Matthew White Ridley. However, this agreement could not mitigate 
competition from the Tyne collieries. Here, regulation had broken 
__ down to the extent that Sir Matthew's agent could say .that; 
"should the fight continue much longer many will be 
slain." (3) 
Fortunately by 1828 the situation had stabilised and the vend from 
Cowpen pits increased to 80,000 tons. 
With the death of Sir Matthew White Ridley in 1836, his son and 
heir retained John Buddie to undertake a survey of the Cowpen colliery 
workings and Blyth harbour. Buddie's report indicated that a total of 
£5000 would have to be spent in order to work certain seams and bring 
the pits up to full production. Mter these measures had been taken 
Buddie anticipated that annual profits would be between £3500 and 
£4000. It seems that Sir Matthew's son was unwilling to undertake the 
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required investment and in 1838 the whole Cowpen rmdertaking was 
leased to a Messrs. Carr and Jobling. 
The Cowpen mines continued to be worked on a leasehold basis for 
the next twenty years until, in 1858, Sir Matthew sold the mines to a 
consortimn including Joseph and John Straker and John and William 
Isaac Cookson. Shortly after, in 1861, Cowpen was amalgamated with 
the North Seaton Collieries to form the Cowpen and North Seaton Coal 
Co. , Joseph and John Straker having in any case been members of a 
syndicate who owned the North Seaton colliery. After amalgamation the 
new company sunk the Straker mine in 1874 followed by the Mill pit in 
1886. 
Yet Blyth was not the only area in which the Ridley family had 
an interest. In 1834 land at West Cramlington was sold to Sir Matthew 
White Ridley, making him the principal land owner alongside the 
Lawsons of Cramlington Hall and the Shum-Storeys of Arcot Hall. 
Beneath the land was coal so that as early as 1786 a George Green 
reports to the Lawsons on the difficulties of mining coal while 
significant individuals control the natural outlets at Hartley, Blyth 
and the Tyne. Green writes; 
"Having therefore considered those ways with various 
other things relating to the winning and working of coal 
I am of the opinion that at present it is of very little 
value now nor is there any prospect of it being of more 
in the future unless to sell or let to Lord Delavell or 
Sir Matthew White Ridley,when their collieries are near a 
conclusion which time is very uncertain and perhaps may 
not happen for forty or fifty years yet." (4) 
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However, by 1824 John Straker is writing to John Watson of Newcastle 
in the following terms; 
"As my mission to the metropolis in search of partners 
for the Cramlington Colliery was not successful we have 
now thought of making it a Joint Stock company for which 
Mr. Lamb has drawn up a prospectus. Should we fail to 
get subscribers for it the colliery materials are to be 
immediately disposed of and certain to be abandoned. 
Your being in London I thought it would be a good 
opportunity to try the market for subscribers ••• if you 
can manage to get the thing forward with a sufficient 
prospect of success, Mr. Lamb would have no objection to 
rewarding you well. Our general hope must rest with the 
London subscribers." (5) 
The mission must have been successful for in 1824 Joseph Lamb is 
recorded as the major share holder in the East Cramlington colliery, 
with John Straker acting as his manager. Humble Lamb, Joseph's 
brother, managed the West Cramlington Colliery. But the Lambs' 
interests did not stop here. Humble Lamb and Co. owned two pits at 
Backworth, which opened in 1818 and 1820, while Joseph Lamb and Co. 
commenced mining at Seaton Delaval Colliery in 1837. By the 1850's 
two companies existed, J. Lamb and Co. and H. Lamb and Co., both 
producing high grade steam coal. 
It is around the 1860's and after that the Cramlington Coal Co., 
the Seaton Delaval Coal Co.,the Shiremoor Coal Co., and the Backworth 
and West Cramlington Coal Co. emerge as a product of a series of 
mergers. Thus, for instance, Lamb and partners' original Cramlington 
venture developed into the Cramlington Coal Co., operating the 
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'Amelia', 'Hartford', and 'Lamb', pits and in 1898 it acquired the 
adjacent West Cramlington colliery then joined forces with the 
Backworth Colliery Co., itself the product of a merger. At the turn 
of the century this expanded Cramlington Coal Co. merged with the 
Seaton Delaval Coal Co. to form the Hartley Main Colliery Ltd which 
existed until nationalisation in 1947. 
Likewise, by the early 1900's the Cowpen and North Seaton Coal 
Co. had come under the umbrella of the Mickley Coal Co. Ltd which, as 
well as owning a mine at West Wylam, controlled the Cowpen Coal Co. 
Ltd, the Hazlerigg and Burradon Coal Co. Ltd, the Acomb Coal Co. Ltd, 
and William Benson and Son Ltd. 
What is significant is the continuity of family ownership and 
direction, despite changes in capitalist form. The Colliery Year Book 
for 1946, therefore, lists three members of the Cookson family on the 
board of directors of the Mickley Coal Co., including the chairman and 
managing director, Mr. Clive Cookson, all being descendants of the 
origit:Ial speculators in the Cowpen mines, John and William Isaac 
Cookson. With reference to the Hartley l-'ain Colliery Ltd, the 1946 
Year Book lists as a director a Mr. R.A. Lamb, a great grandson of 
Joseph Lamb, one of the first owners of the Cramlington Collieries. 
A number of elements can be drawn out from the preceding 
comments. The leasing of Cowpen colliery in 1836 by Sir Matthew White 
Ridley rather than putting up fresh capital was symptomatic of a wider 
process of withdrawal from the coal trade by the landed aristocracy. 
The Duke of Northumberland, for example, was both a direct producer/ 
employer and also used sub-contractors to work his mines. By 1799 all 
his collieries were out to lessees and the Duke never entered the 
colliery business again. The Delavals, after 1756, ran their own 
collieries through sub-contractors but the mines were leased out after 
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the death of Lord Delaval in 1807. The Marquess of Bute sank the 
Tanfield colliery in 1829 but sold it to the Joiceys in 1847. The 
Grand Allies, Lords Ravensworth, Strathmore and Wharncliffe had still 
been active colliery proprietors in the 1840's but had sold out by 
1860. 
By 1869 it seems that only 5% of the collieries in England were 
owned and managed by landowners, (6) the notable exceptions being Lord 
Londonderry and the Earl of Durham. In general, landowners were 
ceasing to be an important source of mining capital as outside capital 
became more plentiful and the costs of sinking newer, deeper pits 
rose. By the 1860's it was the Lambs, Joiceys, Strakers and Cooksons 
who were running the collieries of the North East. Many of these men 
had started out as merchants, moved on into coal and other 
manufacturing industry and now put their profits into landed estates. 
The landed aristocrats, such as the Duke of Northumberland and 
Sir Matthew White Ridley, while taking a back seat, still drew 
substantial and increasing income from royalty and way leave rents. 
For example the Duke of Northumberland's mineral income grew from 
£3000 in 1800 to over £20,000 in 1820 reaching £25,000 p.a. by the end 
of the 1850's and expanding again in the middle of the 1880's.(?) At 
this level it was not quite a quarter of his farm rents. 
COLLECTIVE CAPITAL AND TIIE EARLY ORGANISATION OF TIIE COAL TRADE 
A consideration of biography can tell us something about the 
organisation of the coal trade. However, organisation can also be 
understood as a form of class action. In the latter half of the 17th 
century a Nicholas Ridley, coal owner and merchant, was admitted to 
the company of Hostmen in Newcastle upon Tyne. This company, 
originating in the Middle Ages, performed the function of entertaining 
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merchant strangers and supervising the sale and purchase of their 
merchandise. By 1600 it was the big coal owners who controlled both 
the company and the nn.micipal government of Newcastle. The coal 
owners then used the company as an instrument for excluding potential 
entrants into the field of mining. Secondly, it was the means by 
which the coal owners protected themselves from the disastrous results 
of unbridled competition within their own ranks by agreeing and 
allocating quotas in order to regulate output. With the demise of the 
company the mine owners sought new means and methods to mitigate 
competition and maintain profit. By the 1720's a coal owners' combine 
had been formed. This organisation excluded new entrants to the field 
by buying up coal land and way-leave leases, blocking off the coal 
property they could not buy from river outlets and paying other coal 
owners to leave their mines idle. At the same time the old attempts 
at regulating prices and output by the use of quotas continued. For 
example, in 1747 Richard Ridley is writing; 
"In order to bring the several persons concerned in the 
coal trade into Regulation as to Price and Measure it was 
necessary that everyone should fix a settled proportion 
of his share of the delivery, which delivery should 
always be in proportion, so that when any one exceeded 
what was set for him and another fell short, the person 
over, agreed to forbear selling any more till the short 
was brought up; at the beginning of January my Staiths 
were full and I loaded several ships, which threw me so 
far forward that I have been obliged to stop three weeks 
entirely and for another three weeks have delivered only 
between three and four hundred chaldrons weekly." (8) 
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When all else failed mixed coal was sold as best coal or prices 
slashed in order to drive weaker competitors out of business. 
Despite the existence of a coal owners' syndicate, there is no 
evidence to show that regulation existed during the years 1750 to 
1771. This lapse of regulation was associated with the expansion of 
the coal market and increasing demand for coal. In such cirCUill.Stances 
there was no need for formal regulation. HOwever, with the expansion 
of productive capacity production soon caught up with and surpassed 
demand, leading to complaints of excessive competition. Once again, 
therefore, the coal owners moved to regulate coal production. From 
1772 to 1845, with direction given by an employers' association known 
as the United Committee of the Coal trade, regulation was constantly 
being formed, allowed to collapse and reformed under the pressures of 
competition, market demand and the owners' own failure to agree 
quotas. The regulation, known as the "Limitation of the Vend" had, by 
1845 collapsed under the weight of various forces, both internal and 
external. Internally, colliery coal quotas were fixed on the size of 
the undertaking. Therefore there was always the temptation to enlarge 
plants at the expense of other producers. The consequence of this was 
highlighted by the report of the 1836 Committee of Enquiry into the 
Coal Trade. It notes that; 
"the pits sunk, and the machinery upon them are capable 
of affording easily double the quantity at present 
worked."(9) 
Secondly, the coming of the railways, despite opposition from 
the Tyne and Wear coal owners, opened up the inland coal measures both 
in Durham, Northumberland and other coal fields. From 1829 to 1876 
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new collieries streamed into the association at a faster rate than 
sales increased and the process was much accelerated after 1836. As 
one observer remarked; 
"the old collieries have in fact been obliged to 
surrender about 50% of their quantity in order to make 
room for new ones.". (lO) 
Lastly, with the railways providing access to other sources of 
supply, the economic basis for the Limitation, namely complete control 
of the London and East Coast markets began to dissolve. The 
"Economist" of 1845 greeted the end of the Limitation with 
satisfaction hailing it a victory for free trade. The price of coal 
it concluded; 
"will now be settled by fair and honourable competition, 
instead of, as heretofore, arbitrarily and with only a 
vague reference to the great laws of supply and 
· demand ... (U) 
Yet the end of the Limitation was merely an interlude before an 
era of increasing combination in the coal trade. Moreover, the 
collapse of the Limitation did not eliminate the need to make a profit 
nor did it mean that coal was ceasing to be profitable. Coal 
continued to be an attractive source of profit, indicated by the fact 
that investment in the collieries on Tyne and Wear increased from £2 
million to £14 million between 1830 and 1860. Consequently the 
lifestyle of the coal owner was one of opulence, built on and 
reflecting the profits to be had from coal. For example, by the time 
of his death in 1834 John Buddle' s estates and coal interests at 
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Benwell and Wallsend were valued at £150,000 while Joseph and John 
Strakers' estates were valued at £300,000 and £919,000 respectively 
with William Cookson's estate valued at £592,000. Therefore the much 
voiced complaints from the coal owners that the returns on mining 
investment were inadequate needs to be treated with some scepticism. 
Indeed, given the coal owners' periodic attempts to reduce pitmen' s 
wages and their concern to mollify prevailing free trade sentiment, 
they had a vested interest in understating the profits to be had from 
coal trade. 
I have noted the involvement of the aristocracy in the coal 
trade. An involvement which provided the basis for the accumulation 
of wealth, the acquisition of power and the elaboration of a cultural 
hegemony. It is to these images of power and authority that I now 
want to turn. 
IMAGE'S OF POWER 
At his death in 184 7 the body of the Duke of Northumberland went 
by road from Alnwick Castle to Gateshead Station and then by special 
train to London for burial in Westminster Abbey. National and local 
newspapers described the scene as follows; 
"On the news of his death all the tradesmen in Alnwick at 
once partially closed their shops, and when the funeral 
procession passed through Newcastle a week later the 
streets were lined and all the shops closed. In this 
procession can be seen the county and Northumberland 
·. tenantry bidding farewell to their feudal chief. A mile 
outside Alnwick on the southward road the column halted 
and the townspeople and household staff dismissed; two 
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miles further on the motmted tenantry fell away. The 
reduced party of notabilities from the estate staff and 
the comptroller of the household passed streets lined 
with people at Felton and Morpeth on their way, and seven 
hours later reached the Town Moor at Newcastle where a 
full procession was again formed. This now included the 
Mayor and Corporation and many other gentlemen on 
horseback, and still more on foot, including the 
connnittees of the various charities which the Duke had 
supported. The tenantry of the southern parts of his 
estate were marshalled in a military fashion according to 
their bailiwicks, each mounted column under the command 
of its own bailiff, and the whole accompanied the column 
to Gateshead station. There would be no mistaking the 
ducal style of this. An inner coffin of french-polished 
figured mahogany lined with padded white silk and lace 
was encased in a lead coffin; over this was an outer 
coffin of oak covered with rich crimson Genoa silk 
velvet, emblazoned with the Percy arms in gold plate, and 
provided with eight coroneted handles and coffin nails 
also in gold plate."(l2) 
The expense of this ftmeral must certainly have been considerable but 
a minor sum compared with the money the next Duke was prepared to 
lavish on the reconstruction of the family seat of Alnwick castle. 
This work, when finished in 1866, made Alnwick into the "Windsor" of 
the North and was completed at a cost of £320,000. The architects 
received £14,000 and the Italian artists and carvers £17,000. The 
main building contractors received £225,000 while £20,000 was spent on 
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mechanical equipment including steam closets, hydraulic lifts and gas 
fittings. At the peak of activity over eight hundred workmen were 
employed and entertained at a works dinner held every year at a cost 
of four shillings and sixpence per head. 
A local newspaper offered a graphic account of the new kitchens, 
noting now contrivances and gadgets adopted from the technology of 
industry and mining had been incorporated into the design. The 
newspaper reporting on the kitchens said; 
"They are planned in the Gothic style ... It surprises 
the beholder that so grand a piece of architecture could 
be designed in these generate days. A huge baron of beef 
weighing three hundred weight and numerous other joints 
were before the principal range all on spits turned by a 
water wheel. The screen before the fire is of a size, 
and possesses culinary contrivances and architectural 
features alone sufficient to confer celebrity on any 
architect. Not only is water power applied to the 
rotation of pits, but mechanical devices are used in 
other ways. Hydraulic presses hoist with steady power 
the coals from the vaults below, and lift the viands from 
the kitchen to the galleries which lead to the banqueting 
hall. Corrnnunicating with the main kitchen are separate 
pantries for the reception of butcher meat, fish, cold 
meat, stock, pastry and other edibles." (l3) 
When the Duke was not upgrading Alnwick Castle he was attending 
to his town house in London or advising on the administration of his 
town house in the Strand. By the mid 18th century, the Alnwick estate 
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office was the centre of the most advanced practice in estate 
administration, involving the management of a considerable labour 
force working on the estate and castle. 
The Duke sat at the apex of the aristocratic establishment in 
Nortlnnnberland but he was not the only powerful aristocrat. On 
retiring as a member of parliament for Newcastle after thirty eight 
years, covering eight successive parliaments, the Newcastle burgesses 
in thanking Sir Matthew White Ridley for the protection of their 
liberties agreed that the constituency should pass to Sir Matthew's 
son. 
The announcement of Sir Matthew's retirement from all public 
office did not pass without ceremony. The Newcastle Gazette of 1824 
noted that; 
"The Corps of the Newcastle Loyal Associated Volunteer 
Infantry having voted that a magnificent piece of plate 
should be presented to him, as a token of the high 
estimation in which they held his conduct as their 
connnanding officer, a splendid silver vase, nearly two 
feet high, of an elegant Etruscan form, the sides 
ornamented with military trophies, and the arms of the 
Ridleys, the cover surmounted by a female figure, 
representing the town of Newcastle, and the whole valued 
at £350, was presented to him, August 31, 1812, on which 
day the regiment assembled in Pilgrim Street, and from 
thence marched to the Town Moor, attended by a great 
concourse of people ••• " (14) 
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The Literary Gazette goes on to say that; 
"The regiment then greeted Sir Matthew with cheers in 
which they were joined by the great assembly, which the 
occasion and the fineness of the day, had drawn together. 
The regiment then wheeled back into line, when they fired 
a 'feu de joi', the guns on the castle at the same time 
firing a salute. The ceremony of presentation concluded 
by the regiment advancing in line, and making a general 
salute. Before the regiment was dismissed, Sir Matthew 
generously presented each company with ten guineas, to 
regale themselves on the occasion. In the latter part of 
the day a magnificent dinner was served up in the 
Assembly Rooms, to the officers, and a large party of 
visitors, making in all one hnndred and thirty two." (l5) 
On the 16th April, Sir Matthew died while visiting his London 
home in Portland Place. His body was brought back to Newcastle and 
interred in the family vault in St. Nicholas Church. Yet even in 
death Sir Matthew was determined to be remembered having instructed 
that a monument to his memory be erected in the nave of the church. A 
report of the time describes the scene as follows; 
"This beautiful monument displays in very high relief a 
full length figure of the deceased, as large as life, 
dressed in a Roman Toga, and standing in a graceful and 
dignified attitude. His right hand rests upon an altar 
or pedestal, and grasps a scroll; at the foot of the 
pedestal lies a volume, inscribed 'Magna Carta', behind 
the figure is seen a curile chair, nnderneath which are 
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placed the fasces and scales, in allusion to the 
senatorial and magisterial fnnctions of the deceased, 
whilst a military standard, on top of which is a lion, is 
seen leaning against the pedestal; above the standard 
hangs a shield charged with the family arms 
top of all this is placed a helmet."(16) 
At the 
Sir Matthew was succeeded by his eldest son, the third baronet. 
Like his father he had attended Westminster School, then Oxford, 
finishing his education with a grand tour of Europe. On his return he 
settled in Heaton, Newcastle, running the family business of 
collieries, glass works, a bank, the Port of Blyth and the family 
estates. Following his father's death, he moved from Heaton to 
Blagdon Hall and in 1827 disposed of his Portland Place house, buying 
up another London site in Carlton House Terrace and building a much 
grander residence designed by Nash at a cost of £15,000. The third 
baronet had ten children. Two of these, Sarah and Janetta, were later 
to marry into the Cookson family, Sarah marrying John Cookson in 1837 
and Janetta marrying William Isaac Cookson in 1843. Past business 
links had existed between the families when William Cookson's.father 
was· a short term partner in the Ridley bank. Now marriage was to 
strengthen and reinforce these links. By the 1860's the two Cookson 
brothers had become the dominant partners in the Cowpen collieries 
after the collieries had been relinquished by Lord Ridley in 1838. 
With the passing of the third baronet in 1836 his son, another 
Matthew White Ridley, inherited the title. Again he followed the well 
worn path of Westminster School, then Oxford, and the grand tour, 
eventually marrying Cecilia, daughter of Baron Wensleydale. Some 
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sense of their lifestyle and outlook can be gleaned from Cecilia's 
surviving letters. On taking up residence at Blagdon she writes; 
"They are capital rooms and a great many of them and the 
house is very convenient and contains a greater number of 
chests of drawers and wardrobes than any place I ever 
saw. The best room is the dining room which is very 
handsome and has some beautiful pictures, as all the 
rooms have. The other three sitting rooms are all 
carpeted and curtained with red, plenty of nice tables 
and sofas about and very comfortable •••••••••• I am in 
the saloon at this moment writing. It has a high coved 
ceiling, very handsome and . three long French windows 
· opening into a sort of outer room with a stone floor and 
windows partly of coloured glass. 
portico there are plants and statues 
In this sort of 
I have 
not ordered dinner today and shall probably not 
tomorrow. " ( 17) 
While the house and its contents are an object of discussion, 
the servants also come under the gaze and judgement of the mistress; 
"Pearson is a tall man with a drabbish hair and skin, 
holds himself gracefully and walks well, his manner is 
good and he seems to know his place. He was a footmen to 
Lord de Grey and I think I recollect his face." (18) 
With a small army of servants to cook and clean and order the 
household and gardens, the mistress was freed to indulge in a social 
life of visiting and receiving friends, attending parties, arranging 
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shopping trips to Newcastle and musing upon the manners of 
acquaintances. Following a party at Ravensworth Castle we are told 
that; 
"All Northumberland and Durham were there and some of 
London besides, to the number I should think, of five 
hundred or more Dinner.was in the library for the 
Royal party and in the drawing room and dining from for 
all the rest. Two narrow tables in each room, the whole 
length. Lord Hardwick gave all the toasts and they were 
repeated in the drawing room." (19) 
On returning from a visit to Meldon, the Cookson family residence, 
Cecilia remarks that; 
"I enjoyed myself at Meldon and was glad to be there and 
make friends with my sister Cookson. She is a sensible 
amiable woman and wonderful considering her education 
••• but not a person of much cultivation." (20) 
While after a party Cecilia concludes that her sister-in-law; 
"was out of her own set and appeared to great 
disadvantage." (2l) 
All these remarks indicate that the world of the northern aristocracy 
was a well circumscribed one in which manners and cultivation helped 
mark out status and place distinctions. The rising bourgeoisie such 
as the Cooksons and Strakers, while wealthy and influential and able 
to associate freely with the aristocracy could, on occasion, still be 
seen as "out of their set". 
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By virtue of her class, Cecilia was certainly privileged but her 
gender meant that she fell under the sway of patriarchy. The 
practical effect of patriarchy was first to privilege certain spheres 
of activity as women's work. Cecilia was therefore responsible for 
entertaining and overseeing the management of the household. 
Secondly, patriarchy defined what constituted wifely qualities so that 
refinement, cultivation and the ability to converse were expected of 
an aristocratic wife. 
With Cecilia having her own important areas of activity, Sir 
Matthew's primary concern was the oversight of his estates. He also 
managed to indulge his favourite sport of pheasant shooting, buying a 
grouse moor in North Northumberland and hunting three days a week 
. . 
during the season. ·Like many. other aristocrats he found time to 
. patrorlise the arts, spending thousands of pounds on works commissioned 
from a local Newcastle sculptor. 
However, it was Sir Matthew's position as a major land owner and 
Member of Parliament for North Northumberland that gave him the right 
to speak on the education of the labouring classes. Therefore in 1870 
we find him saying that; 
"In this industrial phase of society as it has been 
called by a foreign philosopher there can be no end more 
important for the good of the conmnmi ty than the doing of 
good work; and there can be nothing which does so much 
good to a man as that he should thoroughly . master 
principles, so that when he is at work he should know not 
only what to do, but why it is done, and, should be able, 
if circumstances required him, to vary his work, and pass 
without difficulty to some other kindred branch of his 
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employment. A man so taught is a better man and a more 
useful citizen: he is well educated both for his own good 
and that of his master and the corrnmmity. It is not his 
head alone that the labourer is to live; it is no use to 
take a boy and give him a great deal of careful 
instruction in something he will never require, and which 
will fade out of mind in afterlife. Let him acquire 
those principles, and that sort of learning which he will 
be able to make use of when he is a man, which will be 
perpetually recurring to his mind in the course of the 
labour for which he destines himself, and which cannot 
fail to exercise on improving influence upon his 
performance of the work which occupies his time and 
thought, and to which, if he be a thoroughly good 
workman, he would wish to give a real and hearty service. 
When asked then 'why do you want to educate the 
labourer?' one answer will be because good education, 
practically directed, makes good work, and good work is 
an excellent thing for society, and an elevating 
influence on the character of the workman. Such an 
object is in itself worth making an effort for It 
follows that education will raise the value of labour 
and that the labourer should earn more money only by 
performing labour of greater value to his employer." (22) 
What we have here is a statement in favour of strict vocational 
·education, which at the same time allows for a degree of labour 
flexibility. Behind vocationalism is an assumption that people are to 
be fitted into pre-ordained slots for life. Allied to this is a rigid 
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utilitarian conception of education which stresses the learning of 
useful knowledge. Useful knowledge being the knowledge required to 
perform a limited range of job tasks. Moreover the worker should know 
how his particular task relates to the whole operation and production 
process, and benefits wider society. This sort of knowledge, it is 
hoped, will increase worker self motivation and pride in the job. 
Education is, therefore, about increasing the value of labour, making 
the worker more useful for capital and about producing better 
citizens. Crucially Sir Matthew's statement picks up on working class 
concerns about craft pride and a practical component to education but 
turns these concerns into a set of constraints. 
More generally Sir Matthew's remarks are underpinned by a taken-
for-granted assumption that he has a natural right to connnent upon and 
influence the subjective formation of the working class. An 
assumption which was both a shared and defining characteristic of the 
ruling class and middle class 19th century reformers. This is not to 
say that capital was or is always united in its dealings with labour. 
In this context, Sir Matthew's connnents can be seen both as an 
intervention in the class struggle and within the ruling block. 
Within the class struggle over education there is a degree of 
coincidence of interest. Learning and having a skill is an important 
and necessary achievement for labour while capital needs a varying 
proportion of skilled workers. However, insofar as education is about 
acquiring a skill and little more, then it is education structured for 
capital. More radical notions current in the 19th century expressed 
very different ideas about working class education. At least four 
themes dominated. First, education should be self organised and 
provided by the working class itself. Second, it should be broad and 
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deference. Calculated precisely because they were highly public and 
visible acts. In this respect, these charitable actions hark back to 
the elaborate ceremonial at the second Baronet's retirement from 
public life, the public giving of money to the regiment, the funeral 
ritual and the monument depicting Ridley as a Roman patrician. All 
profoundly visible and widely reported displays bound up with 
eliciting deference. 
In drawing upon the imagery of classical antiquity the Ridleys 
were also saying something about how they understood the world. It 
was clearly a world of cultivated masters and uncultured lower orders 
of whom the first requirement was that they should know their place. 
Behind the gates and high walls surrounding their considerable 
mansions, the aristocracy and coal owners were sealed off and defended 
from the outside world. Indeed, with their vegetable and landscaped 
gardens, stables and valuable statuary, expensive paintings, ornaments 
and silver collections they had a great deal to defend. Once outside 
the walls their coachmen, servants and bailiffs shielded them from the 
connnon people. Meeting the working class largely occurred in the 
formalities of the bench, on ritualised occasions or during organised 
displays of patronage. When the working class was thought of at all 
it was in terms of a "foreign body" to be investigated, categorised, 
feared, controlled, disciplined, punished, improved, encouraged or in 
certain deserving cases helped with a little charity. The common 
denominator in all this being that the working class was something to 
be acted upon. 
A number of points can be .noted from the . preceding sections. 
The fact that since 1750 one member of the Ridley family has followed 
another into Parliament, often being elected for the same constituency 
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of Newcastle or North Northumberland. The Ridley willingness to speak 
on national issues such as working class education. The ritualistic 
displays and evocations and the grand imposing architecture of 
aristocratic mansions. All this proclaims a stability and self 
confident style, a habit of managing things, people and threats to 
dominance. A habit and style in which the great were tutored from 
birth • Think, for instance, of the generations of Ridleys going from 
public school to Oxford. Learning not only academic subjects but also 
acquiring a sense of themselves as being born to rule. And rule in 
Parliament the landed aristocracy certainly did, right up to the 
middle of the 19th century, only being displaced by electoral reform 
and business interests. But this displacement of the landed 
aristocracy as the dominant interest did not mean the disappearance of 
the aristocracy. The landed interest remained as a political force, 
well entrenched in the Lords and at county level. MOreover, by the 
turn of the century many individual aristocrats and landowners 
remained in Parliament as Conservative members and by theri were taking 
on or extending business interests rather than simply remaining 
landowners and rentiers. For example, the first Viscount Ridley 
(1842-1904) became Home Secretary from 1895 to 1900 while his son, Sir 
Jasper Ridley (1887-1951), held extensive banking and insurance 
interests, although the first Viscount still had an eye on property, 
buying the village of Stannington from the Earl of Carlisle in 1900. 
The third Viscount Ridley (1902-1964) was Chairman of the Consett Iron 
Company and a director of the Newcastle and Gateshead Gas Company. He 
was also involved in insurance and banking and was Chairman of 
Northumberland County Council from 1941 to 1946 and again from 1949 to 
1952.<24 ) 
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COAL OWNERS AND COAL COMBINES IN NORTHUMBERLAND 
I have touched on the family connections between the Ridleys and 
the Cooksons and noted that in 1858 John and William Isaac Cookson 
became partners in the Cowpen Collieries. I now want to consider the 
Cooksons a little further, firstly because they illustrate a 
manufacturing bourgeoisie which moves into coal yet aspires to landed 
status; secondly because an investigation of their coal interest 
highlights changing forms in the organisation of coal capital in 
particular the creation of coal combines. 
In 1743 Isaac Cookson, a significant member of the Goldsmiths 
Company, was given a lease to refining houses and an adjoining quay at 
Elswick, Newcastle, for the refining of lead and extraction of silver. 
By the 1870's the firm of W.I. Cookson and Company had become well 
established and the Cooksons had already taken their first steps 
towards diversifying from coal. However, while the main source of 
their income was mining and lead refining, it was clear that the 
Cooksons desired the. status of country gentry. As an entry in the 
Newcastle Daily Journal for instance notes; 
"In 1832, portions of the Greenwich Hospital estates in 
Northumberland were offered for sale by public auction. 
The chief portion of these estates was the manor of 
Meldon, consisting of some 2,070 acres, bringing in an 
annual rent of £2,119, and free from tithe. The Meldon 
park and estates, once forming part of the deer park of 
the Earls of Derwentwater, as was natural, excited keen 
competition. Mr. Isaac Cookson became the purchaser of 
the estate for the large sum of 56,900 guineas. In the 
same year he commissioned the rising Tyneside architect, 
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Mr. John Dobson, to design him a suitable house, which 
would be in keeping with his means and family 
connections, and at the same time make the estate a 
residence for a country gentleman. This was duly carried 
out, and there now stands perhaps the finest of the many 
noble halls designed by Mr. Dobson in this country." (25) 
Later, John Cookson, when not overseeing his lead and coal 
interests, managed to improve and extend the Meldon estate to 4,192 
acres so that it yielded more than double the rental at the time of 
purchase. 
COAL <nmiNES 
(a) The Cookson Group 
By the end of the 19th century the Mickley Coal Company had been 
formed. It controlled four other coal companies operating in 
Northumberland, namely the Cowpen Coal Company Ltd; the Hazlerigg and 
Burradon Coal Company Ltd; the Acomb Coal Company Ltd; and William 
Benson and Son Ltd. Right up to the nationalisation of the coal 
industry, three members of the Cookson family sat on the Mickley board 
of directors, with Clive Cookson acting as chairman and managing 
director. Moreover, the three Cookson directors and other members of 
the Cookson family held the largest block of shares.C26) 
Apart from the Mickley Coal Company the Cooksons had other 
financial interests in the North Walbottle Coal Company and the Seaton 
Burn Coal Company. Meanwhile, Norman Cookson, until his death in 
1909, was the chairman of the Wallsend and Hebburn Coal Company and a 
director and major shareholder in Parsons Marine Steam Turbine 
Company.C27) 
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But the Cooksons' interests went further still. Clive Cookson, 
along with Lord Ridley, appears on the 1939 board of directors of the 
Consett Iron Ore Company, thus establishing a link into the Durham 
coalfield.<28 ) The Consett Iron Ore Company in its turn is listed as 
owning eleven mines in County Durham employing 10,000 men as well as a 
steel works, coke oven and by products works at Consett.<29 ) 
Another director of the Consett Iron Ore company was Sir Cecil 
Cochrane who was also on the board of the Bolsover Colliery Company, a 
Nottingham and Derbyshire based coal company.<30) 
While the Mickley Coal Company held the largest block of shares 
in the Hazlerigg and Burradon Coal Company the second biggest 
shareholder was William Cory and Sons Ltd, a large coal merchanting 
and exporting firm from South Wales. Also, one of the directors of 
the Hazlerigg and Burradon Coal Company appeared on the board of the 
Ruabon Coal and Coke Company and Llay Main mines, both North Wales 
companies. (31 ) 
These inter-regional linkages do not, however, exhaust the scope 
and reach of the Cookson family, for both Clive Cookson and Sir Cecil 
Cochrane turn up as directors of the Consett Spanish Ore Company Ltd, 
a company with substantial interests in the Orconera Iron Ore Company 
Ltd, a Spanish mining company. For its part Orconera was jointly 
owned by the Consett Iron Ore Company through its subsidiary Consett 
Spanish Ore and by Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds Ltd, a large South 
Wales coal, iron and steel combine.< 32) 
Meanwhile the Cooksons lead and antimony business did not stay 
static with Cookson anq Company, being transferred in 1922 to Cookson 
Lead and Antimony Company and in 1930 forming part of the much larger 
group of Goodlass and Wall, becoming in the 1960's the Lead Industries 
Group.<33) 
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Throughout all these changes in capital form, the Cooksons 
remained central. Roland Cookson, for example, became chairman of the 
Lead Industries Group in 1962 by which time the company was just 
outside the top one hundred British companies by turnover. In 1955 he 
was appointed a director of the Consett Iron ·Ore Company Ltd and 
became chairman from 1964 until nationalisation · in 1967. His other 
interests included a directorship of the North East Electricity Supply 
Company until its nationalisation in 1947 and in 1964 a directorship 
of Lloyds Bank Ltd, becoming chairman of its Northern Regional Board 
in 1966. C34 ) 
The Cookson group was not alone in constituting a major coal 
combine in the Northumberland coalfield. Two other groups are worth 
mentioning, namely the Priestman-Joicey group and the Furness-Gainford 
group. 
(b) The Priesbnan/ Joicey Group 
The chief company in the Priestman Joicey Group was the 
Ashington Coal Company with members of both the Priestman and Milburn 
families being the major shareholders and directors. (35 ) It was 
linked through the Priestman family to two other Northumberland Coal 
companies, Priestman Collieries Ltd, operating seven pits, and J .L. 
Priestman Ltd. 
The Priestmans also had share interests in the Elswick Coal 
Company which in turn provided directorial links to the Stella Coal 
Co. , the Throckley Coal Company and the Walls end and Hebburn Coal 
Company Ltd. Likewise their major shareholding in the Hartley Main 
Collieries brought them into alliance with the principal shareholder, 
James A. Joicey, and lesser shareholders such as the Lambs.C 36) Later 
a marriage would bring the Joicey family into a working partnership 
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with the Dickinsons, a Newcastle firm of solicitors. (37) It was 
through the Dickinson firm that coal profits and compensation monies 
would be funnelled into the property and finance sector enabling, 
among other things, the building of Cramlington New Town in the 
1960's. 
(c) 'lbe Furness/Ga.inford Group 
The last and least significant combine operating in 
Northumberland was the Furness Gainford Group. It does, however, 
illustrate the links, both directorial and financial, which had been 
established with the iron, steel and shipbuilding interests of 
Viscount Furness. The chief l.mit of this group was the Broomhill 
Collieries :Ltd., operating two pits. The chairman of Broomhill was 
Viscount Furness who was also chairman of the South Durham Steel and 
Iron Company Ltd. <38) This company in turn controlled Cargo Fleet 
Iron Company, manufacturers of steel rails. However, the Viscount's 
coal interests did not stop at Northumberland for he was the chairman 
of Weardale Steel, Coal and Coke, a concern operating six pits in 
County Durham.(39) Another director of Broomhill was Lord Gainford, 
for a time the deputy chairman of the Durham Coalowners' Association 
and a prominent figure in electricity undertakings in the south of 
England. 
Other companies linked to Broomhill by directorate connections 
included the Wingate Coal Company of Durham, the Easington Coal 
Company, the New Brancepeth Colliery Company and the Trimdon Coal 
Company, all Durham based companies.(40) 
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In the case of Broomhill close arrangements clearly existed 
between coal, iron and steel enabling transfer pricing from coal to 
steel producers, thus disguising coal profits. 
CAPITAL AND LABOUR 
(a) The Fonnation of a Working Class 
Prior to 1820 the area now defined as Seaton Valley was hardly 
developed at all compared with the neighbouring townships of Blyth, 
Newsham, Cowpen and Hartley. At this time the Seaton Valley area was 
mostly devoted to agriculture with some degree of 'land sale' mining. 
The specialisation of the area took place in the 19th century, 
transforming Seaton Valley into a coal production area. It was not a 
matter of a few local pits supplying a few local industries but 
significant deep mines exporting coal and dependent upon markets in 
the south of England, the Baltic and Northern Europe. In terms of a 
space economy, South East Northumberland in the 19th century 
represents a sub-region operating as a functional unit within a 
national and international economy largely dependent on coal as the 
major energy source. 
While local capitalists raised capital and opened pits and 
regional coal owners moved into the area, land owners such as Lord 
Ridley at Cramlington and Blyth, the Duke of Northumberland at 
Earsden, Backworth and Holywell, Lord Hastings at Seaton Delava1, 
Seghill and New Hartley and the Duke of Portland at Ashington, leased 
land to the coal companies. But without labour no coalfield and no 
coal commodity production could come into being. Therefore throughout 
the 19th century South East Northumberland, Blyth and Ashington became 
locations for the concentration of labour, with census statistics 
indicating that the population of the area increases as mines develop. 
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Cramlington for example, increases from a population of 330 in 1821 to 
5,745 in 1881; Seaton Delaval from a population of 271 in 1831 to 4096 
in 1891 and Ashington from a population of 519 in 1851 to 10,000 in 
1898, with a coal company labour force of 3,500. 
(b) From Total Control to Incorporation 
Unlike workers in engineering or cotton, the work experience of 
the miner did not, at least up to 1914, depend to any great degree 
upon scientific improvement or technological advance. This in part 
reflected the employers' unwillingness or inability to invest. Indeed 
the industrial villages of the mining industry are the usual location 
given to the 'pre-industrial' practices of coerced labour, truck, 
· penal discipline and so· on. A comprehensive picture of these mining 
connmmities can be gained by looking at the reports of the Mines 
Inspectorate from the 1840's onwards. 
The central feature which emerges from these reports is that the 
so-called pre-industrial practices. were actually the reverse - that 
is, open and considered attempts to enforce and maintain a total 
industrial discipline. Truck, for example, was more to do with 
obtaining and holding on to labour than with profit. A "tormny shop" 
manager claiming that; 
"Without a store we could not get many of our men to 
attend work, before we had one they got advances in cash 
daily from the office, got drunk and kept their families 
starving."C4l) 
Otherwise truck was justified in terms of controlling drinking habits, 
either by restricting the availability of alcohol, or at least by 
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cutting down the time lost by providing it 1 on the spot 1 or in set 
amounts per week. Truck meshed in with a system of fines at source, 
with employers claiming that this was the only method of enforcing 
discipline and achieving quality. Another fonn of control was the 
employers right to "arrest wages" so that if a local trader had a debt 
with an employee, he could ask the employer to deduct a weekly sum to 
be paid directly to him. The other side . of this coin being that 
employers attempted to coerce striking workers back to work by 
insisting that local traders stop the giving of credit. Lord 
Londonderry is noted for this tactic but according to WelbourneC4Z) he 
was then widely imitated by other employers. When all else failed 
blackleg labour was imported, for example from Ireland, from Cornwall 
and from the workhouse, in order to break strikes. Then there was the 
widespread use of selective victimisation and the blacklisting of 
strike leaders who then found it impossible to get work in the 
locality. 
Apart from truck, the miner until 1871 was legally bound to his 
employer, usually for a period of one year when the bond came up for 
renewal. Welbourne gives a graphic description of the bond and the 
signing procedure; 
"Every April the manager of each colliery read aloud to 
his assembled men the terms of service for the coming 
year. The bond which the men were required to sign was a 
long document • • • It opened with a description of the 
manner of working and a statement of the hewing and 
putting prices. Clause after clause followed until no 
matter seemed to be left open for dispute. From the 
demand that the hewers should at need undertake work of 
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any kind the clauses turned to such trivialities as the 
restraints on keeping dogs and pigeons in colliery 
houses." Moreover; "the reading of the bond contract was 
done in a hurried, unmeaning manner •••• while at bonding 
time officials were wise enough to put on their most 
affable ·manner meanwhile beer in abundance washed 
down any dislike of the proposals and the offer of a 
guinea to the first man who signed the bond ensured a 
rush at the opening of the office door." (43) 
However, these sweet stuff tactics, employed to encourage the signing 
of the bond, were often of only momentary success. 
Yet another weapon in the employers arsenal was the use of mass 
evictions during labour disputes. This followed from the fact that 
the employer was usually the landlord and local magistrate. But the 
power to determine the character and allocation of the housing stock 
had other insidious effects. For example, the type of housing 
provided reflected the status at work, reinforcing divisions within 
the coomrunity while housing itself could be used to influence 
behaviour. In this regard FynesC44 ) notes that during a strike at 
Cramlington in 1865 a few of the strikers returned to work, lured by 
the promise of a deputy's place with "its upstannen wage and dooble 
house in Quality Raa". 
Like truck, the provision of housing helped to maintain and keep 
labour, but in a dependent position. Most companies provided 
accommodation to married men only. In the northern counties housing 
was customarily rent free and marriage or "settling down" not only 
secured a home but in many districts also a pay rise. The rise in pay 
partly a recognition of the lack of female employment. Clearly what 
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was being encouraged was a family unit, dependent at some stage in the 
family life cycle on the single male wage. The hope being that this 
would produce a "responsible workman", less likely to take industrial 
action because of family connnitments and the threat of eviction not 
only of himself but of his family. 
Despite these systems and strategies of pervasive control, 
worker resistance .did take place. At the root of the conflict was, on 
the one hand, employers' attempts to reduce wages, alter, ignore or 
dispute the terms of the bond or otherwise interfere in working 
practices. On the other hand, the miners tried to at best increase or 
maintain their wages or at worst limit any wage decrease while at the 
same time defending working practices and areas of autonomy. All this 
class action was played out against the background of a market for 
coal over which neither the employers, after the collapse of the 
limitation of the vend, nor the men, had any real control and whose 
fluctuations each responded to. 
Yet a reading of both Fynes and Welbourne indicates that a 
defining characteristic of trade unionism in Northumberland and Durham 
was its defensiveness. This conservatism in turn had its roots in the 
. 
upholding of custom and practice as a way of maintaining certainty 
over the regulation of effort to wages. Consequently the unions' main 
purpose was the defence of agreements and a defensive reaction to 
innovation. Even cavilling, the miners self-managed practice of 
rotating work places by a random allocation in order to even out 
wages, can be seen as a democratic sharing out of the fluctuations of 
the market. In other words, rather than establishing a minimum wage 
to which additions could be made, cavilling accepted the logic of 
market forces while attempting to ameliorate its worst effects. 
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Broadly, the early historical trajectory of Northumberland 
Miners' Uhion is marked by a break around the late 1860's. Prior to 
this date the Uhion had twice been formed and twice collapsed after 
the strikes of 1832 and 1844. In both instances the employers had 
used every power at their disposal including the filling of pit 
villages with police and special constables, the widespread use of 
eviction, the exclusion of miners and their families from workhouse 
relief and the use of nnnour and disinformation. (45) 
With the formation of the Miners' Permanent Relief Fund in 1862 
and the Northt.nnberland and Durham Miners' Mutual Confident Association 
in 1863, the stage was set for the emergence of a moderate union 
leadership who attempted to limit industrial unrest. Certainly the 
defeats of past unions in lost strikes was a powerful inducement to 
moderation but moderation's material basis lay in the fact that 
limited gains were possible. As long as gains occurred moderation and 
its spokesmen became legitimized. 
Various pointers signify the new relationship between the 
employers and the union. The ending of the bond system in 1871 is 
followed by the formation of a Joint Committee of miners' leaders and 
coal owners. At a more symbolic level there was the building of a 
hall for lodge meetings by a Newcastle coal master. 
It was through the Joint Committee that both the wage advances 
of 1871-2 and the reductions of 1875 were negotiated, with the miners 
executive at tempting to 'police' the agreements. According to 
Welbourne(46) this system of deciding wages ended because it "excited 
too keen an interest amongst the men and provoked serious discontent". 
Its successor, the sliding scale, had two important consequences; 
firstly, it removed direct responsibility for wages from the union, 
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and secondly, it established the principle that prices rather than any 
custom or agreement govern wages. Like cavilling, the tieing of wages 
to prices via a sliding scale was an acceptance of the logic of market 
forces. However the sliding scale mechanism was not a substitute for 
the Joint Committee but rather an addition to it, the terms of the 
scale still having to be jointly agreed. 
The change of emphasis from confrontation to the incorporation 
of union officialdom at a county level in both Northumberland and 
Durham is therefore apparent. Looking back for example, Welbourne 
notes that; 
"In 1869 men were being dismissed their work, for 
spreading the principles of combination. In 1872, 
the union had met in formal friendly conference 
with the masters. A joint committee had been formed 
to settle disputes on pay and hours, and conditions 
of work, a committee to which men and management alike 
appealed. " ( 4 7) 
(c) Politics and Ideology in the Northnmberlaod Coalfield in the 
·late 19th Century 
The most obvious feature of the union leadership after 1865 was 
its rejection of a class model of society. The union leaderships of 
both Northumberland and Durham were Gladstonian Liberal and non-
conformist. In their economic views they believed that the market 
operated by laws which could not be contravened. Moreover, market 
relations were not thought of as class relations but as functional 
relations governed by the invisible hand of market forces. 
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In Northtnnberland the most prominent representative of Radical 
Liberal non-conformism was Thomas Burt, leader of the Miners Mutual 
Confident Association from 1865 to 1913 and Parliamentary Secretary to 
the Board of Trade from 1892 to 1895. The essentials of Burt's 
philosophy can be readily stated.C48 ) First, and in conjunction with 
a rejection of a class model of society, was a belief in class 
collaboration. This accorrnnodative attitude included opposition to 
strikes in principle and stressed conciliation and arbitration as a 
means of resolving differences. Burt therefore opposed the strike of 
1887, called in response to a 15% wage reduction demanded by the coal 
owners. He was also instrtnnental in setting up and developing the 
Joint Corrnnittee and the sliding scale. Lastly, the logic of a 
philosophy which saw no fnndamental conflict between capital and 
labour and laid stress on co-operation opposed the establishment of a 
separate working class party. The basis for this opposition being 
that such a party would institutionalise difference, encourage 
conflict and divide the nation. 
Just as Burt's collaborationism had practical consequences so 
too did his belief in the free working of the market. This led him to 
advocate free trade, to oppose state intervention and to disapprove of 
the early trade nnion practice of restricting output. In 1892 we 
therefore find Burt voicing opposition to the Eight-Hours Bill and, by 
taking thirty five Liberals with him into the opposition lobby, 
effectively defeat the Bill. Likewise, he opposed the policy pursued 
by the Miners' Federation of a minimum national wage. Finally, in 
supporting county unionism Burt attempted to persuade the 
Northtnnberland miners against joining the National Miners' Federation 
thereby nndermining attempts at national solidarity. 
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Burt 1 s views concerning a hannony of interests between labour 
and capital were echoed by the more progressive coal owners. In 1875 
for instance, J.W. Pease is found saying that; 
"He had never admitted and he hoped he never would admit 
that there was any opposing interest between the employer 
and the employed • • • They had their times of prosperity 
in which they had rejoiced and they had had times lately 
when the workmen 1 s remuneration had been reduced very 
considerably and when the profits of the coal owners had 
also been reduced, if not to nothing, to a very low 
figure ••• Pease and Partners had thrown open their 
rooms to the Trade Unions, believing and hoping that 
while the men were looking out for themselves they would 
look at the position of the employers and the employers 
would also try while working for themselves to look at 
the pos~tion of the men, so that employer and employed 
might go hand in hand, not only for the benefit of each 
other but for the benefit of the community at large. (49) 
Liberalism then was not only a shared ideology but a cement 
which bound both employers and county union officials in a common 
purpose. At the level of national politics the Liberals relied on men 
like Burt to carry the working class vote for the party. Moreover, 
the presence of labour in Parliament helped legitimise the State. 
Speaking to the House of Commons in March 1882 on a motion proposing 
an extension of the franchise, Gladstone clearly recognised the 
benefit to be gained from a strengthened presence of responsible 
labour; 
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"It is greatly to be desired that there should be some 
enlarged representation of Labour in the House. We have 
at present among us only two members whom we can call, in 
the strictest sense representatives of Labour. I ask the 
House whether the specimens before us, in the member for 
Stoke and the member for Morpeth (Thomas Burt) ••• I ask 
whether these two specimens are not such as· to lead us to 
desire that extension. Nothing contributes more to the 
union of all classes, to the strengthening of the 
Constitution, to making the nation one in heart and 
sentiment, and thoroughly attaching the people to their 
country, than thus to open the doors of the House of 
Connnons to the representatives of the people." ( 50) 
Also the experience of responsible labour could be drawn upon to 
influence and modify the workings of the state apparatus. Therefore 
in offering Burt the Secretaryship of the Board of Trade Gladstone 
notes that; 
"The development of the Labour Bureau and the prosecution 
of the interests connected ·with it will engage the 
attention of the Government, and open a long and broad 
perspective, and I am very glad that your place at the 
Board of Trade will supply you with a post of influence 
where your experience and ability may be made directly 
serviceable for purposes which you have so much at 
heart. " ( 51 ) 
Just what that purpose was Burt made clear when addressing the Miners' 
National Union in 1895; 
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"Everybody must see", said Burt, "that the great problem 
of the time was the reconciliation of the interests of 
Labour and Capital." (SZ) 
It was with this over-arching aim of class reconciliation in mind that 
Burt could look back on the setting up of the Joint Committee as his 
greatest achievement; 
"If it had not existed", remarked Burt, "long protracted 
strikes would have ensued."(S3) 
Even initially hostile coal owners such as R.O. Lamb when opening 
'Burt Hall' in 1895 had to admit that; 
"the greatest improvement that had taken place was the 
cordial agreement that existed between the coal owners 
and the miners."(S4) 
Yet if we allow for Burt's acconnnodating attitudes his "Radicalism" 
lay in the fact that he supported franchise extension, exposed "Old 
Corruption" and aligned himself with leading intellectuals such as 
Alfred Marshall and T.H. Green against Malthus and Ricardian 
economics. Like Green and Marshall he advocated a moralised 
capitalism and relied upon an evolutionary conception to support his 
thinking and practice. Within this moralised capitalist framework; 
"Progress would go on steadily if slowly, till the 
official distinction between workingman and gentleman had 
passed away."(SS) 
From Burt's vantage point in Parliament; 
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"Leaders of the union did not need to tramp from door to 
door and beg their bread (as they had done after the 
collapse of the 1944 strike) they sat at Westminster, 
governors of the nation."(S6) 
The position then was that after 1872 elaborate Joint Committee, 
sliding scale and arbitration arrangements came into being. These 
arrangements were under pressure at a local level from the mid 1880's 
onwards. Sometimes a coal owner abused the sliding scale by setting 
"unfair" reductions of wages below the connty average. This in turn 
provoked localised strikes which the owners responded to with 
lockouts, evictions and blacklisting. But at ·a more significant level 
the sliding scale and Joint Connnittee arrangements only worked if 
depressions were not so severe as to force the owners to make requests 
of the union leaders that the men could not tolerate. In addition the 
sliding scale had a fundamental defect. It enabled the owners to 
quote low prices in their competition for contracts and since price 
conditioned wages then wages automatically fell. The whole S)7Stem was 
inherently unstable. For example, in the midst of a depression in 
1886 the coal owners demanded a wage reduction of 15%. This move ·was 
more than the men could bear. According to the Durham Chronicle; 
"The men had been getting a little bacon for breakfast, 
and the children got the fat. With the proposed 
reduction there would be neither bacon, nor fat. .. (S7) 
In an attempt to protest at the proposed wage reduction and in order 
to back up a. demand for a 20% wage increase, the men withdraw their 
labour and a strike commenced which lasted for seventeen weeks. From 
the beginning the union leadership opposed the strike with Burt; 
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"going from colliery to colliery telling the men that 
reduction was inevitable and that concession and 
negotiation alone could make an end of the dispute".(58) 
In the end the strike was settled with the men sullenly accepting a 
12% wage reduction. 
Such episodes slowly dissolved the credibility of union 
leadership. And the effect was cumulative. Each crisis after 1890 
weakened the grip of the progressive coal owners as they were driven 
to ever more severe measures to overcome the resistance of the men to 
wage cuts. Moreover, the fact that these same coal owners were often 
prominent Liberals helped discredit the Liberal party amongst the 
miners. Indeed the actions of the masters increasingly undermined the 
Liberal trade unionists since their position depended heavily upon the 
"goodwill" of the coal owners. However the crisis of 1886/87 had 
still other consequences in that it provided the space and opportunity 
for socialist agitation and organisation in the Northumberland and 
Durham coalfields to take root. It was this organisation which slowly 
chipped away at the base of Liberal support amongst the miners in the 
years up.to the 1920's. 
(d) The Working Class Presence 
The leadership in the Northumberland coalfield from the 1860's 
onwards was solidly liberal in its ideology and practice stressing as 
it did constitutionalism and gradualism. But what of the wider 
working class? Certainly in so far as the leadership sprang from the 
working class and depended upon it for their continued position, they 
reflected sections and currents within the class. However it was 
never only a case of reflection since the leadership also attempted to 
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mould and direct the class so as to accord with their liberal 
senti.Illents. Therefore Burt regularly sent circulars arm.md the lodges 
outlining his views and requesting compliance with his 
recommendations. However, I am moving the narrative on too far. 
If we go back to March 1831 all of the miners in Northumberland 
and Durham were on strike for a general advance of wages and shorter 
hours. A meeting of 20,000 miners assembled on the Newcastle Town 
Moor. Speakers objected to the terms of the bond and to the power of 
the coal owners to evict miners from their homes. The meeting also 
discussed the injustice of being forced to remain idle at Christmas 
without compensation. In the end it was resolved to petition 
Parliament~ -to boycott .the "Ton:nny shops" ·and to .remain on strike. 
By April some pits had returned to work, but according to Fynes; 
"1, 500 miners visited these collieries in the neighbour-
hood by Blyth and Bedlington and laid the pits off work 
by various destructive devices ... (59) 
After this incident and during the course of a strike riot a number of 
pitmen broke into the house of a colliery viewer leaving a letter 
behind. It read; 
"I was at yor hoose last neet, and meyd mysel very 
comfortable. Ye hey nee family, and yor just won man on 
the colliery. I see ye hev a greet lot of rooms, and big 
cellars, and plenty wine and beer in them, which I got rna 
share on. Noo I naw some at wor colliery has three or 
fewer lads and lasses, and they live in won room not half 
as gude as yor cellar. I don't pretend to naw very much, 
but I naw there shudn' t be that much difference. The 
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only place we can gan to o the week ends is the yel hoose 
and hev a pint. I dinna pretend to be a profit, but I 
naw this, and lots a rna marrows naws te, that wer not 
tret as we owt to be, and a great filospher says, to get 
no ledge is to naw wer ignerent. But weve just begtm to 
find that oot, and ye maisters and owners may luk oot, 
for yor not gan to get se much o yor own way, we gan to 
hev some o wors now ...... (6) 
Attempts to increase wages and reduce hours provided the basis 
for collective action. But united purposive collective action was 
something which was achieved, it did not happen automatically. 
Sometimes, as we have been, the ranks split and "blackleg" miners 
returned to work only to be forced out again. At other times, as in 
1875, the Cowpen Coal Co. miners rejected the strike weapon despite a 
proposed 20% wage reduction, and then failed to agree any alternative 
grassroots action. Instead, t~ey pressed the union to accept no more 
than a 6% reduction or failing that take the matter to 
arbitration.C6l) 
But collective activity and a sense of injustice was not 
confined to the workplace nor to the miners. The feeling that "there 
shouldn't be that much difference" and that "we are not treated as we 
ought to be" was widespread, extending to the working class as a 
whole. 
For example, on Monday 11th October 1819 two months after the 
Peterloo massacre, ·an open air protest demonstration calling for 
constitutional reform was held in Newcastle. It was hoped that the 
buoyant state of the coal trade together with the threat to dismiss 
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men who attended would curtail support. In the event, from fifty to 
one hrmdred thousand people marched into Newcastle including pitmen 
from outlying villages, sailors from Srmderland and Shields, 
shoemakers and others. 
After "Radical Monday" radical "classes" were formed in all the 
surrormding villages and ports while the "Black Dwarf" could be seen; 
"in the hat crown of almost every pitman you meet".C62) 
Then according to Thompson; 
"against this Radical threat the Newcastle loyalists 
formed an armed Association. Against the armed 
Association the pitmen and forgemen began to arm in their 
turn". (63) 
However, by the end of December 1819 the Radical movement, itself a 
continuation of earlier Jacobin and Republican agitation, was in a 
state of collapse brought on by divisions. among Radical leaders and 
the repression of the Six Acts. 
By 1830 the formation of "Hepburn's Union", persistent 
restriction of output and a series of strikes in the Northern 
Coalfield represented further collective effort. But the bitterest 
opposition from the coal owners was provoked not by demands for 
improved conditions or higher wages but by restriction of output and 
by infringement of managerial control. Activities which can be.viewed 
as harbouring a latent syndicalism. The most elaborated expression of 
this syndicalism appearing in working class publications around 1833 
with a plan for a "House of Trades"; 
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"which must supply the place of the present House of 
Connnons, and direct the connnercial affairs of the 
country, according to the will of the trades which 
compose associations of the industry. This is the 
ascendancy scale by which we arrive at universal 
suffrage. It will begin in our lodges, extend to your 
general Union, embrace the management of trade, and 
finally swallow up the whole political power".(64) 
According to Thompson( 6S) this vision was lost almost as soon as it 
was elaborated. But just how widespread this vision was and how much 
momentary support it had remains an open question. Certainly no trace 
of such a vision can be found originating from the early leadership of 
Miners' Association in the northern coalfield. 
Eight years on and June 1838 saw another popular upsurge this 
time in support of the People's Charter with seventy to eighty 
thousand people assembling on Newcastle Town Moor. Many of these 
people included miners from the pit villages at Cowpen, Seaton 
Delaval, Cramlington and Sedghill. 
However the significance of Chartism was not so much its 
physical force manifestations as the fact that it shifted the focus to 
political representation rather than economic exploitation. For 
according to Gannnage; 
"the masses look on the enfranchised classes, whom they 
behold reposing on their couch of opulence, and contrast 
that opulence with the misery of their own condition. 
Reasoning from effect to cause there is no marvel that 




is the cause of our social 
The issue then is one of political exclusion and the remedy 
universal suffrage. Once universal suffrage was achieved 
representatives of the labouring classes would be in the majority in 
Parliament, 'old corruption' overthrown and economic justice prevail. 
Therefore a characteristic of Radical rhetoric is the distinction 
between the represented and unrepresented rather than the employer and 
the employed. Every oppression, distress and hardship is laid at the 
door of lack of representation while universal suffrage will issue in 
an age of social justice and material prosperity. It is within this 
context that Hepburn, following the defeat of the 1832 strike and his 
personal victimisation, could say at a Reform meeting; 
"Only get the Bill and every working man will have rum in 
his coffee every morning". ( 6 7) 
Or as the Northern Star put it, writing on factory legislation, in 
April 1839; 
"If they [the people] , as they easily may, compel the 
tottering imbeciles who now hold the reins of government 
to restore their rights of universal suffrage, a 
parliament so chosen will soon teach these mill devils 
[owners] to dance a very different tune". (68) 
While Radicalism in its early phase was an alliance between the 
working class and the middle class around the issue of political 
representation Chartism clearly had wider economic and social 
implications for many of its working class advocates. At the very 
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least a working class presence in parliament meant that capitalism 
could be controlled and humanised. At most the land would be 
confiscated and redistributed among the working class, the numbers of 
idle rich, rentiers and 'shopcrats' diminished, education made by and 
for the working class and community sentiment replace competition. 
Given these implications the wider extension of the suffrage met 
resolute hostility from the properties classes. Their fears were 
expressed by Macaulay the Whig historian, speaking in the Connnons 
after the presentation of the Second Chartist Petition in 1842; 
"But I believe that universal suffrage would be fatal to 
all purposes for which government exists, and for which 
aristocracies and all other things exist, and that it is 
utterly incompatible with the very existence of 
civilisation. I conceive that civilisation rests on the 
security of property ••• and if it be that fact, that all 
.classes have the deepest interest in the security of 
property, I conceive, that this principle follows, that 
we never can, without absolute danger, entrust the 
supreme Government of the . country to any class which 
could, to a moral certainty, be induced to connnit great 
and systematic inroads against the security of 
property ... (69 ) 
It was a hostility which materialised in deeds as well as words. 
For example, in 1839 Chartists held meetings .at Cowpen and 
Cramlington •. Many miners armed themselves with pikes in readiness for 
the start of the 'Sacred Month' (August) when they believed that the 
land would be taken from the land owners and divided among the working 
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class. Indeed the landlords were requested by the men to give up 
their lands quietly. However the 98th Regiment of the Kings Cavalry 
was quickly sent to Cowpen, Cramlington and Seghill, the meetings 
broken up and leaders arrested. 
Later miners at collieries including Seghill and Cowpen struck 
work following a call for a National Strike after the first Chartist 
Petition to Parliament had been rejected. But generally the national 
call failed to gain national support and the Northmnberland men 
returned to work. However, as far as the mining districts of the 
North were concerned Tremenheere could describe them as; 
"hotbeds of Chartist intrigue and infidel teaching".(70) 
A view shared by his political masters and the coal owners. Nor was 
the collective activity purely a male matter. In the winter of 1838 
for instance three hrmdred women at Messrs. Cookson's plate glass 
works had twice come out on strike when their employer had attempted 
to change the day and method by which they were paid. Then, when 
Cooksons dismissed an overlooker at the factory because of his 
Chartist activities the women marched through the streets in his 
support, enrolled in the Female Political Union and pledged to "take 
care of the dismissed man's future welfare". 71) 
In Mining Districts by contrast women were excluded from the 
labour market. For according to the Children's Employment Commission 
of 1842; 
"pitmen not only kept their wives out of the pits, they 
denied them any outside occupation holding that the care 
of their homes, their families and their men was work 
sufficient".(7Z) 
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Yet when bailiffs came to evict families and turn furniture on to the 
street it was; 
"hard for men to keep their anger within bormds an harder 
still for house-proud women".C73) 
Therefore women would take an active part in repulsing bailiffs and 
would agree a strategy of banging pots and pans to warn and raise the 
district at the approach of police or candymen. 
By the 1850's Chartism had declined and failed to achieve any of 
its six demands. Certainly in so far as Chartism was bormd up with 
economic want and insecurity the general upturn in the economy after 
1851 dampened doWn. Chartist support. Meanwhile argument over physical 
force and moral persuasion strategies divided the Chartist leadership 
as did confusion over ultimate objectives and immediate tactics. In 
addition state repression acted to disorganise and deter Chartist 
activity. Cole and Postgate(74) indicating that after Chartist strike 
action in 1842 fifteen hundred people were arrested and 79 transported 
to Australia. 
On their own though such explanations are not enough to account 
for Chartist failure. Essentially Chartism thought that no 
improvement could take place rmtil universal franchise was achieved. 
When the Government repealed the Corn Laws in 1846, passed the Ten 
Hours Act in 1847 and the Mines Regulation Bill in 1850, it seemed 
that change was possible by pressurising the existing system rather 
than pushing for full blooded political reform. Moreover in the 
decades a:fter 1850 there· occurred the expansion of working class 
organisations of defence such as trade unions and institutions of 
self-help such as co-operative stores and relief frmds. The effect of 
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this was to direct working class energies into the protection and 
strengthening of these autonomous organisations 
While many coal owners feared that the development of these 
institutions would enhance the capacity of the working class to 
maintain a strike, the more astute representatives of capital such as 
Hugh Taylor, Sir M.W. Ridley and later Jonathan Priestman supported 
the establishment of self-help initiatives. Taylor and Ridley 
actively promoting the Miners' Permanent Relief F\md and Priestman 
supporting the Ashington Co-operative stores.C75) Indeed by 1863 the 
Relief Fund had £4,500 invested with the Tyne Connnissioners, £2,340 
invested with the North East Railway Company and £500 invested with 
the Blyth and Tyne Railway Company.· 
The years 1840 to 1850 therefore mark a watershed. Before 1850 
Chartism tied together political and economic reform and extra 
parliamentary activities within a broad working class alliance. After 
1850 working class organisations of defence and self-help expand in 
order to mitigate the constant insecurity of everyday life. Trade 
unions concern themselves with a narrow economism and with the defence 
of status and rights inside the workplace while politics is reduced to 
and channelled into Parliamentary forms. 
As far as the ruling class is concerned a key feature of its 
strategy was concession and change so that essentials might remain the 
same. Bagehot in the second edition of 'The English Constitution' 
published in 1872 offers this advice; 
"But in all cases it must be remembered that a political 
combination of the lower classes, as such and for their 
own objects, is an evil of the first magnitude; that a 
permanent combination of them would make them (now that 
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so many of them have the suffrage) supreme in the 
country; and that their supremacy, in the state they now 
are, means the supremacy of ignorance over instruction 
and numbers over knowledge ••. 
So long as they are not taught to act together, there is 
a chance of this being averted, and it can only be 
averted by the greatest wisdom and the greatest foresight 
in the higher classes. They must avoid, not only every 
evil, but every appearance of evil; while they still have 
the power they must remove, not only every actual 
grievance, but where it is possible every seeming 
grievance too; they must willingly concede every claim 
which they can safely concede, in order that they may not 
have to concede unwillingly some claim which would impair 
the safety of the country."(76) 
Furthermore, alongside the institutionalisation of trade 
unionism the post Chartist years saw a series of Factory Acts with 
educational provisions, paralleled by the growth of provided religious 
schools supported by Government grants. These schools served mainly 
to instil Christian dogma, to establish basic counting and literacy 
and to teach deference, punctuality, cleanliness, politeness and self-
discipline. 
Just how far this education system succeeded in reforming the 
subjectivity of the working class remains an open question. 
Tremenheere< 77 ) however was clear that he expected education to 
counter union influence and radical ideas and produce conformity and 
respect for authority, praising the Consett Iron Company for its 
educational efforts and insisting it was a model to be followed. 
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The twenty years between 1860 and 1880 saw the consolidation of 
the miners' union in Northumberland and Durham, craft nnions in 
general and self-help organisations. A consolidation which excluded 
many women, tmSkilled and semi-skilled workers, home based artisans 
and the poor. Groups who had previously been included in the Chartist 
movement. At the same time Liberalism established itself as the 
prevailing orthodoxy. 
By the late 1880's, however, the first cracks appear in Liberal 
hegemony. In 1887 delegates from the London Docks addressed meeting 
after meeting in the North in support of their claim that the state 
should nationalise the means of production. Welbourne explains that; 
"In one Northumberland pit village 8,000 men gave them an 
enthusiastic vote of support. Then, two years later 
Henry George, the advocate of land nationalisation 
appeared on the platform [at the annual miners' gala]. 
Before long the men of both counties were demanding the 
abolition of royalty rents. More and more the new cry 
for economic change took the place of the old Radical 
'political enthusiasm rmtil in the North the liberals saw 
their alliance with the miners broken by what they were 
pleased to call ingratitude ... (78) 
The formal process of turning away from the Liberal Party was 
completed by 1910. In July 1906 the Northumberland miners voted for 
an eight hour day in the coalfield. A year later in August 1907 they 
voted:to af~iliate to the Miners' Federation of Great Britain, then in 
May 1908 they voted by 14,371 votes to 10,169 to affiliate to the 
Labour Party.C 79 ) 
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But it would be incorrect to read this process as a turn towards 
socialism. Rather it was about finding a more suitable vehicle by 
which to pursue electoral and parliamentary politics. For on the one 
hand the miners displayed a stubborn economism and a concern about 
bargaining rights at work and regulation of the workplace. On the 
other, a history of industrial defeats, of failure to establish the 
union, of victimisation and the pervasive power of the coal owners 
meant that Parliament was constantly looked to for the redress of 
grievances. Only the countervailing power of Parliament, it was 
thought, could offset the power and influence of the coal owners. 
The acceptance of Parliamentarianism and gradual reform was 
therefore deeply entrenched in consciousness. In addition the gradual 
extension of political democracy at a local level and the ability of 
the miners to concentrate their vote because of single occupation 
villages or towns encouraged support for electoral politics. 
(e) Religion and the Working Class 
The importance of Methodism in the Northumberland coalfield can 
be appreciated just by considering the numbers of chapels built in the 
area in the nineteenth century. By 1882 the Cramlington area alone 
had six chapels, two from each of the three branches of Methodism. 
Moreover, many of the leaders of the Northumberland and Durham miners 
were Methodists. 
What then was the significance of religion? A reading of Burt's 
autobiography(80) indicates the austere effects of Methodism. The 
Burt household made a virtue of frugality, good housekeeping and self 
discipline. Temperance was upheld and enjoyment was to be had from 
reading the bible and "Pilgrim's Progress". This picture reflected 
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the wider injunctions of Methodism. Jolm Wesley, a central Methodist, 
rejoicing that Methodists had abstained from; 
"reading plays, romances or books of hrnnour, from singing 
innocent songs or talking in a gay diverting marmer". ( 81) 
In Welbourne's account the Methodists had; 
"Fought the evils of dnmkenness, gambling and 
improvidence. They took away from the pitman his gun, 
his dog and his fighting cock. They gave him a frock 
coat for his posy jacket, hymns for his public house 
ditties, prayer-meetings for his pay-night frolics. They 
drove into the minds of a naturally independent race the 
idea that extravagance was in itself a sin, until the 
falling wage sufficed for an ever-advancing domestic 
comfort."(BZ) 
In other words Methodism played a key part in suppressing older forms 
of popular working class culture and "civilising" sections of the 
working class. Secondly, the stress on frugality and condemnation of 
extravagance tended to encourage a toleration of wage reductions. 
A major pr~blem for the industrial bourgeoisie in the early 19th 
century was that of sustaining worker discipline and effort. Mere 
wage payment, incentive or coercive systems could never secure whole-
hearted compliance and increases in productivity. What was needed was 
inner self compulsion and it was this inner compulsion which Methodism 
-supplied. For the Methodist was a saved person. But only God could 
save souls. Therefore in order to have a chance of salvation you had 
to maintain yourself in a state of grace by serving the church, 
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nurturing your soul, submitting to authority, and applying both self-
discipline and self denial. Indeed labour itself was blessed and the 
greater the exploitation the more blessed it was. 
Salvation, however, was always provisional. You could fall from 
grace and thus wreck your hope of salvation by straying from the path 
of righteousness. Constant vigilance and self examination was 
therefore necessary in order to maintain correct behaviour and make 
certain election to the ranks of the saved. It was Sunday worship 
which provided the appropriate form for collective self examination, 
confession and outpouring of emotion. 
Methodism then was very much concerned with psychic repression 
and release within the bounds of religious observance and worship. In 
general spiritual and emotional energies were deployed in the service 
of the church and individual salvation rather than directed towards 
radicalism. 
The overwhelming tendency was for Methodism to constitute a 
conservative force. But this process was not without contradictions. 
To quote Welbourne again; 
"It was true that the management of their little chapels 
gave some pitmen a dangerous habit of self-sufficiency 
• • • • • Many a man was to pass out of the bible into 
newspapers. Many a boy who had learned to read the 
scriptures was later to reject the improving books of 
colliery libraries and prefer exciting literature, 
. Chartist and infidel tracts • • • The building of the 
chapel was the first lesson in communal effort. In the 
management of the services was an opportunity for the 
natural leader, in the administration of the funds an 
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education in business method. At the class meetings the 
men lost their fear of self-expression. In the pulpits 
the local preachers practised oratory. Later this gift 
of speech was to be used to recite the tale of the 
pitmen' s wrongs, and to stir the men to union and to 
strike. The Bible furnished many an economic argument, 
many a warning to the rich, many a threat to the 
oppressor. The Sermon on the Mount is an education in 
social equality, the Old Testament a trumpet blast to the 
warrior • • • under banners embroidered with texts the 
pitmen assembled lodge by lodge, at their meetings. 'He 
that oppresseth the poor, reproacheth his maker'."(83) 
Without exception Methodism retained a puritanical zeal which 
reformed and informed interpersonal relationships. The bible, 
however, could be interpreted in more than one way, a fact that led to 
the formation of various sects. The Primitive Methodists or Ranters 
stressed the material as well as the spiritual uplift of the poor. 
The bible could provide justification for a moral condenmation of 
inequality. It could make distinctions between oppressive and 
honourable employers. It could even require the 'nationalisation' of 
the land. Yet there was a limit to interpretation. What a reading of 
the bible could not do was provide a 'scientific' critique of 
capitalism as a system. More than anything else religion demanded 
individual reformation. Even in its more radical versions it tended 
to require that individual employers be made to see the light and 
transform themselves into good employers. It did not offer a critique 
of the capital labour relationship as such. 
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CONCWSION 
According to Hughes the first half of the 18th century saw a 
double revolution in the North combining the demise of the old largely 
Catholic landed gentry and the rise of a new ruling class. The new 
families such as the Carrs, Ridleys and Cooksons made their way to 
their great houses and substantial estates via smaller estates. Their 
wealth coming in the first instance from trade, banking and industry. 
By 1852 Lord Ridley was organising the Conservatives election 
campaign in Northumberland but as we have seen the Ridleys were active 
at other times and in other places. Be it in 1812 commanding the 
Newcastle Volunteers, a consciously anti-radical force, or in the 
1860's supporting the Miners' Permanent Relief Fund. 
With their wide and often overlapping business interests and 
their connections through marriage and political association, these 
families constituted a powerful ruling class. Within the world of 
this class the habit of managing things and people was acquired even 
though differences over tactics and policies existed. 
By 1869 the majority of the landed aristocracy had ceased to own 
and manage mines. It was now the likes of the Cooksons, Lambs and 
Joiceys who ran and owned the collieries in the North East. 
Nevertheless, the aristocracy, while ceasing to be the master or 
leading class, preserved large areas of influence and privilege for 
itself. 
Towards the end of the century coal combines dominated 
production in both Northumberland and Durham, many companies being 
closely ~ntegrated. into iron, steel and coal by-product manufacture. 
Allied to this a pattern of inter-locking directorships reflected the 
often complex and numerous interests of the directors. 
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Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries labour is assembled in 
particular localities in ever increasing numbers in order to produce 
coal. At the same time the enforcement and maintenance of a total 
industrial discipline is attempted, reflected for instance in the use 
of the bond system. Yet despite pervasive control, labour 
consistently resists attempts to have a commodity or thing like status 
imposed upon it. 
Sometimes this resistance expresses itself in the development of 
the Chartist movement or in the formation of the trade union or in the 
accommodative strategies of Burt. Sometimes it works for the 
establishment of co-operative societies, voluntary organisations and 
alternative forms of working class education. 
All the while the coal owners attempt to "incorporate" or 
"disincorporate" the union according to their own economic exigencies. 
After the collapse of Chartism in the 1840's energies are 
directed towards building organisations of defence. 
Anderson and Nairn the working class henceforth; 
According to 
"Evolves separate but subordinate ••• with an intense._ 
consciousness of separate identity and a permanent 
failure to set and impose goals for society as a whole 
The very intensity of its corporate consciousness 
realised in and through a distinct hermetic culture, 
blocking the emergence of a universal ideology ..... (84 ) 
While this characterisation contains an element of truth it is 
somewhat overdrawn. Certainly subordination and intense awareness of 
a separate identity can be recognised as fitting the Northtnnberland 
Miners. But what is missing here is any acknowledgement of resistance 
post 1840 and any reference to real struggles and to differing 
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oppositional and socialist currents within the class. Moreover, the 
Anderson Nairn thesis relies on a absent abstract working class which 
is supposed to behave in a revolutionary way. The English working 
class is then measured against this abstract category and fol.IDd 
wanting. On the other hand Thompson adopts a realist position by 
asking us to examine real events. To consider the class as it is not 
as we might wish it to be. He notes that after Chartism failed to 
overthrow capitalism the working class; 
"Proceeded to warren it from end to end. Each advance 
within the framework of capitalism simultaneously 
involving the working class far more deeply in the status 
quo."(85) 
This description accurately reflects the historical trajectory of the 
Northtnnberland miners and the working class in general. But the 
situation is one of contradiction. For at the same time labour 
displays a historical impulse to escape connnodification. However, 
these escape attempts do not automatically mean revolutionary action. 
More frequently escape has been via reformism and this too must be 
recognised as a form of class action. A form with pervasive and deep 
roots precisely because it has secured limited gains. Reformism, 
however, offers only partial solutions. The social formation remains 
a capitalist one therefore pressures to reverse gains and impose a 
cormnodity status are ever present as is the impulse to maintain gains 
and resist connnodification. · 
While . accepting much of the force of the argument as to the 
conservative nature of Methodism, I have also pointed out the radical 
inflexion which religion could take and the fact that within theology 
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itself there was a struggle over the meaning of scripture and the role 
of the church. The working out of this struggle having an influence 
on the wider class struggle. Moreover, elements of theology stressing 
charity and mutual support could be taken up and counterposed to naked 
laissez-faire. But this moral philosophy had limits since it acted to 
ameliorate circumstances rather than change relationships or provide a 
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CHAPTER 1llO 
FROM REACTION TO INCORPORATION 
INTROOOCTION 
Historically the Liberal Party represented business and 
manufacturing interests as opposed to agrarian capital and landlord 
interests lodged in the Tory Party. From the 1830's onwards the 
Liberals challenged the old corrupt and paternalist order. But 
Liberalism was not only a party, it was also an ideology. As an 
ideology it stressed individual sovereignty and right to property 
which in turn was dependent on a free market and minimal State 
intervention. Although in practice the State did intervene to 
maintain social order while State passivity was itself a form of class 
action. The new Poor Laws representing a social policy designed to 
underpin market hegemony. The Chartist movement of the 1820's and 
1830's prompting a series of electoral reform Acts indicating that the 
Liberal State of 1867 intended to incorporate the working class into 
the nation on the basis of limited suffrage and under the tutelage of 
the Liberal Party. The presence of Lib/Lab M.P. 's such as Burt and 
Fenwick reflecting the considerable success of this strategy. 
From the 1880's onwards a succession of crises originating from 
various sources act to break up Liberal hegemony. First, the 1889 
dock workers strike and its reception in the northern coalfield is an 
early sign of the organised working class looking to separate from the 
Liberal Party and establish independent political representation. 
This search for independence quickens over the next twenty odd years 
culminating, for instance, in the 1907 vote by the Northumberland 
miners to affiliate to the Federation and the 1908 vote to affiliate 
to the Labour Party. Second, widespread agitation for mass democracy 
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begins to disrupt and undermine Liberal unity. Third, the Irish 
question crystallises ruling class fears about the security of the 
empire, splits the Liberal Party and reanimates jingoistic 
sentiments. Dangerfield(!) claiming that these multiple threats 
provoked the death of Liberal England. Yet as we shall see Liberal 
ideology, if not the. Liberal Party, was still a force to be reckoned 
with well into the 1920's and 1930's. 
On the other hand the pre-war and inter-war periods witness 
pressure for collective solutions to crises so that the State is 
called upon to intervene on behalf of collective interests rather than 
simply adopt .a night-watchman role. 
Once again the pressure for collective provision and solutions 
arise from a number of sources. At a certain point the intensity of 
system dysfunction means that the reproduction of market relations 
depends upon a level of State intervention. In addition the organised 
labour movement exerts pressure from below, both the Labour Party and 
the T.U.C. supporting extensive social reform programmes by the early 
1900's. At the same time the State itself as it attempts to 
investigate, regulate and manage has an inbuilt tendency to expand and 
multiply its functions. As well as this, the years 1900 to 1914 saw 
an upsurge in worker militancy and Syndicalist activity heightening 
the fears of the establislnnent that a socialist. transformation was 
imminent. Welfare measures could then be deployed to defuse protest, 
win electoral popularity and prevent workers turning to extreme 
solutions.CZ) 
If we move on to the terrain of politics then at least three 
political forces can be identified pushing for collective welfare 
provision. The New Liberals who speak of universal rights such as the 
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right not to be impoverished or ill-educated and whose policies aim to 
compensate those who for legitimate reasons cannot participate in the 
market. The Fabians who elevate the bureaucrat and expert and call 
for State regulation. The Social Imperialists, a broad cross party 
grouping, which talks of the need for need for national efficiency 
achieved by welfare at home and imperialist development abroad. 
What results from the action of this plurality of forces is a 
series of social reforms including old age pensions, social insurance, 
minirrrum wage legislation and the setting up of labour exchanges. 
However, these reforms represent the formation of a social assistance 
State which · whil~ benefiting· certain . cat~gories qf workers also 
. promises to strengthen the cormoodity status of labo'ur. For example, 
welfare provision frees fit family members from the necessity of 
caring for old and infirm relatives thus allowing them to enter the 
labour market. Social insurance pegs entitlements and benefits to 
employment, work performance and contributions. Old age pensions free 
up the labour market by enabling employers ·to rid themselves more 
easily of older, less efficient workers. 
In this chapter I consider the politics surrounding the coal 
industry commissions of 1919 and 1925 in order to illuminate class and 
State relations. I then move on to look at the General Strike, its 
consequences and the response of the regional . bourgeoisie to the 
inter-war crisis. A response which shifted from neo-liberal to 
increasing calls for State intervention and attempts at modernisation 
of the regional economy on the basis of re-incorporation of leading 
labour and trade union representatives. 
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THE POLITICS OF CLASS CONFLICT 
By 1914 coal was central to the British economy.(3) Railways, 
still the main method of transporting people and goods, ran on steam 
engines fuelled by coal. Ships burnt coal in their boilers while coal 
carrying significantly contributed to the prosperity of shipping 
lines. At home, coal was the basis of power for nearly all industrial 
processes while abroad coal was a major export earner. Domestic 
heating and cooking in Britain's nine million homes relied on coal. 
Mine workers numbered over a million and with their families 
constituted one tenth of the population and a significant section of 
the organised working class. In coal· pl!oducing regions such as the 
North East the relative weight of the mining population within the 
general population was even more pronounced. The most Widespread and 
visible expression of working class identity and presence being the 
cloth cap. (4) 
As Britain stood on the brink of war the main branches of 
production in the Northern coalfield were inter-connected. These 
linkages included inter-locking directorships, price-fixing rings, and 
overarching employers' organisations. While the northern combines 
had inter-regional and overseas interests, the majority of their 
capital was grounded within the region either in mines, machinery and 
equipment, housing and railways, in related coal by-product activities 
or in trade generated by production in the region. 
The period up to 1921 saw the coal combines, the heavy 
industries and engineering generally make super profits first in the 
war years and then in the inflationary boom just after the war. 
Between 1918 and 1920 prices soared. Therefore, at its conference in 
Southport on 14th January 1919, while the coal industry was still 
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under Government war-time control, the Miners' Federation agreed 
to demand an increase in wages of 30% (i.e. three shillings a day 
on average throughout the coalfield), a six hour day and the 
nationalisation of the mines with some degree of workers' control. 
The Government in reply offered one shilling a day and a Committee of 
Inquiry. This offer was rejected and when a national miners' ballot 
showed a six to one majority in favour of industrial action, notice of 
a national strike was given starting at the end of February. Under 
the threat of a national strike in a key industrial sector, the 
Government proposed a Royal Commission to be chaired · by Sir John 
Sankey, with equal repr~sentation of labour an~ employers and promised 
to implement the Commission's findings provided there was no strike. 
At the same time the Government indicated that it was prepared to use 
all the coercive power it could muster if the national strike went 
ahead without first waiting for the Commission's report. Strike 
notices were therefore suspended until the Royal Commission made its 
interim report. 
(a) Evidence fran the Sankey ·Qmnission 
As witness after witness appeared before the Sankey Commission 
their evidence revealed how each understood the condition, operation 
and future of the coal industry. 
The Duke of Northumberland representing the coal royalty owners 
said that for the year 1918-1919 he had received a gross royalty 
income of £82,450. He then justified this income as a necessary and 
legitimate return enabling him to upkeep and manage his estates. His 
only regret being that the State took approximately £50,000 in various 
taxes and duties. An amolint he considered excessive.CS) 
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As far as nationalisation of the mines was concerned the Duke 
saw this policy as the thin end of the wedge; 
"I mean to say that they [the M.F.G.B.] are only going in 
for this scheme of nationalisation as a step to something 
far more drastic and for measures more revolutionary ••• 
probably the control of all the resources of production 
of all the industries in the country ••• they want the 
complete control of the coal industry for themselves. I 
do not think that the State is going to have much control 
in the matter."(6) 
With these thoughts in mind the Duke reflected on the course of action 
to be followed if the Commission recommended nationalisation; 
"Well I should do my utmost in the House of Lords and in 
trying to organise opposition in the country of any 
scheme of nationalisation. " ( 7) 
While the Duke was concerned to prevent nationalisation the following 





Do you deny the death rate amongst children in Durham and 
Northtnnberland? 
I do not know anything about the death rate. 
Is it not worth your while to see how these people live, 
to see what causes these deaths? 
You think landowners have nothing to do but examine 
statistics. I am a hard working man. I am not a 
privileged man like you. I cannot afford to waste time 
sitting on a Commission like this.CS) 
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The same attitude regarding infant mortality extended to miners' 
housing. For having strongly denied that the miners on his estate 
lived in hovels, the Duke went on; 
"I insert in every lease that the colliery owner is botmd 
to keep the [miners'] houses in a proper state of 
repair ... (9) 







Have you been round to see if they are kept in a proper 
state of repair? 
No I have not had a chance yet; I have been too hard 
worked. 
You took the estate as you fotmd it and nothing done? 
What do you mean nothing done? 
Improving the miners' houses? 
The miners are not the only people in the world. I have a 
lot of other people to look after besides miners.ClO) 
As far as the landowner was concerned the royalty system should remain 
intact. The fact of land ownership was justification enough for money 
got from coal royalties. Any questioning of the right to own land and 
the minerals beneath it, of royalty payments or of estate management 
was seen as gross interference and met with condescending irritation 
and threats to resist any change to the status quo. 
Lord Gainford appearing for the coal owners was just as strongly 
opposed to nationalisation commenting that; 
"I am authorised to say, on behalf of the Mining 
Association that if the owners are not left in complete 
executive control, they will decline to accept the 
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responsibility of carrying on the industry, and though 
they regard nationalisation as disastrous to the country, 
they feel they would, in such an event, be driven to the 
only alternative, nationalisation on fair tenns."(ll) 
But it was not only nationalisation which was ruled out. According to 
Lord Gainford; 
"Any system of joint control, whether between the State 
or with representatives of the miners, would be 
absolutely unworkable and subversive of discipline and 
detrimental to national interests ••• there is no firm of 
employers who would carry on the industry for a moment if 
they were not going to have the direction of the 
business."(lZ) 
While the owners resisted nationalisation and joint control, evidence 
before the Commission had highlighted both the inefficient and uneven 
nature of the industry under private ownership. This observation 
raised the question of compulsory grouping to form larger combines and 
a more rational organisation. Once again Lord Gainford voiced his 
objections; 
I have come to the conclusion that such combinations are 
a mistake and produce more evils than they do good. A 
colliery which ought not to be maintained as a separate 
entity, or is ill-equipped, or is a badly managed 
concern, is encouraged, whilst the good and well equipped 
and economically managed concerns are prejudiced. Such 
subsidies and doles promote reaction and retard 
progress."(lJ) 
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Having rejected any interference in the structure of the industry that 
would undennine the "free enterprise ethic" or the control of the coal 
owners and directors, Lord Gainford suggested the repeal of the 
existing Minimum Wage Act. In addition; 
"The wages of workers in -each distri~t, instead of 
varying with the selling - price of coal should be 
regulated with reference to the profits resulting from 
the industry in that district ... (14) 
Linked to this the coal owners proposed a profit sharing scheme so 
that; 
"A coomrunity of interest between workmen and employers is 
established alike in increasing output and in promoting 
economy of production."(15) 
Within this framework; 
"Joint Pit Connnittees will secure that full advantage is 
taken of the experience and practical knowledge of the 
workmen in all questions relating to safety and 
industrial efficiency."(16) 
The Joint Pit Connnittee would therefore be a purely consultative body 
with the final say over pricing and investment or underground 
operations resting with mine management ~d the Board of Directors. 
The only way that miners would be allowed to exercise influence over 
these areas was by becoming individual shareholders; 
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Ques:- So that unless men become shareholders they are not to 
have a voice in the management, commercially of the 
industry for ever? 
Ans:- That is my view. 
otherwise. (l7) 
The industry would collapse at once 
At one level then the Joint Pit Committee had limited functions, at 
another it was an attempt to incorporate while seeking to put the 
"experience and practical knowledge" of the workmen at the service of 
capital. Likewise the profit sharing scheme was clearly intended to 
promote a harmony of interest between labour and capital. 
Turning to the inefficiency of the industry and the problem of 
uncompetitive and backward pits, Lord Gainford offered an explanation 
and a solution. The explanation lay with the miners themselves; 
"The terms demanded by the miners have frequently 
prevented and retarded fair trials being given to coal 
cutting and labour saving appliances which managers have 
been keen to introduce."(18) 
The solution was the invisible hand of the market; 
"My reply is that under the system of private enterprise 
the tendency is always to bring them [backward pits] up 
to standard and very rapidly if it is worthwhile carrying 
them on."(l9) 
But while the coal owners demanded a free hand for themselves they 
were happy to see the State selectively intervene with regard to 
mineral ownership and royalties. A contradiction not overlooked by 
the Commissioners; 
-76-
Ques:- You are suggesting that the royalty owners must be 
controlled even to the point of interfering with their 
Ans:-
ownership where necessary ••• but you do not see any 
necessity for the coal owners being controlled? 
I do not, because .I believe that the demand for coal which 
the nation had put forward has always been met by the 
industry. <20) 
Faced with the evidence from the witnesses, the Sankey 
CommiSSiOn produced four reportS • The Chairman IS report COnmJellded 
State ownership of both the coal royalties and the mines with fair 
compensation to the owners. The justification for State ownership of 
the royalties was succinctly put; 
"Under State ownership there will be one owner instead of 
nearly 4,000 owners of the National Asset, and the 
difficulties caused under the present system in regard to 
barriers, drainage, pumping, boundaries and support will 
largely disappear."(2l) 
Turning to State ownership of the mines the chairman set out a 
number of reasons for favouring nationalisation. Firstly, a reliable 
supply of cheap coal was needed for both the householder and industry. 
Secondly, State ownership would allow industries and consumers a voice 
in deciding the ammmt and price of coal. A facility not available 
under private ownership. Thirdly, competition was depressing the 
export price of coal while the 28,000 retail distributors inflated the 
inland coal price. Moreover, lack of capital in some mines and 
inadequate management prevented the development of coalfields. Lastly, 
it was hoped that State ownership would bring economies of scale, 
therefore; 
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"Unification under State ownership makes it possible to 
apply the principles of standardisation of materials and 
appliances and thereby effect economies to an extent 
which is impossible under [the present] system."(22) 
However, . while economic rationality pointed in the direction of State 
ownership labour/capital relations in the coalfields and movement in 
working class consciousness also indicated a strategy of 
nationalisation. According to Sankey; 
"The relationship between the masters and workers in 
most of the coalfields in the United Kingdom is, 
unfortunately, of such a character that it seems 
impossible to better it under the present system of 
ownership. Many of the workers think they are working 
for the capitalist and a strike becomes a contest between 
labour and capital. This is much less likely to apply 
with the State as owners, and there is fair reason to 
expect that the relationship between labour and the 
connmmity will be an improvement upon the relationship 
between labour and capital in the coalfields ... (23) 
In addition; 
"Half a century of education had produced in the workers 
in the coalfields far more than a desire for the material 
advantages of higher wages and shorter hours. They have 
now, in many cases and to an ever increasing extent, a 
higher ambition of taking their due share and interest in 
the direction of the industry to the success of which 
they, too, are contributing."(Z4) 
-78-
Therefore Sankey concluded that; 
"It is true that in the minds of many men there is a fear 
that State ownerships may stifle incentive, but today we 
are faced in the coalfields with increasing industrial 
unrest and a constant strife between modern labour and 
modern capital. 
I think that the danger to be apprehended from the 
certainty of the continuance of this strife in the coal 
mining industry outweighs the danger arising from the 
problematical fear of the risk of loss of incentive."(25) 
Justice Sankey then sided with the miners' representatives on the 
Corm:nission in reconnnending a scheme of nationalisation. A scheme 
which included the setting up District Councils and a National Mining 
Council under a Minister of Mines with veto powers. Significantly, 
arrangements were to be built into the scheme prohibiting strike and 
other industrial action rmtil- the matters rmder dispute had been 
referred to and deliberated upon by the National Mining Council. 
Essentially this was a corporatist model underpinned by State 
ownership and aimed at regulating labour. In contrast a draft 
Parliamentary Bill proposed by the Miners' Federation had vested the 
mines not in the State but in the Mining Council and transferred all 
the powers of the Secretary of State for Mines to the Council. In 
turn the Mining Council was to have 50% of its members nominated by 
the Miners' Federation. Moreover the Council would have the power to 
take over and carry on iron, steel and other works carried on in 
connection with mining. As it was, the Miners' Federation nominations 
on the Commission accepted the Sankey proposals with minor 
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qualifications arguing for greater provision for workers' 
representation in the administration of the industry.C26) The 
majority of employers, on the other hand, produced a report arguing 
for continued· private ownership, profit sharing and enhanced 
consultation with the workforce.C 27) A fourth repOrt from an 
independent employer propesed unification of the industry on a 
privately owned basis.C28) On the issue of wages and hours, the first 
Interim Report had shown the employers' side split. The colliery 
owners offering l/6d. a day increase and a reduction in hours to a 7~ 
a day. The other three employers and Justice Sankey offering 2 
shillings a day increase and a seven hour day. The Government agreed 
the hours and wages proposals of the Interim Report, while Bonar Law, 
for the Cabinet stated in the House of Connnons that the Government 
would accept the final reconnnendations of the Connnission. He then 
sent a letter to the Miners' Federation saying that "the Government 
are prepared to carry out in the spirit and in the letter" whatever 
proposals Sankey would make. (29) That was in March. By June the 
final Connnission Report was published and in August the Government 
announced its decision not to accept the policy of nationalisation of 
the mines while agreeing to State purchase of the mineral rights. 
Having agreed the composition of the Connnission the Government used 
the Connnission' s failure to reach a consensus as a reason for non-
interference with the private ownership principle. 
According to Saville(30) the Connnission and the events 
surrounding it represented the classic case of political deceitfulness 
in modern British history. The whole episode indicating that when the 
chips were down political rulers would lie, procrastinate and 
manoeuvre in order to continue the desired policy of private 
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ownership. In this context one could also see the establishment of 
the Commission as part of the class struggle. At one moment the 
Commission and its deliberations could buy precious time for the 
Gov~rnment· in a period of crisis. In another instance the Commission, 
with its appearance of rational impartiality provided by the Chairman, 
could play a part in demobilising and disorganisirig the collectivity 
represented by the miners. At yet another level the Commission 
evidence signalled what sort of settlement the Miners' Federation was 
prepared to accept, while setting out the views of the contending 
forces. The Government could then appear to stand above the 
Commission evidence as neutral arbitrators and final decision takers 
acting in the national interest. A position underpinned by the 
doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty. 
In the end the decisions to increase miners' wages and cut 
hours, continue private ownership and purchase mineral rights, was 
determined by the strength of class forces and the condition of the 
economy. The Sankey wage increases and the profit sharing scheme 
proposed by the coal owners reflected the room to manoeuvre provided 
by the high profits and boom conditions in the immediate aftermath of 
the war. However, even the commitment to State purchase of the 
mineral rights was quietly dropped. A sign of the continuing strength 
and influence of the landowners. In its place the Mines (Working 
Facilities and Support) Act of 1923 increased mineowners' rights of 
access to land. This had the effect of softening the mineowners' 
opposition to the landowners. 
The main thrust of the Sankey proposals pointed in a corporatist 
direction while the increase in wages and reduction in hours went 
beyond the mineowners' original position. By 1921, however, the 
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economy had gone into a recession. The years from 1923 to 1929 
witnessing a partial recovery but unemployment still remaining high in 
the coal producing sector, in shipbuilding and in iron and steel. 
Therefor~, the fourteen months from July 1924 to August 1925 show 
unemployment ill the Northumberland Colliery Area never going below 
9.5% of the insured populating, touching an unemployment high of 33.7% 
in June 1925 and averaging 18.6%.(31) 
The response of the employers to these changed economic 
circumstances together with an insight into the condition of the coal 
industry six years after Sankey, can be found in evidence to the 
Samuel Commission set up in 1923. 
(b) Evidence fran the Samuel Qmni ssion 
The majority of the Sankey Commission had agreed that the 
present system of ownership and working in the coal 
industry stands condenmed. " 
But in the six years following this judgement little was done to 
change the system. Rational layout and economic working of the mines 
was still held back by the system of land ownership. The grouping of 
collieries into larger units was still slow, uncertain and unevenly 
achieved. A revealing piece of evidence from Sir Richard Redmeyne 
illustrates the deficiencies of the system with an example from 
Northumberland. 
"For eight years I managed the Seaton Delaval Collieries 
as Resident Manager. We had our own rolling stock, our 
own railway of eight and a-half miles to the shipping 
staith, and our own shipping staith, and we had to keep 
-82-
all that up. The neighbouring colliery - there was only 
a barrier of 120 yards between us and them - were a large 
group raising about the same that we were raising. That 
was the Cramlington Collieries. We each raised about 
3,000 .. tons a day. They had their railway nnming 
parallel with ours, they had their own rolling stock, and 
they had their shipping staiths. One railway, one set of 
rolling stock, and a considerable savings in wagons too, 
and one shipping staith (because they were not fully 
employed), would have served the whole thing, and would 
do today. More curious still, they had a chairman who 
was chairman of both companies, and some of the directors 
were the same on both companies; but they still remain 
unamalgamated ... (32) 
Meanwhile the teclmical backwardness of the industry was apparent. In 
1?24 for example 19% of British coal was cut by machine compared with 
70% in the U.S.A. The figure for Northumberland being 28.3% of coal 
output cut by machine in 1924. 
Added to this coal faced increasing competition from new forms 
of power notably oil while demand from home industries such as iron 
and steel had slumped in the depression. A system which had enriched 
the coal owners in the past was no longer able to do so. Faced with 
competition from abroad and from other fuels as well as the slump in 
the home market coal, capital saw o~y one solution, lower coal prices 
achieved by reducing.wages and lengthening the working day. However, 
it was not only miners' wages that needed to be cut; 
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"The Association emphasise the view that the maintenance 
of railway, coal tipping and dock charges on coal traffic 
at their existing high level, in order to maintain the 
wages of railway and d?ck workers at a leve~ entirely out 
of relation with that which is possible in the great pro-
ducing industries is an injustice to the workers in those 
industries which calls for an immediate remedy."(33) 
The remedy being a reduction in railway and dock workers' wages in 
order to cut coal transport and dock charges. Moreover, the coal 
owners claimed that high local authority rate charges were a function 
of a high local government wages bill therefore local government 
employers should accept wage cuts in order to ease rate costs on the 
coal industry.<34) 
On the 30th June 1925, the coal owners gave a month's notice of 
their intention to end the existing wage agreement and replace it with 
one involving savage wage reductions. The Miners' Federation rejected 
the employers' proposals and the Baldwin Government intervened to 
mediate between the two sides and set up a Court of Inquiry. 
However, the miners refused to attend and asked for support from the 
rest of the trade union movement. The T.G.W.U. and the three railway 
unions therefore agreed to place a stop on all movements of coal 
unless the employers withdrew their proposals. 
The Government, not being prepared for such a crisis, decided to 
play for time. On the 31st July, Baldwin met miners and T.U.C. 
representatives and informed them that the coal owners had agreed to 
suspend the notices. The government in its turn would guarantee a 
subsidy to the industry until 1st May 1926. In the meantime a Royal 
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Commission chaired by Sir Herbert Samuel would inquire into the 
industry. This time the Commission consisted of just four men: Sir 
Herbert Samuel, a former Liberal Cabinet Minister with extensive 
family connections in banking; Kenneth Lee, Chairman of Tootal, 
Broadhurst, Lee, a large cotton fi::i:m; Sir Herbert Lawrence, director 
of insurance companies, railway companies and Vickers Ltd; Sir William 
Beveridge, formerly a top civil servant and now director of the London 
School of Economics. 
When the Commissioners issued their report on lOth March 1926, 
they saw no alternative to a reduction in mineworkers' wages; 
What we contemplate is not a permanent lowering of wage 
standards but a temporary sacrifice by the men in the 
industry, other than the worst paid, in order to avoid 
the possible unemployment of hundreds of thousands of 
them • • • Any material fall in wages will, we fully 
recognise, on the facts presented 7lsewhere in this 
Report, bring real wages at the present cost of living, 
below pre-war level for a large proportion of miners. 
This is a necessity to which other great industries have 
been driven. In the situation immediately confronting us 
it cannot be avoided for the coal industry except by 
making that industry a burden on the rest of the 
connnunity ..... ( 35 ) 
But it was not only wages that had to be cut. For according to 
the Commissioners; 
"The subsidy [to the coal industry] should not be 
continued. In our view the principle is wrong 
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[Moreover] it has sometimes been suggested that 
collieries which are on the margin of profitability might 
receive some form of subsidy as a temporary measure to 
save them from closing. We cannot recommend that 
expedient. First, it would constitute in many cases a 
dole to the inefficient to the disadvantage of the 
efficient. Second, it is right that these collieries 
should bear the brunt of economic pressure ... (36) 
As far as public ownership was concerned the Commission came down 
against the idea; 
We have seen, however, no scheme [of nationalisation] 
that will withstand criticism, we perceive grave economic 
dangers; and we did find no advantages which cannot be 
attained as readily, or more readily in other ways ... (37) 
More spe~ifically the Commissioners pointed to a m.nnber of areas of 
concern. First that; 
"The closing of uneconomic mines, always a matter of 
difficulty, would become far more difficult under 
nationalisation. There would be a strong temptation to 
draw upon the profits of the better mines rather than 
inflict the hardships and incur the resentment involved 
in such an operation."(38) 
However: even more worrying was the division of responsibility 
between the State and the proposed self governing Councils that would 
run the industry. A division reflected in the contradictory position 
of the Minister of Mines; 
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"Like other Ministers he is responsible to Parliament 
But under this scheme the Minister is also to be the 
Chairman of the two bodies, by whom questions of wages 
and prices are to be settled. These bodies are not 
appointed or controlled by him; their members are almost 
. all elected by independent constituencies. The Minister 
may therefore receive the instructions of Parliament but 
he has no power to give effect to them • • • As it stands, 
the position in which the Minister for Mines is to be 
placed leaves him as the embodiment of the inconsistency 
of one authority being given the right to manage, another 
being left with the liability to pay ••• We cannot 
afford to rely merely upon the hope that, out of a spirit 
of goodwill and public responsibility, the independent 
bodies which will conduct the industry will fully 
safeguard the interest of the Treasury."(39) 
It was apparent that what was raising the anxiety of the 
Commissioners was the degree of autonomy proposed for the Production 
and Consumer Councils. An autonomy which allowed them to take 
investment and wage decisions without reference to Government and 
potentially left the Treasury to pick up at least part of the bill. 
Moreover, the Commissioners thought that the proposed institutional 
arrangements involved in the Federation's nationalisation scheme were 
biased towards labour and therefore tended to produce coal price 
increases · in order to pay for wage claims. A factor not in the 
interests of industrial consumers who favoured cheap energy. Finally, 
the Commissioners argued that nationalisation of the mines alone would 
disrupt those combines that had already come into existence; 
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"But if mining were nationalised and the other associated 
industries remained in private hands, a new frontier 
would be drawn across the domain. Integrations that have 
already been effected would hav~, in fact, to be broken 
up."(40) 
Having rejected the Labour movement's nationalisation plan, an 
alternative would have been direct "State control" of the mines. 
However, the Commissioners disingenuously objected to this move on the 
grounds that failed to satisfy the miners' demand for a decisive say 
in the running of the industry. More significantly they hesitated at 
bringing the State into an unmediated relationship with the miners. 
In the end the Royal Commission was adamant that the mines 
should remain in the private sector. But having said that they noted 
the desirability of further amalgamations as a way of meeting the 
crisis. Then, having ruled out compulsion, and recognising that left 
to itself the coal industry would not take the necessary action to 
achieve further mergers and rationalisation, they recorrmended the 
setting up a Coal Commission to encourage and facilitate 
amalgamations. Broadly, the Coal Commission was to work by persuasion 
but also have reserve powers to buy up and transfer leases from owners 
"incapable of initiative" to those "willing to work the mineral on 
progressives lines ... (4l) In this context of overarching private 
combines the State was to play the necessary supportive role of 
acquiring all coal royalties. 
THE GENERAL STRIKE 
While the Samuel Commission was deliberating the Government was 
constructing an organisation to meet the expected challenge of labour. 
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Emergency bodies were created to keep transport on the road and ensure 
food delivery. A Civil Commissioner was appointed to each of the ten 
emergency administrative regions and under him various co-ordinating 
officers. 
. .. 
After September l925 a network of 150 voluntary haulage 
connnittees composed· of businessmen from the food and distributive 
trades was established. Thus one of the main elements of the 
emergency organisation would be in the hands of businessmen rather 
than civil servants. 
In tandem with this organisation another formally private body 
was set up with Government approval. Known as the Organisation for 
the Maintenance of Supplies, it was led at a national level by a 
collection of retired army generals, admirals and high ranking civil 
servants. In the localities the O.M.S. brought together businessmen 
and the concerned middle classes. The job of the O.M.S. being to 
enlist volunteers and train them as drivers or to do work vacated by 
strikers. All the while the O.M.S. stressing that it fully supported 
constitutional trade unionism. 
These organisation arrangements simultaneously created a buffer 
between the Government and labour while allowing the army to protect 
strike breakers as opposed to strike breaking themselves. Rather than 
being everywhere the army and navy could concentrate in strategic 
areas and by their presence and numbers intimidate the population. By 
creating the O.M.S. and the Civil Commissioner central government 
could by-pass unreliable local authorities while co-opting town clerks 
and engineers on to Civil Connnission staff to provide local knowledge. 
In the event relatively few local authorities in the North Fast 
refused to co-operate with the O.M.S. and Civil Commissioner. Jarrow 
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refused to provide facilities for the recruitment of volunteers while 
Blaydon U.D.C. refused; 
"To be party to a strike breaking scheme designed to 
assist the Iron Heel of Capitalism and bring disaster to 
our own class ... (4Z) 
But these were exceptional instances for as Mason notes; 
"the general strike came just too soon to be affected by 
the great labour takeover of local authorities in the 
North East which was a feature of the next decade."(43) 
Having noted the government's preliminary moves what of the 
T.U.C. leadership? Throughout the months before the strike call their 
support for the miners had been grudging while no effort was spared to 
find a negotiated settlement. More generally the majority of the 
T.U.C. leadership supported the maintenance of the capitalist system 
although they had no coherent policies to deal with the depression and 
its consequences. They were therefore forced into a reactive response 
to the employers. In terms of dominant ~ssumptions they believed in 
the "national interest" and thought that reasonableness on their side 
would produce reasonableness in response. Other strands of their 
thinking included the desire to separate the industrial from the 
political and limit trade unions to wages and conditions matters. 
Finally they realised that a successful general strike would have 
strengthened the left both in the trade union movement and on the 
General Council. Consequently they took every opportunity to announce 
their loyalty to the constitution and find a way of calling off the 
strike. 
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Inside the Conservative Cabinet the dominant group believed that 
the way out of the economic crisis was to take a strong line with 
labour. The Government therefore precipitated the general strike by 
breaking off negotiations with the T.U.C. 
Once the strike was underway local newspapers exhorted people to 
.· . . 
. . 
go to volunteer centres. Articles appeared aimed at lowering the 
morale of the strikers and stiffening the resolve of those opposed to 
the strike. In the North East the Civil Commissioner made an appeal 
to the unemployed to vohmteer and keep services going. Sir Alfred 
Palmer, of Palmers Shipbuilders, and chair of Gateshead magistrates, 
in sentencing a miner charged with circulating a newspaper likely to 
cause disaffection amongst the people smmned up his feelings about 
troublesome workers; 
"Why you and those associated with you don 1 t go to 
Russia, I don 1 t know. • • We don 1 t want you. Nobody wants 
you. You are just a source of dangeJ; to the community, 
and the sooner you make up your minds to either reform or 
get away, the better for all concerned."(44) 
On the ground trade union activists established a central co-
ordinating strike committee in Newcastle as well as councils of 
action, in fact an embryonic system of dual power. In reality the 
whole thing was a matter of daily improvisation supplemented by trial 
and error. Inter-union co-operation was uneven and difficult to 
achieve while the various union hierarchy were reluctant to surrender 
their independence. Having said that most people who were called out 
on strike came out while others unofficially walked out or wanted to 
stop work. Only where a middle class existed, usually in urban areas, 
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was a strike breaking organisation likely to succeed. In mining 
conmnmities solidarity was intense with widespread picketing, 
disruption of transport and sporadic violence. For example on the 6th 
and 7th of May at Throckley traffic was stopped and buses stoned. On 
the 9th May bus services in· the Ashington area were suspended. On the 
. . . 
12th ten Stakeford miners appeared in court charged with attempting to 
stop and burn a newspaper van. On the lOth May the Flying Scotsman 
express was unintentionally derailed at Cramlington in mistake for a 
coal train. (4S) As a result eight local miners received severe and 
exemplary prison sentences. One of the jailed miners recalls the 
conditions in which he lived and worked and the motivations behind his 
actions; 
"I was getting 6s 9~. per shift, and a 40% reduction in 
pay had been threatened by the mine-owners. The 
conditions were wet, with foul air. There was no annual 
or statutory holiday pay. There were no pit-head baths. 
We lived in hovels. The toilets were earth closets and 
water was drawn from a standpipe 30 feet from the house. 
On the 6th May 1926, a meeting of the Cramlington Lodge 
was held in the Miners' Institute. One of the lodge 
officials ended the meeting with A.J. Cook's slogan: 
'Stop the wheels turning' • Someone in the meeting called 
for them all to come back after dinner and have a rail up 
to stop the blackleg coal trains going through. The men 
returned about 1.30pm, and just as they all met they saw 
blackleg platelayers working in their 'plus fours' on the 
line. The miners stoned and chased them away. Then 
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someone called out: 'Come on lads, we' 11 have a rail 
out ••• ' 
Our aim was to stop blackleg coal trains only, and for 
this we have no regrets. We were on starvation wages and 
fighting tb preserve ourselves, and our families from 
·further degradation ... (45) · 
However, the stiff jail sentences and imprisonment at Maidstone 
Prison was not the end of the matter. An organisation called the 
"International Class war Prisoners' Aid" campaigned for the men's 
freedom. On their release; 
"Meetings· in London, Newcastle, Dudley and Cramlington 
welcomed us home. I remember the great welcome we 
received at Poplar Town Hall, then at Newcastle by a 
demonstration led by Will Lawther, followed by a packed-
out meeting at Cramlington Co-op Hall and finally at 
Dudley Co-op Hall where we were presented with I.C.W.P.A. 
silver medals."C47) 
Certainly these recollections illustrate the spontaneity of action. 
Moreover, the imprisoned miners saw themselves not only as 
Northtnnberland miners but also as part of an international working 
class. The presentation of medals honouring and recognising their 
actions and sacrifice at the same time established them as examples to 
be emulated and remembered. But what is recalled is a defensive, 
militant and heroic struggle whose irrnnediate aim was maintenance of 
living standards. This I suspect was how the majority of working 
class participants understood the situation although a minority hoped 
for a revolutionary overthrowing of the state and capital. 
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Had the strike gone on for three or four more weeks or had the 
government acted differently working class perceptions and 
rmderstanding might have changed and developed in a more radical 
direction. A successful general strike would have rmdennined the 
government's economic· policy, raised the confidence of the working 
class generally, strengthened the left and created a new political 
situation. It would also have legitimated industrial action for 
political ends. But it was not to be. Instead the abandonment of the 
general strike by the General Council, the subsequent miners' lockout 
and defeat of the Miners' Federation had a mnnber of consequences. 
First widespread class demoralisation and unwillingness to take 
industrial action set in. The position of the right wing and centre 
on the General Council was strengthened while the Miners' Federation 
and Minority Movement was marginalised. Before 1926 the dominant 
ideology of the Trade Union movement had been an uncomfortable mixture 
of labourism and syndicalism. After 1926 labourism held sway 
stressing constitutionalism, the separation of the industrial and 
political spheres and the need for co-operation between labour and 
capital. ·Lastly, since the Miners' Federation constituted a key union 
blocking the governments's policy of economic non-intervention and 
wage cutting, their defeat opened the way to a deepening of the 
politics of reaction. As far as the coal industry was concerned those 
elements of the ruling block favouring state non-intervention were 
strengthened and nationalisation put off the agenda for another twenty 
years. 
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STRATEX;IES FOR MANAGING TIIE INTER-wAR CRISIS 
(1) The Neo-Liberal Solution 
The strategy of the coal owners for dealing with the crisis, as 
indica ted by evidence to the Samuel Connnission, was clear. The 
industry had to stand on its own two feet. Unprofitable pits should 
close and Government subsidy cease. In order to increase coal 
exports, cheap coal was called for and to pay for this miners' wages 
would have to be cut. Additionally the men would be asked to work 
longer hours. National agreements would be replaced by district 
negotiation thus allowing the coal companies to vary wages and 
conditionS from district to district. But it was not only the coal 
owners who purSUed such a . wage cutting strategy. It was a coiiDOOn 
policy of industrial capital throughout the North East. 
Apart from these strategies other responses included mass lay 
offs and short time working particularly in the steel, shipbuilding 
and coalm.ining ~dustries. A steel worker recalling that; 
"A works would be idle for a month, and the men would be 
on the dole. Suddenly the news would come rmmd, 'the 
mill is going to start, don't know how long' • And they 
would start producing tinplate again for maybe two 
months. Then they closed down again. We called them 
'umbrella plants' in that they were opening and 
closing."<48) 
Then because of shrunken demand companies moved to reduce 
capacity by closing plant. This move was often associated with 
mergers and amalgamations. In the case of shipbuilding the National 
Shipbuilders Security Ltd was formed with the backing of the Bank of 
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England. The N.S.S. used its fnnds to buy then close down other 
yards. Whole finns disappeared, as well as individual yards within 
bigger groups. By 1937 a million tons of capacity had gone, a 
reduction of a third. 
The effect of these strategies was to leave whole communities 
surplus to requirements. In coal mining districts nnemployment 
reached new peaks. In shipbuilding the closure of Palmers shipyard 
promoted Wilkinson to refer to Jarrow as the "town that was murdered." 
The Conservative Government was not alone in supporting policies 
of restructuring for capital. In May 1929 a Labour Government took 
office determined to pursue a policy of continuity. The implications 
of this course of action were made clear by Ramsey MacDonald in an 
address to a meeting of the Oxford Union on June 5th 1930; 
"I have deliberately, and will continue deliberately, to 
proceed on the basis of a process of rationalisation in 
industry, which must for weeks increase unemployment 
figures. I have to do this in the interests of the 
country ... (49) 
According to Hannington, the newly appointed Minister for 
Unemployment, J.H. Thomas, took an active role in promoting this 
strategy; 
"He called conferences of employers to persuade them of 
the values of amalgamation into combines, and of re-
organisation and rationalisation in production. In the 
name of the Government he offered help to employers who 
took his advice, by securing credit on favourable terms, 
with State backing for loans advanced. In this 
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connection the Bankers' Industrial Development was formed 
by the Bank of England with Goverrnnent approval for the 
purpose of financing rationalisation. He addressed 
Chambers of Conmerce on the need for increasing the 
competitive ability of the British capitalist class for 
the defeat of their rivals in the struggle for world 
markets."(SO) 
As the surplus population increased how to manage and maintain 
it became a matter of Government concern. Maintenance payments, based 
on the insurance principal, kept the unemployed and their dependants 
at subsistence le~el. . In the year before the formation of the 1929 
Labour Government the Conservatives had strictly applied the "not 
genuinely seeking work" rule to eliminate 285,786 cases from benefit. 
But while the new Labour Government, in the face of working class 
pressure, replaced this· clause with benefit disqualification for 
"refusing a sq.itable offer of employment" it adhered to all the mean 
administrative measures of its predecessors. For example, "suitable 
employment" was defined by the Fmployment Exchange Officer while the 
applicant, to be eligible for benefit, had to agree to follow any 
written instructions issued by him. Applicants for Poor Law relief 
had first to show they were able bodied and willing to work by 
performing "test and task work" such as stone breaking or wood-
chopping. Moreover, each Poor Law applicant was treated on a 
discretionary case by case basis rather then being entitled to a 
certain scale of relief as a right. 
In August 1931 the Labour Government endorsed the findings of 
the May Committee and embarked upon cuts in unemployment benefit and 
increases in worker contributions to the scheme. This was quickly 
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followed by "means testing" in order to qualify for benefit allowance. 
The result being to remove people from benefit entitlement and shift 
the responsibility of maintaining them on to family and friends. 
Underpinning the cuts in benefit, the means testing, and the 
support for an insurance based as opposed to a non-contributory 
payments based scheme was a Government commitment to financial 
orthodoxy and balanced books. Many commentators suggesting that this 
orthodoxy was itself a reflection of the dominance of banking capital 
during the inter-war years. 
Apart from efforts to reduce benefits other schemes to deal 
with the surplus population were tried and others rejected. The 
option of developing large scale public works was ruled out as being 
too expensive. On the other hand labour was encouraged to transfer 
from the "distressed areas". In the six years ending December 1933, 
19,533 juveniles (8,338 boys and 11,144 girls) transferred from the 
coalfields of South Wales, Durham, Northumberland and Lancashire. The 
majority of the girls (90%) being sent into domestic service. 
According to the Special Area Commissioner, Sir Malcolm Stewart; 
was; 
"Transference of individuals and families out of the 
special areas must in my view be regarded as one of the 
essential measures of relief. My policy is, therefore, 
aimed at making clear the desirability of encouraging the 
younger persons to take every opportunity of obtaining 
employment outside the areas ... ( 51 ) 
Meanwhile the Samuel Commission has noted that although there 
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"no demand for miners in the Dominions many of them might 
make useful agriculturalists, and would be welcome there 
in that capacity ... (52) 
This back to the land strategy now became official government policy 
with the Unemployment Assistance Board and Land Settlement Association 
collaborating to encourage the establishment of indigenous small 
holdings worked by the unemployed. 
At the same time the State moved to support voluntary 
organisations such as the National Council of Social Service develop a 
network of welfare and occupational training centres for the 
unemployed. From Hannington' s . accotmt. the- training element was 
haphazard and low level confirming the · view that these centres had 
more to do with diverting the unemployed into official channels. 
Keeping them off the streets in places which not only monitored and 
categorised but also provided a routine of work. The significance of 
these centres only being fully realised with the passing. of the 1934 
Unemployment Act which compelled the unemployed to engage in work 
tasks as a condition for the receipt of benefit from the Unemployment 
Assistance Board. 
The inter-war period then, witnessed industrial restructuring, 
cuts in wages and punitive welfare measures. Moreover, in the midst 
of the crisis an ideological offensive was taking place designed to 
convince popular imagination that "capitalism is the finest system 
that human ingenuity can devise ... (53) One element in that offensive 
being the propaganda of the Economic League , an organisation directed 
by the likes of Lord Gainford, Clive Cookson and W.L. Runnciman, a 
director of Blyth Drydocks and Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. (54) 
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Then as a parting gesture of political retribution pressure from 
the Tory constituencies forced the Government to introduce the 1927 
Trades Dispute Act aimed at restricting trade union activity. 
(2) The New Politics of !blernisation and Class Incorporation 
The defeat of the miners while simultaneously deepening and 
prolonging the politics of reaction also entrenched the right in the 
T. U. C. and the Labour Party and opened a space whereby the Labour 
right could contemplate co-operation with capital. Alongside co-
operation went a rejection of large scale militancy and a recognition 
that despite the crisis, capitalism was not about to collapse. 
Citrine, for example, observing that; 
"the system which we call capitalism has changed its form 
in the last 100 years tremendously and has adapted itself 
with remarkable flexibility to changing conditions. That 
it will change even more in the next few generations 
cannot be doubted."(SS) 
Given this continuance a solution to the crisis had to be found 
within the existing system. The new role for the T.U.C. was therefore 
spelt out in the General Council's Report to the 1928 T.U.C. Congress. 
According to this the trade union movement should; 
"say boldly that not only is it concerned with the 
prosperity of industry, but that it is going to have a 
voice as to the way industry is carried on, so that it 
can influence the new developments that are taking place. 
The ultimate policy of the movement can find more use for 
an efficient industry than a derelict one, and the unions 
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can use their power to promote and guide the scientific 
reorganisation of the industry as well as to obtain 
material advantages from that reorganisation."(S6) 
In short the trade tmions should assist reorganisation in the 
hope of raising the living standards of their members and creating 
long term general prosperity. MOreover, by showing a willingness to 
co-operate with capital the trade unions sought to influence outcomes 
and gain status. 
But it was not only a pragmatic acceptance of defeat in the 
general strike which promoted the new mood of co-operation. A number 
of other faetors were at work. First the return to the gold standard 
of 1925 had penalised the export industries while favouring finance 
capital. This policy, combined with high unemployment and insecurity 
notably in department I industries(S7) convinced many leading trade 
unionists that there was an over-riding industrial interest as such 
and that labour and employer shared a coi1Bllon concern in overcoming the 
economic crisis. 
Second, dominant groups within the trade union movement were 
rethinking capitalism. As Jacques(SS) notes capitalism was now 
conceived of as an evolving system. There was now an increasing 
separation between ownership and control reflected in the growth of a 
strata of professional managers. Competition, another distinguishing 
feature of capitalism, was being replaced by monopoly concentration 
and centralisation. Capitalism would therefore evolve into State 
Monopoly Capitalism which for some became equated with socialism. 
Within this problematic the old exploitative irrational 
capitalism was naturally being replaced by a rational system. 
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Socialism did not have to be struggled for. The challenge now was to 
get labour's voice heard and put labour on an equal footing with 
capital in the corridors of power. 
Within capital it was large and new capital such as the big 
international science based industries like chemicals, rubber and oil 
and new industries such as electrical engineering and cars that 
regarded the co-operation of labour as critical to the success of 
rationalisation. It was therefore this section of capital which 
initiated the Mend-Turner talks with the T.U.C. aimed at facilitating 
rationalisation and drawing labour into an alliance with big capital. 
Ultimately these discussions and the agreed joint reports were 
rejected by the Federation of British Industries and the National 
Confederation of Employers Organisations. Organisations dominated by 
small, medium and old capital in staple industries where low profits 
and labour intensive production was the norm. 
However, despite the collapse of the Mbnd-Turner initiative the 
fact of the talks taking place at all was symptomatic of a change of 
attitude by a section of capital. By the mid 1930's there was a 
dawning recognition amongst capitalists both nationally and locally 
that the old nee-liberal policies not only depressed demand and made 
matters worse but also threatened social peace and stability. Given 
the massive amount of capital still tied up in the region local 
capital had an immediate interest in finding new solutions to the 
crisis. Some of these solutions finding reflection in the 
organisations set up and the policies they elaborated. 
In 1925 the Tyneside Development Conference came into being. 
The Times Trade and Engineering Supplement of 1934 saying that: 
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"It was established with the support of such local 
corporations and urban district cotmcils as were 
empowered to contribute financially, the Tyne Improvement 
Commission, the public utility companies and some of the 
large landowners in the district, in short, those 
interests that were most likely to benefit by a revival 
of industry ... ( 59 ) 
Its key purpose was the attraction of new industries, 
publicizing Tyneside products and acting as a · clearing house for 
inquiries about sites for new works, facilities, rates and labour 
supply on Tyneside. After 1935 the Conference became the Tyneside 
Industrial Development Board and as well as national capital it was 
considered that; 
"Foreign manufacturers must be attracted and an extensive 
advertising campaign to bring before the world the 
facilities and ·advantages on Tynes ide was 
tmdertaken ... (60) 
Part of Tyneside' s advantage, it was said, being a ready supply of 
willing and adaptable labour. 
In 1934 the Special Areas Commissioners experimented with the 
establishment of the North East Trading Estates Ltd, the most 
significant estate being located at Team Valley, Gateshead. Then in 
1935 the Commissioners assisted in the formation of the North East 
Development Board under the chairmanship of Lord Ridley. The stated 
aim of N.E.D.B. was to facilitate; 
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"the exchange of opinions and concerted action on non-
party lines by representatives of a great variety of 
interests who have no other corrnnon meeting grmmd ... (61) 
Those interests included local and cot.mty cot.mcils, M.P. 's, trade 
unionists and local capital. All represented on the N.E.D.B. cot.mcil. 
Clearly the N.E.D.B. was the organisational expression of a cross 
class alliance formed with the intention of elaborating a consensus on 
economic and social policy. Part of the ideological cement holding 
this alliance together was an appeal to regional sentiment based on a 
perception of corrnnon suffering during the inter-war depression. The 
solution to the crisis involving all the key interests constituting 
the region pulling together. 
Within the N.E.D.B. cot.mcil it was capital which took the lead 
in initiating policy. However the main role of the organisation was 
that of a pressure group seeking to influence central government and 
shape the operations of the North East Trading Estates, the North East 
Housing Association and local authorities. Meanwhile in terms of 
policy the central feature to emerge from the N.E.D.B. was a common 
agreement on the necessity of state involvement in· the control of 
indtistrial location especially since the 'new' inter-war industries 
had been mostly located in the South East. This call for state 
'control' marking a recognition that market forces alone could not 
guarantee that new industries would set up in the North East. 
In 1940 the N.E.D.B. was dissolved and in its place a new 
organisation, the Northern Industrial Group, was established in 1943. 
Fogarty (6Z) suggesting that the reason for the dissolution being that 
the N.E.D.B. was "overweighted on the side of the local authorities" 
and hence not open enough to the needs of capital. According to the 
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Benwell Cormmmity Development Project< 63) the Northern Industrial 
Group was meant to correct this imbalance to one favouring industrial 
capital. Whatever the reason for the dissolution, the Northern 
Industrial Group developed and elaborated the tentative policies of 
the N.E.D.B. while continuing to seek support from labour and local 
authority interests. 
A pamphlet published by the Northern Industrial Group in 1946 
described the origins of the Group as follows:-
"Early in 1943 a few people met privately rmder the 
chairmanship of Lord Ridley to try and estimate what the 
post--war position of the North East was likely to be, 
e$pecially in regard to employment and industry and to 
consider what might be done to prevent a recurrence of 
those conditions which developed after the war of 1914-18 
and which culminated in the North East becoming a 
'Depressed Area' ... (64 ) 
What then occurred was that; 
"This small body which was the nucleus of the Group set 
out its views, which were then referred to other 
industrialists and to a mnnber of leaders of the Trade 
Union movement in the North East for their corrnnent and 
support ... (6S) 
Subsequently the Northern Industrial Group developed into a 
strong lobby, financed by local capital, with powerful research panels 
covering many branches of industry. In 1944 the North East 
Development Association was formed with the Group operating as its 
industrial component while retaining its independent existence. The 
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membership of the Group in 1946 encompassing all the leading sectors 
of capital in the North East with Viscount Ridley acting as Chairman 
and Clive Cookson Vice Chairman. 
The policies of the Group were set out in two documents, namely 
"Considerations Affecting Post War Employment in the North East"(66) 
published in 1943 and their "Memorandum on the Government White Paper 
on Employment Policy"(67) published in 1944. Taken together both 
documents represented a new policy direction uniting the various 
regional interests and included calls for; 
(a) Continuity of employment in each part of the 
country following the shift from a war to a peace 
economy. 
(b) Any deficiencies in employment being met by schemes 
of public works. 
(c) A stable level of employment in heavy industry. 
(d) Retention of population and an abandonment of 
labour transference outside the region. 
(e) Clearance of derelict buildings to encourage 
development. 
(f) Amendment of housing legislation to assist labour 
mobility within the region. 
(g) Building houses for business executives in order to 
promote the growth of industry. 
(h) Diversification of industry in order to ensure 
adequate employment. 
(i) Government finance to help the conversion from war 
to peace production. 
(j) Government measures to assist industry secure 
overseas markets. 
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(k) Government loans to industry at low rates of 
interest. 
(1) Government action to speed up the pace of factory 
construction in the region and encourage new 
industries to locate in the North East. 
This programme then was very much inter-related, the call for 
new and diversified industry implying the retention and reassembly of 
labour in new locations. For capital the new regional programme 
offered the opportunity to expand sales and income, for labour it held 
out the prospect of full employment and, via N.I.G. and the N.E.D.A., 
the chance to influence policy. 
Finally, the Memorandtnn of 1944 proposed that the Northern 
Industrial Group and the North East Development Association acting 
jointly with regional branches of Government Departments would be best 
placed to implement the recommendations embodied in the 1943 and 1944 
documents. The basis for this claim being that they constituted 
broadly representative organisations acting in the regional interest. 
By 1944, therefore, the regi0!181 bourgeoisie was advocating 
State intervention in the region and the economy in ·contrast to 
earlier pronouncements about the sanctity of the free market. Clearly 
Lord Ridley and other leading figures had concluded, from their 
experience of running the war economy, that State intervention did not 
necessarily equal socialism. 
The new programme, by addressing the need of labour for 
employment and by incorporating labour representation via N.I.G. and 
the N.E.D.A., sought to harness labour support for a project of 
regional modernisation directed by the regional bourgeoisie. 
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CLASS POSITIONING AND .CAPITAL DIVERSIFICATION 
By the 1930's many of the most significant members of the 
bourgeoisie had followed the lead of Ridley and Cookson and moved out 
of Newcastle to country estates in Northumberland and Durham. The 
estates they left behind and the few undeveloped West city sites 
providing a base for several emerging building companies such as 
William Leech and J. T. Bell. 
The Samuel Commission, it will be recalled, had recommended that 
the difficulties besetting the coal industry could only be solved by 
amalgamations. To implement this policy a Coal M:i,nes Reorganisation 
Commission was set up and as anticipated the effect of amalgamation 
was to concentrate still further the ownership and control of industry 
in the hands of a small number of coal owners. The P.E.P. report of 
1934 summarising the position as follows; 
"In nearly every district it is probably true to say that 
three quarters of the production is concentrated in less 
than half the total number of pits, and in the hands of 
less than a quarter of the total number of colliery 
ow.ners ... (6B) 
As far as Northumberland and Durham were concerned twelve 
families, including the Cooksons and Ridleys, where directors and 
major share holders in coal companies employing a workforce of 60,000 
and producing 20 million tons per annum or 45% of the entire output of 
the two counties. 
Further State support for the coal owners came with the 1930 
Coal Mines Act which allowed the owners to create district cartels for 
fixing the price and output of coal for each colliery. This was 
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followed up in 1936 by a central selling scheme established with the 
intention of raising prices. In such circumstances it was not 
surprising that profits and dividends rose. Yet the overall strategy 
of the coal companies was one of minimal re-investment in mining. 
Instead the profits from coal were re-directed towards more profitable 
sectors. This process of capital diversification already apparent in 
the 1930's was to become even more marked in the post-war period. 
At the same time second and third generation family members were 
moving into the new constnner goods industries and public utilities, 
into banking and insurance, investment holding companies, property 
companies and building societies and professions such as stockbroking 
and law which were orientated towards money management. For example, 
J.W.B. Pease sat on the board of Lloyd.s Bank in the 1920's became 
chainnan for 23 years and was later joined by Lord Ridley. While 
Ridley himself became a director of the Yorkshire Insurance Group and 
the Newcastle and Gateshead Gas Co., with his son, the fourth 
Viscount, becoming a director of Tyne Tees Television, the Northern 
Rock Building Society, Barclays Bank and the Swan Hlmter Group. 
Likewise the 1920's and 30's saw a growth in Investment Trust 
fonnatioJ:?., their funds swollen from coal profits. 
As capital flowed into the finance capital sector significant 
family members entered the professions best placed to handle the 
transfer of funds and provide specialist advice. Of particular 
importance here was the solicitors firm of Dickinson, Miller and 
Turnbull. This company, whose partners were related through marriage 
to the Joicey family, played a central role in managing investment 
funds and developing owner occupation through their professional and 
directorship involvement with the Northern Rock Building Society. 
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Owner occupation in turn generated an increasing flow of conveyancing 
fees for the firm. 
By the late 30's and early 40's therefore the regional 
bourgeoisie was both diversifying its interests and positioning itself 
to take advantage of a modernisation policy it had played a key part 
in defining. 
CONCUJSION 
Prior to the first world war, the economy of the North East, 
although centred on coal, steel, shipbuilding and heavy engineering, 
was buoyant. Much of this upsurge of activity being based on the 
production of armaments. 
Outside the northern region, new consumption based industries 
were establishing themselves in the South East while on a world scale 
the competitive position of British industry was starting to be 
tmdermined by the rise of new productive forces in other countries 
notably the u.s.A. and Germany. Consequently much needed capital for 
investment went where it could get a higher rate of profit either to 
the constnnption goods sector of the South East or abroad or to the 
colonies of the empire. This export of capital serving to starve the 
peripheral regions such as the North East of investment and lock their 
economies into a spiral of disadvantage in relation to competitor 
regions. 
After 1918 and the end of the war, the British economy 
experienced a short boom. Then comes 1921 and the start of a deep and 
lasting over-production crisis. This crisis mostly being centred on 
the investment goods industries but having knock on effects by 
reducing demand for consumption goods as investment sector workers are 
made unemployed. However, unemployment is unevenly spread across the 
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national space reflecting the reliance of certain regions on the 
investment goods sector. In the North East for example male 
unemployment in the Northumberland Colliery area reached 33.7% in Jnne 
1925.(69) 
· · In 1919 Sankey had reconnnended nationalisation of the mines in order 
to ensure a supply of cheap fuel, reverse nnder investment and 
ameliorate labour demands within the industry as well as damp down 
wider class action. This essentially corporatist recommendation, 
which included conciliation and no strike arrangements, was not, 
however, acceptable to the government, to the coal owners or to 
capital in general. However, the miners were not be be confronted 
directly but. quietened by wage increases and shorter hours. 
By 1926 the solution of capital to the crisis, as illust,rated by 
the employers' response to the Samuel Commission, was to call for wage 
cuts and the lengthening of working hours. State intervention in the 
form of the nationalisation of the coal industry was rejected while 
subsidies to the industry were abolished. On the other hand a coal 
cormnission to encourage further amalgamation was established. A 
proposal which favoured big coal capital. The neo-liberal solution 
going further still with its emphasis on punitive and restrictive 
welfare policies and the encouragement of surplus labour to move out 
of the "distressed areas". 
The welfare reforms enacted between 1885 and 1914 together with 
a series of electoral reforms starting in the 1860's enfranchised ever 
more of the working class and helped incorporate that class into the 
nation while providing legitimacy for the state. Therefore by 1926 
the British state was nnderpinned and armoured by institutional 
democracy, an amalgam of coercion plus consent with consent being the 
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operative factor. In this context the economic demands of the general 
strikers although threatening to spill over into a wider political 
. challenge are contained and fail to develop into a hegemonic strategy 
which can transform the consent of the majority to the rule of 
capital. 
The defeat of the general strike strengthened the right wing and 
reformist elements within the working class. At the same time 
significant factions within capital recognised the dysfunction of neo-
liberal policies and sought to elaborate a modernisation strategy 
which among other things called for state intervention, the 
maintenance of "traditional industries", a stop to labour transference 
and the diversification of industry. This new strategy is then given 
organised form with the setting up of regional organisations such as 
the North East Development Board, the Northern Industrial Group and 
the North East Development Association. Significantly N.E.D.A. is a 
broadly based group which includes labour representation reflecting 
the strategy of important sections of local capital to "bring labour 
on board". 
By the late thirties and forties the writing was on the wall for 
the coal industry. Family members from the coal dynasties were 
expanding their interests and taking on directorships in other areas 
such as banking, finance and insurance. Coal would eventually become 
nationalised but the coal owners were already attempting to direct and 
shape the economy of the future. 
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ASPEX:rS OF M>DERNISATION 
The last chapter noted the break between the neo-liberal 
policies of the 1920's and the policies of the late 1930's which, like 
Keynesianism, were intended to save capital from itself. 
This chapter focusses on the modernisation of South East 
Northtnnberland which centred on the development of Cramlington New 
Town. A significant feature of Cramlington being that it subordinated 
public investment to private capital. 
At one level Cramlington represented an investment project which 
contributed to the evolution of Leech and Bellway builders into big 
national companies. At another Cramlington signified the trans-
formation of a coalfield area into a locality containing a much more 
varied workforce with many of these workers buying their own homes. A 
pre-condition for this massive extension of home ownership implied by 
the building of Cramlington being a general rise in working class 
income and availability of mortgage credit. 
Lcistly, this chapter has a wider purpose which is to say 
something about the character of the coal industry as it was 
transformed from a privatised to a nationalised concern. In addition 
Cramlington is placed in the context of the various 'Plans for Coal' 
and regional development strategy while the continuing influence and 
importance of Lord Ridley is indicated. 
1. THE POLITICS OF. NATIONALISATION 
The Nationalisation Bill of 1919, re-introduced in 1923, 1924 
and 1925, in which Coal's hand was paramount, gave to a National 
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Mining Council and to District and Local (Pit) Mining Councils the 
real power of management of the mines. Half the places on the 
National and District Councils being reserved for Federation 
representatives and half the members of the pit councils being elected 
annually by miners at the pit. Moreover, under the terms of the Bill, 
no compensation was to be paid to landowners for royalties and 
wayleaves while the mines themselves would be valued on annual output 
in the five years preceding the war and compensation to the mineowners 
made by the issue of state mines stock. 
In contrast to this system of joint control involving the 
Federation and others appointed by the Crown, the Sankey 
reconunendations made the various councils purely advisory. The real 
power of decision and policy making resting with the Minister of Mines 
and the district chairmen and vice-chairmen appointed by him plus the 
numerous pit managers. Sankey therefore offered the Federation a 
voice but no real power or responsibility. It was these 
recommendations which the miners 1 representatives on the Commission, 
at the urging of the Fabian Sidney Webb, were prepared to accept. 
Additionally, the Sankey Commission proposed that royalties would be 
valued and purchased at a "total maximum sum" to be fixed by 
Parliament. Barry(l) therefore concludes that the "Sankey Report 
offered a smaller degree of industrial democracy than the Federation 
Bill." 
By 1925 the joint T.U.C., Labour Party and Miners 1 Federation 
Memorandum to the Sarrruel Commission was suggesting that the coal 
indtistry be ·transformed from simply an extractive industry to a 
nationalized energy producing and coal utilising industry. 
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"We suggest that the coal industry should become an 
organisation for mining coal, manufacturing electrical 
power on a very large scale, making both coke and 
smokeless fuel, and producing, in addition, gas, fuel, 
oils, annnonium compounds, chemical base materials for 
tars and other by-products. We propose that this 
transfonned industry should be nationally owned • .,( 2) 
In the event rather than an energy and chemical conglomerate as 
envisaged in 1925 nationalisation draw a boundary around coal. 
Yet apart from objecting to nationalisation in principle the 
Samuel Conmrission took exc,eption to the autonomy . of the proposed 
Production and Consumer Councils that would run the industry on the 
grounds that this autonomy would undermine ministerial responsibility 
and parliamentary sovereignty. 
By 1944 the General Council of the T.U.C. issued its "Interim 
Report on Post-War. Reconstruction ... (3) This report opposed worker 
participation in the regulation of public industry while supporting 
normal trade union functioning within the nationalised industries and 
the establishment of consultative works councils covering matters not 
falling with the scope of normal negotiating machinery. The task of 
management was to rest with full-time professional administrators 
accountable to their superiors. At the highest level, board members 
were to be selected solely on the basis of their competence to 
administer the industry and the board would be accountable to the 
public through a Minister responsible to Parliament. The T.U.C. could 
nominate a list of board candidates for selection by the Minister but 
any such candidates should, on appointment to the board, relinquish 
trade union position and responsibilities. No places were reserved on 
-119-
the board for T.U.C. candidates nor was the Minister required by law 
to appoint T.U.C. nominations. 
Broadly, the T. U. C. gave three reasons for rejecting workers' 
control or representation. First, the need to maintain trade union 
independence which otherwise would be compromised by workers on the 
board. Second, worker representatives could not simultaneously serve 
the Minister and the trade union. Third, Parliament through the 
appropriate Minister, must have final control over policy since 
Parliament represents the general will. 
In short the "Interim Report on Post-War Reconstruction" adopted 
a position which tied the nationalised coal industry to the State, 
limited the role of the trade unions to their traditional concerns of 
bargaining over wages and conditions and policing health and safety, 
reduced workers' control to consultation and exalted the role of the 
professional. Such a position represented the victory of Fabianism(4) 
over earlier guild socialist and syndicalist conceptions which kept 
the State at arm's length and stressed workers' autonomy and control. 
In so far as Sankey had approved a very similar formulation to the 
1944 recormnendations it was a position which could be supported by 
sectors of the establishment. 
Yet only some of even these modest proposals were embodied in 
the 1946 Coal Mines Nationalisation Act. The Minister of Fuel and 
Power was able to appoint the Board and give "directives of a general 
character" in "Matters affecting the national interest". However, the 
practice of accepting T.U.C. nominations for appointment to the Board 
was not included in the Act. Moreover, the first draft of the Bill 
did not propose even consultative machinery. It was only as a result 
of Conservative pressure that Section 46 was later included which 
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imposed a duty on the Board of consulting with the trade unions to set 
up machinery for the settlement of labour disputes and also for 
consultation on health and safety and other matters. 
In practice managers retained the right to make policy and take 
decisions while consultation rarely took place prior to decisions 
being made and was usually concerned with implementation. Moreover, 
the unions and workers were seldom allowed the detailed information 
necessary to form considered judgements and articulate alternatives. 
The trade unions could use the obligation on the Board to 
consult as a delaying, mechanism. They could ask the Board to supply 
information but it was at the Board's discretion whether it provided 
such information. 
In the immediate aftermath of nationalisation Shinwell as 
Minister for Fuel and Power asked the N.U.M. to submit nominations for 
Labour Directors of the Board at National and District level. The 
nominations were not, however, accepted and the N.U.M. General 
Secretary Ebby Edwards was appointed to the Board. In the divisions a 
large number of N.U.M. district officials were appointed mostly to 
labour management and industrial relations positions. Then, the 
ladder plan, a scheme aimed at giving a proportion of the amrual 
juvenile recruits a chance of promotion to management was introduced. 
This meant that over time management was increasingly made up of the 
sons of miners who had come up the ladder. The in-house nature of the 
training producing a strong identification with the industry and the 
Board. 
From the start of nationalisation senior N.U.M. officials in the 
North East became closely involved in the management structures of the 
N.C.B. some even joining the divisional and national board. These 
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officials came to share much of the Coal Board's ideology as did many 
local M.P.'s and councillors. The divide between capital and labour 
was displaced by a discourse that spoke of working for our industry on 
behalf of the people. Labour M.P.'s such as Lord Robens could now 
move effortlessly from his position as M.P. for Wansbeck and then 
Blyth to the chair of the Coal Board in 1961. 
This patronage system at the level of locality was reflected at 
national level. On the one hand, appointments to the National Board 
were in the gift of the Minister, on the other trade union appointees 
were required to relinquish all trade union responsibilities. These 
two factors ensuring a functional Board of like minded individuals. 
In any case by 1957 Will Paynter then President of the South Wales 
miners was complaining that; 
"Progressively trade union men appointed to the Board are 
subordinated to control by production executives ••• a 
process accelerated since the Fleck Report."(S) 
Hanson(6) confirming that the report had brought ~he_ industry under a 
much more centralised and authoritative mangerial structure. 
As early as 1941 Picture Post was asking what kind of Britain 
are we fighting for? In answer it quoted a miner saying; 
"It is security against war and exploitation by man or 
country." ( 7) 
The solution to exploitation, squalor and poverty being sought in 
pianning and nationalisation. Three years later the T.U.C. Interim 
Report on Post War Reconstruction gave as reasons for nationalisation 
and public control; 
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"Full employment; price stability; the protection of the 
people, either as workers or consumers against 
exploitation; the equitable distribution of income and 
economic opportunity and the promotion of national 
development and national security ... (B) 
Moreover nationalisation would ensure that; 
"industrial efficiency serves its proper purpose of 
improving the standard of life of the conmrunity ... (9) 
Clearly more was being expected of nationalisation than could be 
delivered given the form of nationalisation and its· insertion in a 
dominant capitalist social formation. 
By 1945 the Reid Commit tee <10) reported that the coal industry 
lacked investment and modern equipment, relied on a largely untrained 
workforce and had a lower O.M.S. than any comparable coal industry in 
the world. As for the coal owners they were criticise~ both for their 
individualism and for taking "the short term view". Furthermore, the 
problem of co-operation between capital and labour was the most 
difficult the industry had to face with attitudes being coloured by 
past history, future hopes and a lack of trust between the parties. 
However, the necessary large scale reconstruction of the mines could 
not, the Committee concluded; 
"be satisfactorily carried out by the industry organised 
as it is today."(ll) 
Despite the Committee recommending compulsory amalgamation 
rather than nationalisation a clear coincidence of view can be noted 
with both labour and progressive capital recognising that the coal 
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industry could not continue in the old way. Nationalisation was a 
pre-condition for investment in and modernisation of the industry 
which, insofar as it provided a cheap energy source and maintained 
worker subordination, was acceptable to capital in general. 
On the 1st January 1947, the Coal Industry_was·nationalised and 
the N.C.B. flag hoisted at all the nation's pits. A miner remembering 
the day with these words; 
"The manager came to a point in the colliery and he said, 
'This is your colliery' • That was the beginning and end 
of it all, because nothing was further from the truth. 
We still had to wo~k for a living. The_manager was the 
same manager, he would still make the agreements, good or 
bad."(lZ) 
Clearly democracy stopped at the pit gates. In the workplace the 
miner was still a wage labourer whose capacity to influence Coal Board 
policy, investment decisions, choice of manager or day to day 
operations was. limited or non~existen~. But for some nationalisation 
equalled socialism or was ·a step towards socialism, for others it was 
an end in itself. Macmillan, however, accurately recorded that; 
"This is not socialism it is State Capitalism."(!)) 
His worry being that under these circumstances lack of participatory 
mechanisms would inhibit industrial harmony. 
2. The Coal Industry 
In 1947 the Coal Board took over nearly 1,500 collieries and 
over 800 separate companies. The high level of Government 
compensation at £164 million, in exchange for a rundown and 
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technically backward industry, pacified the coal owners and made 
nationalisation tolerable. In addition, the prospect of a steady 
supply of cheap fuel making possible low production costs satisfied 
manufacturing capital. For the newly elected Labour government 
nationalisation placed the coal industry within the sphere of the 
State and ministerial controL This in turn subjected the industry to 
the other social and macro-economic objectives such as price stability 
and the defeat of inflation. 
The war years had witnessed a shortage of manpower in the pits 
necessitating both "Essential Works Orders" requiring miners to stay 
on the job and the drafting in of "Bevin Boys" to augment mining 
labour. However, throughout the war years manpower shortages 
persisted, absenteeism rose, materials were in short supply and 
equipment worn out, all this causing coal production to fall between 
1939 and 1945. 
As the war ended the industry was faced with the twin 
imperatives of undertaking a major reconstruction and investment 
progrannne while meeting natio~l energy. demand. However, it was 
. 
satisfying demand by maximising coal output which took first priority. 
On the other hand the industry was constrained by a Government 
objective to keep coal prices low. The Ministers' argument being that 
raising coal prices would lead to a spiral of other price and wage 
increases and make more difficult the competitive position of British 
exports. Furthermore, the Government desired the restarting of coal 
exports claiming that; 
"the foreign exchange from their trade will be essential 
to the country's economy" [by helping to correct balance 
of payment problems]C14) 
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The same concern for the balance of payments ruling out the 
importation of mining machinery while national mining machinery 
manufacturers lacked the means to produce the amount of equipment 
required and would need time to gear up their productive capacity. 
Against the background of these constraints the indu.Stry was 
immediately confronted with the interrelated problems of how to fund 
investment given a shortfall on internal revenue, how to hold on to 
labour in the post war boom and how to meet the pressing energy 
demand. The .N.C.B. 's solution was first to borrow from the treasury 
for investment, second to oppose the setting up of competing male 
manufacturing employment in the coalfields and third to establish 
joint production committees in order to raise the numbers working on 
the coal face, bring down absenteeism and increase output per man 
shift. 
With maximising output the first concern the N.C.B. began work 
on surveying the coalfields in order to set area production quotas, 
assess the feasibility of individual colliery modernisation projects 
and allo~te capital to the coalfield areas. An insight into the coal 
board's thinking being provided by the North East Development Area 
Plan(l5) whose statements on the coal industry rely on the work 
carried out and information provided by the N.C.B. According to the 
N.E.D.A. Plan three overlapping phases of coal industry modernisation 
could be distinguished; 
(a) an immediate very short term policy output through 
re-organisation can begin to be effective. 
(b) a middle phase of intensive re-organisation by 
which it is hoped to raise output per man shift 
from the present figure of 20 cwts. to 30 cwts. 
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(c) a longer tenn phase covering the next twenty five 
to thirty years during which much of the remaining 
coal reserves in the older mining areas may become 
exhausted. 
In relation to the Northumberland coalfield the authors of the 
N.E.D.A. Plan noted that; 
"We are of the opinion that comparatively stable 
conditions can be expected throughout the period of the 
plan, some forty years, though with a gradual shift of 
emphasis to that part of the coalfield north of the River 
Blyth and a considerable falling off in production from 
many pits in the south in thirty to forty years. We are 
not aware of any large scale schemes of re-organisation 
that would give rise to appreciable labour redtmdancy. 
We may expect to see a gradual decline in the importance 
of the central Northumberland pits, mostly in a belt of 
territory running north-east from Throckley to Blyth; but 
there are interspersed with these pits a limited number 
of very long life collieries and only the comparatively 
small Throckley-Newburn area west of Newcastle, where 
conditions approximate more closely to north-west Durham, 
is likely to be completely worked out within the next 
twenty-five years. 
Whilst the position in Northumberland, therefore, 
indicates no serious problem of man-power redtmdancy, 
there may be a slow lessening of employment in the 
industry south of Blyth, though the rate of pit closure 
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should be sufficiently gradual for the area to adapt 
itself to change."(l6) 
With the first priority being the maximisation of coal 
production the N.C.B. considered the amount of coal reserves in the 
ground the main factor determining the life of a colliery. Coalfield 
areas could then be classified as "stable long life" or "declining 
areas" depending on the extent of reserves. The Throck.ley/Newburn 
area was therefore a declining area, the coalfield north of Blyth a 
stable long life area and the central south east an area facing 
gradual decline over thirty years but interspersed with longer life 
pits. 
The N.E.D.A. Plan therefore accepted this dual classification 
system along with the continuing centrality of the coal industry and 
the need to sustain maximum coal production. These background 
principles then determined other policies outlined in the N.E.D.A. 
Plan. Therefore the Plan's authors could state that; 
"From the national point of view, with coal the most 
precious and urgently needed of industrial raw materials, 
to introduce into the mining areas, without surplus male 
labour, male-employing industries housed in up-to-date 
factories and able to offer pleasant work at good wages, 
would inevitably attract men away from the mines with 
disastrous consequences for coal production; the miner is 
a skilled worker and it would be a misuse of our 
restricted mining labour force to divert him to other 
industry so long as that skill is needed in the colliery. 
Only by bringing in additional population, which would 
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provide the labour needed for new industries, could the 
necessary manpower be provided. But the attraction of 
further population is not desirable as these areas are, 
on the whole, areas of high population densities where 
. . 
great -difficulty is experienced in finding land free from 
mining subsidence to house even the existing population 
We have, therefore, based our plan on the assumption 
that no appreciable volume of alternative male employment 
should be deliberately introduced into stable long-life 
mining districts which are unlikely to possess much 
surplus male labour." ( l7) 
Competing male manufacturing employment was to be steered away from 
stable long-life coalfields while non-competing industry was to be 
allowed. The Plan therefore adds that; 
"Whilst we make no proposals for major industrial 
development in the east Durham and Northumberland 
coalfields (apart form the development of sites at 
Peterlee in Durham and HOlywell in Northumberland) ••• it 
is essential that for each stable long-life mining 
district there should be make available sufficient jobs 
for women who want them and for the comparatively small 
number of men unsuited for mining."(l8) 
If these proposals are read in conjrmction with the Board's 
three stage development programme then it is clear that the Board 
wanted to keep labour in the coalfields until the time came when the 
reconstructed collieries could meet demand. Moreover, as the first 
review of the Northumberland County Development Plan published in 1964 
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confirmed, there was a serious power shortage in the early 1950's, 
therefore; 
"it was the view of the Government [i.e. the Ministry of 
Fuel and Power] that male employing industry should not 
be introduced into the coalfield."(l9) 
Both the Ministry of Fuel and Power and the Coal Board fonning an 
alliance to discourage alternative male employment. At the same time 
the N.C.B. moved to influence the location and establishment of 
housing and industrial estates either because such development would 
sterilise coal reserves or because the stability of the site could not 
be guaranteed. At Ashington, for instance, while the N.E.D.A. Plan 
recommended 647 additional acres for residential development the Coal 
Board was only prepared to release 100 acres, claiming that further 
development would sterilise reserves. Recognising the importance of 
avoiding the sterilisation of coal seams the N.E.D.A. Plan suggested 
the dovetailing of Coal Board and County Plans. However, with the 
national economy ~d local labour markets dependent on coal the 
N.E.D.A. Plan reflected a high degree of subservience to the needs of 
the N.C.B. 
3. The Plans for Coal 1950 to 1959 
The N.C.B. proposals for long-term development were published in 
1950 in its first "Plan for Coal". (ZO) A plan conceived when demand 
for more coal was urgent. In it the Board considered that without 
substantiai investment the problem of under-production of coal in 
relation to demand would recur. 
Over the period of the Plan, from 1950 to 1965 an investment 
programme of £486 million was proposed and an annual target output of 
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240Mt set for 1961 to 1965. An increase of 38Mt over the 1949 output 
of 202Mt. Additionally, in order to cut unit costs the Board intended 
to reduce employment by 11% to 618,000 and to concentrate production 
in over 250 reconstructed collieries out of the 950 collieries then in 
existence. 
· In Northtnnberland output was to rise by 20% to 14.0Mt by 1961-
65, from its 1949 level of 11.7Mt, while manpower was to fall by 17% 
to 35,600. Each coalfield was allocated capital expenditure with 
Northumberland getting £27 million for the period 1950-65 or 5.55% of 
the total allocation. Other areas such as Yorkshire, Nottingham and 
Derby and South lvales together receiving 49% of the total capital 
allocation. 
All twenty-one coalfield areas would see a measure of 
improvement or reconstruction but clearly some areas would be 
developed more than others. This selective concentration of capital 
in certain areas and collieries raised questions over the future of 
deselected pits. However, the Plan did not specify which collieries 
would be recons.tn~:cted and which not, nor did it indicate the life 
span of all the individual pits under the Board's control. 
In the short term as long as the priority was to maximise coal 
production, loss making pits would continue to be subsidised by 
profits from low cost collieries and the N.C.B. would retain its 
financial break even target taking one year with the next. 
The market forecasts of the Plan for Coal were followed two 
years later by those of the Committee on National Policy for the Use 
of Fuel and Power Resources (the Ridley Commit tee). ( 21 ) From the 
evidence submitted an acute concern about energy shortage was to the 
fore and the importance of coal stressed together with the argument 
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that N.C.B. levels of output were set too low. The Ridley Committee, 
therefore, suggested that by 1965 demand for coal would be 
approximately 250Mt and stressed the need to increase coal exports. 
In 1956 the first review of the Plan for Coal entitled 
'Investing in Coal 1 was publish~d. (22) The optimistic forecasts of 
future demand for coal wen~ reflected in the report and an output 
figure of 240Mt retained for 1965. The N.C.B. going as far as to 
state that after 1960; 
"the problems of over-production for the coal industry 
scarcely arise." 
To reach the target of 240Mt investment at over double the rate 
calculated in 1950 was deemed necessary. Furthermore, the total 
output target was to be met by a greater contribution from the low 
cost East Midlands division and by some 10 million tons of coal 
produced by opencast mining which had been scheduled to cease by 1965 
under the original plan. Consequently the 1950 output forecasts for 
the Northern and Durham divisions were revised down by 0.3% in the 
case of Northumberland and Cumberland and 3.0% with regard to Durham. 
As far as colliery reconstruction was concerned the Review noted 
that few projects had been completed and that reconstruction was 
taking longer then originally thought. The implication of this being 
that with demand buoyant manpower was expected to fall more slowly 
than originally forecast in 1950. Hence to maintain output the Board 
would continue to hold on to labour by resisting the establishment of 
alternative employment in the coalfields. 
By 1959 the N.C. B. 1 s next significant strategy document was 
published. Known as the "Revised Plan for Coa1"( 23 ) it reflected the 
changed circumstances of the time. Now the Board was saying that; 
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"In Britain it is no longer necessary to plan to meet a 
continuous increase in dema.nd."(24) 
The 1965 production target was therefore, for the first time, revised 
downwards to 220Mt. 
Coal stocks had been built up in all the coalfields and by 1958 
stood at 36Mt. The Board was now dealing with an over-production 
crisis which only a few years earlier it had said would "scarcely 
arise". What had changed was not a fall in the demand for energy but 
the increasing substitution of coal by cheap oil for both domestic and 
industrial purposes and for the generation of electricity. Therefore 
in the summer of 1954 the Ministry of Fuel and power had stated that 
the Government's fuel policy was; 
"to supplement supplies of coal with other kinds of 
energy - atomic energy as soon as possible and oil 
forthwith."( 25 ) 
The C.E.G.B. being at once authorized to convert sixteen power 
stations to oil burning while in 1955 "A Programme of Nuclear 
Power"(Z6) foresaw an increasing role for nuclear power in the 
provision of the nation's energy requirements. The promise being that 
nuclear power would be cheap and clean. A promise which subsequently 
turned out to be false. 
The implications of a fall in coal's share of the energy market 
having serious employment consequences for the North East coalfields. 
For now that increasing output was no longer a major concern, 
collieries which would otherwise have been kept open became earmarked 
for closure. Secondly, competitive pressures from other fuels, notably 
cheap oil, plus the slackening of demand for coal, meant that economic 
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criteria came to replace physical reserves as the measure of a viable 
pit. These forces deepening the tendency for uneven development both 
within and between coalfield areas as limited investment was directed 
towards those pits. with the best rates of return. . For a time though 
the N.C.B. stq.ck to its revised 1965 output target of 220Mt to be met 
mostly from reconstructed and new collieries and a smaller labour 
force. Therefore in August 1959 the Coal Board's chairman, James 
Bowman, told the N.U.M. that to bring output into line with the 
revised target output; 
"between 205 and 250 collieries would close mostly in 
Northumberland, Cumberland, Durham and the North West and 
only about half the closures would be because reserves 
were exhausted."(27) 
The prospect of unemployment and surplus labour in the Northern 
coalfields would now become a public issue exercising the minds of 
county planners and politicians alike. 
4. The Reconstruction of the South Fast Northumberland Coalfield 
In 1949 the N.E.D.A. Plan while opposing competing male employ-
ment in stable long life coalfields foresaw a gradual lessening of 
employment in the coal industry south of Blyth as reserves became 
exhausted. A process which was expected to take thirty or forty years. 
The Plan therefore concluded that the northern part of the 
coalfield would expand mining employment and therefore; 
"there should be comparatively little surplus male labour 
and nowhere is there a sufficient concentration of 
population to justify an industrial estate of more than 
very limited size ... (27) 
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In the case of the southern part of the coalfield a "Quasi New 
Town" was proposed at Holywell on a 2,093 acre site and with an 
ultimate population of 44,200 people. According to Pepler and 
McFarlane, . Holywell would be required to acconnnodate overspill 
population fram Tyneside and also provide employment for; 
"any future labour surplus in the mining area south of 
Blyth. ,.( 2B) 
However the majority of the New Town's inhabitants would; 
"be required to make a daily journey of a few miles to 
and from their work [on Tyneside] ••• For the minority, 
some of whom may be members of the families of the 
majority, it should be possible to provide work in the 
new town and industrial areas must be provided and 
equipped for this purpose 
loosening out of the 
Furthermore, with the 
population structure by 
accormnodation of its overspill in peripheral expansion, 
associated where possible with industrial estates, it 
follows that a half may have to be called to the further 
expansion of some of the existing industrial estates, 
notably at West Chirton and possibly Bede, and industry 
that might have been steered to them sited instead on 
estates at Holywell. .. (29) 
Significantly the location of Holywell new town was largely determined 
by the need to avoid mining subsidence and the sterilisation of coal 
reserves, Pepler and McFarlane saying that; 
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"the coal situation is not bad and a large part of the 
area will be available irrnnediately and the remainder as 
required ... (30) 
The Northumberland section of the Plan stressing the need to 
physically restructure the area and reassemble the population in new 
settlements. 
Morpeth was not reconnnended to expand. However at Ashington 
reconstruction was considered essential. Part of the population being 
exported to the model village of Lynnouth and the Coal Board asked to 
release more land even if it involved the sterilisation of some coal. 
Bedlington was to be extended. The population of another nine 
villages removed and reassembled at Stakeford on land having no coal 
difficulties. The new unified village to contain 7,500 inhabitants. 
At Blyth it was considered essential to attract a major new 
employer of male labour to offset the expected redundancies in the 
shipbuilding industry. 
At Cramlington a further development site was identified on 
which to locate the inhabitants of; 
"The obsolete villages of Cramlington,. Shankhouse, Fast 
Hartford, Klondyke, West Cramlington, Annitsford and 
Dudley ... (3l) 
Holywell in addition to taking Tyneside overspill was to rehouse the 
population of the surrounding abandoned villages while the whole 
population· of Dinnington Colliery village was to be brought to a site 
free from coal south of Seaton Burn. 
By 1949 then the N.E.D.A. was proposing a new settlement pattern 
for South Fast Northumberland in part shaped by the desire to avoid 
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coal measures. However, the Plan went further than this for as the 
1960 Seaton Valley Town Map noted; 
"Since the war, the policy has evolved of grouping new 
development in a few selected settlements and allowing 
others to remain static or decline. Several of the old 
colliery villages have either been completely demolished 
e.g. Havelock Place, West Cramlington) or are now largely 
derelict (e.g. Shankhouse, East and West Holywell)."(3Z) 
As early as 1949 therefore areas such as Bedlington, Stakeford, 
Cramlington and Holywell became earmarked for residential development 
while other areas were allowed to decline. 
In 1952 the County Council produced the 'County Development 
Plan' 0 3) which, while committed to relocating population in areas 
such as Cramlington, Seaton Delaval and Shiremoor, argued for economic 
retrenchment. The County Plan concluding its section on industry and 
employment with these remarks; 
"Briefly the Plan assl.IDles concentration on the dominant 
industries of coalmining, shipbuilding and engineering 
tempered by the general introduction of subsidiary 
industry to absorb women and men surplus to, or unsuited 
for, the heavy manual work which is all that is at 
present available."< 34 ) 
The N.C.B. had provided information about the life of pits in the 
Seaton Valley area and the immediate future seemed secure. The seven 
largest pits, ranging from the Maude and Eccles employing 1503 miners 
to the Nelson employing 505, had forecast lives of between ten and 
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twenty five years, while the smaller Gloria pit employing 235 men had 
a forecast life of less than ten years. Furthermore, new sink.ings 
were promised and the industry was set to expand north of Blyth so 
that according to the development plan; 
"there is in fact no reason to suppose that the present 
shortage of labour in the pits will not continue for some 
time, and over the period of the Plan [i.e. until 1971] 
the coal industry may well continue to employ the same 
number of workers as now."(35) 
In such circumstances; 
"it would be folly to introduce into numng areas an 
appreciable volrnne of male employment."(36) 
On the basis of the N.C.B. information and the optimistic projections 
of the first Plan for Coal the County Planners thought it would be 
necessary to find only 2, 750 additional jobs in the county over the 
next twenty years and that; 
"no specific provision should be made for redundant 
labour in the coal mining industry within the next five 
years."< 37) 
Seaton Valley was therefore to be allocated only 40 acres of land for 
industrial development out of a total county reservation of 887 acres. 
The County Plan remarking that; 
"The Council are not committed to accept the 
recommendation in the N.E.D.A. Report in favour of a 
quasi new town at Holywell preferring instead the North 
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Killingworth scheme ••• by reason of its situation in 
relation to the ••• displaced population of the riverside 
towns ... (3B) 
Later in 1960 the Seaton Valley Town Map would say; 
"The present and future mining programme renders most of 
the southern part of the Town Map area unsuitable for 
large scale development. Thus the proposal in the 
Pepler-McFarlane Plan for a new town in the vicinity of 
West Holywell cannot be implemented. In any case, its 
close proXimity to ·-the proposed large seale development 
at North Killingworth makes 
location ... (39) 
it an unsuitable 
This then was the position in 1952 with the County Council stressing 
the centrality of coal, the consolidation of existing industries and 
the scaling down of even the limited development proposed in the 
N.E.D.A. plan. Such a position, clearly supported the monopoly 
position of the N.C.B. and their ability to recruit and retain labour 
on terms they found favourable. Any awareness of the dangers of 
relying upon a single industry to provide the bulk of employment in a 
locality was held in check by optimistic forecasts about the future of 
the coal industry. 
5. The Cramlington New Town Proposal 
By late 1956 the forecasts and optimism expressed only four 
years earlier in the 1952 Development Plan suffered a severe setback 
when the County Planning Committee received the news that; 
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"the N.C.B. intended to reduce employment in coal mining 
in Seaton Valley from 5,900 to tmder 1,000 by 1971 and 
therefore it is apparent that some new source of 
employment will have to be fotmd if population is to be 
retained ... (40) 
It was therefore becoming clear that the Development Plan 
assumption, based on the 1950 Plan for Coal, of a stable coal industry 
operating at 1951 manpower levels tmtil 1971 was tmtenable. Instead a 
substantial decline in coal mining was to be expected during the 
period of the Development Plan. As a consequence Seaton Valley stood 
to lose its major employer of male labour with no alternative 
available unless something was done. The something being Cramlington 
New Town, first mentioned in a report to the Connty Planning Committee 
in 1958 when it concluded that; 
"consideration must be given to the selection of a 
further site for a major new residential area for 
development on comprehensive lines and everything points 
to Cramlington as being the most suitable situation for 
such development ... (40) 
However, even before 1958 William Leech Ltd was buying up sites 
in order to establish a substantial land bank and had just been 
refused planning permission for housing development by Seaton Valley 
Urban District Cotmcil. Significantly, Leech's agent did not appeal 
the decision and at a meeting of the District Cotmcil on the 28th 
October 1958 it was recommended that Leech be; 
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"granted the opportunity to make representations at a 
suitable time in the future when the pattern of 
development in the area is receiving attention."(4Z) 
The clear implication being that Seaton Valley Urban District Cotmcil 
would at some time in the future look favourably upon an application 
for private residential development. 
By May 1959 the County Planning Connnittee was considering the 
scheduling of Cramlington as a Comprehensive Development Area with a 
population of 20,000. But it was with the publication of the Seaton 
Valley District Town Map in 1960 that the first detailed statement 
about the development of Cramlington New Town was outlined. The 
rationale for the New Town being presented in terms of the need to do 
something about job loss in the coal sector and as a method of coping 
with overspill population from the northern half of the Tyneside 
ConUrbation. (43 ) Elphick, however, adds that in 1958 Northumberland 
County Conncil had suggested that Cramlington project to private 
developers as a response to their complaints about a shortage of 
building land. Subsequently the developers, William Leech Ltd and 
J.T. Bell and Sons, agreed to relinquish their interests in land at 
Killingworth on the understanding that they could have all the land 
necessary for housing and central area uses at Cramlington.(44) 
The Seaton Valley District Town Map(45 ) was· approved by the 
County Council in February 1961 despite opposition from Blyth Borough 
Council who objected to resour~es. bein.g concentrated at Cramlington. 
However, the Town Map now envisaged that Cramlington would have a 
population of 39,900 by 1971 and a long term population of 54,300. By 
1965 the population target had been revised to 60,550 and by 1970 to 
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62,000. The majority of the population to be made up of irmnigrants 
from North Tyneside. 
The involvement of private developers was again confirmed in a 
County Planning document of 1962 when it stated; 
"A development company [formed by Leech and Bell] secured 
an interest in the major part of the area and discussed 
the possibility of development with the planning 
authority. A master plan was the first necessity, but 
the resources of the planning authority were being 
applied to the Killingworth scheme. It was agreed that 
the proposal could be furthered by the appointment of a 
planning consultant to draw up a master plan. A firm of 
consultants was therefore engaged by the development 
company and a master plan presented in srnnmer 1961. .. (46) 
A crucial decision had therefore been taken by the County 
Council, the County Planning Department and Seaton Valley Urban 
District Council to involve private developers in constructing what 
was to become a predominantly owner occupied private sector New Town. 
This partnership arrangement has been described by Byrne ( 4 7) as 
producing a corporatist strategy for the resolution of the problems 
created by the restructuring of the Northumberland coal industry in 
the late SO's and early 60's. While undoubtedly a reasonable 
characterisation at one level, this assessment tells us nothing about 
why the New Town was sited at Cramlington rather than elsewhere. The 
avoidance of coal measures and risk of subsidence is one part of an 
explanation as is a factoral planning approach which pointed towards 
Cramlington. However another ingredient suggests the need for both 
-142-
the developers and the planning authority to secure the co-operation 
of the landowners in order to avoid planning delays. A task made 
easier by the fact that one of the major landowners within the 
Comprehensive Development Area was Lord Ridley who, with his son, sat 
on the County Planning Connnittee from 1958 to 1964<48) The son 
continuing on the planning connnittee to at least 1970, acting as vice 
chair from 1967 to 1969 and chair from 1969 to 1970. On the other 
hand the land owners stood to gain from the sale of land. For 
example, in 1962 the county council acquired 170 acres of land south 
of the railway and north of Station Road for industrial purposes. 
Part of this land was owned. by LOrd Ridley .• · Later, in 1966 Lord 
Ridley was able to play off the county council against the N.C.B., who 
wanted his land for open cast mining, in order to dispose of 278 acres 
north of the railway to the county council for £95,000. (49) The 
N.C.B. withdrawing both their objections to the scheduling of the 
C.D.A. and their bid for the Ridley land after they were offered 
another site for opencasting north of the River Wansbeck. 
A preliminary conclusion, therefore, suggests itself, namely 
that Lord Ridley stood to gain from the development of Cramlington and 
could guarantee the co-operation which the developers and county 
council needed, while his position on the planning committee allowed 
him to influence the siting of the New Town. 
Generally, while other New Towns were regulated by technocrats 
and planning mechanisms, Cramlington, in so far as it depended upon 
home ownership for its success, was determined by market forces. Its 
actual legal status being an area of Comprehensive Development under 
Section 5(3) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1947 being approved 
as an amendment to the Northumberland County Development Plan. 
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Within the partnership arrangement the 1965 written analysis(SO) 
made clear the responsibilities of the various interests so that; 
(a) The private developers would be concerned with the 
development of the residential areas and the 
building of the town centre. 
(b) Seaton Valley Urban District Council would be 
responsible for the main town drainage facilities, 
including the construction of a sewage treatment 
works, and as the housing authority for the area, 
for the building of council houses. 
(c) The County Council was responsible for the 
promotion of industrial development and the co-
ordination of other interests, together with the 
provision of the major highway network and 
education and social facilities. 
Finally, in order to co-ordinate these various interests both an 
Action Committee under the chair of the County Planning Officer and a 
Town Development Sub-Committee of the County Planning Committee was 
set up in 1962 
6. The Private Developers 
William Leech Builders was a company first registered in June 
1940. Its objects were stated to be builders and contractors and like 
many other builders it needed to raise money to finance its 
operations. Early mortgages raised by the company carne from the 
Junior Property and Investment Company, its subsidiary Sunholrne 
Developments and the Rock Building Society later to become the 
Northern Rock Building Society. Both the Junior Property and 
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Investment Company and Sunholme Developments being owned and 
controlled by Robert Joicey Dickinson while the same Dickinson was on 
the board of the Rock Building Society.C5l) The rise of William Leech 
was therefore linked to Dickinson support. 
Yet while Leech was dependent on Dickinson the expansion of the 
Jrmior Property and Investment Company in the 1950's was itself made 
possible by a continuous flow of loans from two main sources. First, 
the Equitable Life Assurance Company and second the Dickinson/Joicey 
dynasty itself. Therefore between 1945 and 1954 the third Baron 
Joicey either on his own or jointly with Dickinson advanced £102,000 
to the Junior Property and Investment· Company d~onstrating the use to 
. . 
which some of the Joicey' s £12 million coal compensation money was 
being put.C 52) 
In addition Leech's connections with the Dickinson family went 
further still with R.A. Barnett, a brother-in-law and business 
associate of R.J. Dickinson, being on the board of directors of the 
William Leech Foundation and the William Leech charity the two 
dominant share holders who in 1961 controlled William Leech Builders. 
Just as Leech started as a family firm of speculative builders, 
so did Bellway, the other major private developer of Cramlington. In 
1945 John Bell senior and his two sons specialised in the conversion 
of flats and terrace houses. By 1946 they had purchased land from the 
Lord Armstrong Newcastle estate in order to build a street of houses 
at £1,200 each. 
In the early 1930's, Leech's intention was to build "cheap 
houses for the working man". His first house, in Walker, had three 
bedrooms and cost £540. By building on a large scale in the form of 
housing estates, he was able to sell at £280 and with £250 mortgages 
-145-
arranged, the cost to the buyer was 12/6d. a week. By the beginning 
of the Second W'orld War, Leech had built 17 estates at a rate of 500 
houses a year, many of them in West Newcastle. (S3) Also active in 
West Newcastle was John T. Bell. He linked up with a local landlord, 
J. Gold, and was soon building houses on Grainger Park, an area which 
became available for development in 1933 as the quarry closed. 
Between them, Gold the developer and Bell the builder put up more than 
300 houses before the war, half for letting and half for sale at a 
rate of one house a week costing £500 to buy and a pair of flats every 
ten days costing £800 to buy.(S4) 
Parallel and closely related to this surge in house building for 
private ownership went a growth in building society funds. The assets 
of the societies nationally increasing from £87M in 1920 to £371M in 
1930 and £773M in 1939. Therefore Gold, the developer who was putting 
up houses in the Axbridge Gardens area in partnership with J.T. Bell, 
noted that; 
"The building societies were falling over themselves with 
money, they used to send agents around the builders to 
persuade you to take their money."(SS) 
Gold got loans from the Rock, Grainger, Northern Counties, Percy 
and St. Andiews societies. Moreover; 
"as the market for the more expensive houses became 
progressively saturated, builders in order to maintain 
activity were forced to find ways of enabling more 
families with less free capital, or negligible capital 
resources, to purchase houses. Building society advances 
were limited to 75% of the total value of a house. The 
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problem was thus to finance the balance, that is the 
deposit required from the purchaser by the building 
societies. An ingenious system was introduced by which 
the deposit actually required from the purchasers was 
reduced to 5%. Building societies advanced an additional 
20% by arrangement with the builder against cash and/or 
other collateral deposit with them by the builder. The 
purchaser repaid this total 95% advance in the usual way 
by instalments including interest, so that in the course 
of time the builder's collateral was automatically 
redeemed ... ( 56) 
These two instances indicating the interdependence of the builders and 
the building societies. Each needing the other to promote house 
building for owner occupation and secure profits through house sales. 
By the early 60's both firms had large amounts of undistributed 
profits and both were raising more money by the issue of shares on the 
market. Cramlington was, therefore, another investment project and 
needed outlet for capital. 
Three companies were then created by· Leech and Bell to take 
responsibility for Cramlington in its early stages, namely Cramlington 
Developments, Cramlington Investments and Lee-Bell Investments. All 
three being Bell and Leech subsidiaries equally owned by them. Of 
these three companies Cramlington Developments was the most 
significant its purpose being; 
"to manage and develop and to co-operate with others in 
the management and development of building land at and 
near Cramlington."(57) 
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All three companies were thus methods of financing and co-ordinating 
Cramlington development and enabling further land and building 
purchases jointly by Leech and Bell and all three had as company 
solicitors Dickinson, Miller and Turnbull of Cross House, Newcastle. 
For Bell and Leech, however, their most immediate and important 
gain resulted from their relationship with the local authorities. For 
example, in a designated New Town like Washington the capital 
expenditure of the Development Corporation on infrastructure was borne 
entirely by the government. In Cramlington part of this infra-
structure cost fell on the local authorities although the county 
council made special ar;rangements to prevent too large an increase in 
Seaton Valley rates. The remaining part of the infrastructure cost 
was met by Cramlington Developments. However, as Elphick(58) makes 
clear the developers passed their part of the infrastructural costs on 
to the house buyer at an estimated cost in 1964 of £180 per house. In 
addition the developers were able to acquire land in advance of 
planning permission at agricultural prices rather than, as in a New 
Town with a Development Corporation, at a price reflecting its status 
as housing land. Once again, though the costs of land purchase plus 
the added land value resulting from planning permission for housing 
was passed on to the house buyer. 
Both the Leech and Bell companies did not, however, exist in a 
vacuum. Instead they are situated within a capitalist logic and set 
of social relations. Equally, each company as a particular capital 
has its own distinctive requirements while being subject to the 
general requirement to make a profit. Therefore during periods of 
high demand when house prices were being forced up both companies 
preferred to build for private sale. However, at times of slump in 
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the private sector they relied on the state for work. The local state 
in turn acted in two ways to support the private builder, first by 
having them tender for council house building and second by buying 
half or fully completed private estates for council tenancy. For 
example in 1974, Newcastle City Council entered into a package deal 
with William Leech to buy 270 private houses at a cost of 
£2,516,333.( 59) This ability to switch from private to public sector 
building cushioned the builders against slowdown in Cramlington house 
sales. 
John T. Bell, the other main property . and building group 
involved in Cramlington was, like Leech, no small. concern. In 1968 
the company was extending beyond the North East with five of its 
twelve major housing developments located outside the region. In 1971 
though still involved in the North East through office development at 
the Regent Centre, Gosforth, and Princess Square, Newcastle, it had 
building subsidiaries in Scotland, New South Wales and Paris.C60) 
By 1971 issued shares numbered 5,318,000 of which the Bell 
family held 1. 7 million making them the largest single group of 
shareholders.( 6l) A further 97 share holders held over 1,000 shares 
each of which the largest were the Midland Bank Executors (89,000), 
charter Court Pension Trust (70,000), Metropolitan Trust Co. (65,000), 
Standard Trust ( 60, 000) , Eagle Star Insurance (50, 00) , U. S. and 
General Trust (40,000) and Samares Investments (39,900). This last 
shareholder was a Channel Island based company with Lord Ridley as a 
diiector~(6Z) It was through this route then that Lord Ridley had a 
direct material interest in the success of Bellway. Moreover, as we 
have seen, firms like Bellway (the current name of J.T. Bell and Sons) 
and William Leech rely upon a guaranteed supply of mortgages from the 
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building societies both for their land acquisitions and for would be 
purchasers of their houses. Both R.J. and R.H. Dickinson and Lord 
Ridley, as directors of the Northern Rock Building Society, were able 
to ensure that funds were deployed in support of the building 
companies.C63 ) 
By the mid 80's Bell way had built up a substantial property 
investment portfolio and was diversifying its activities into fitted 
kitchen manufacture and associated retail outlets, heavy plant hire, 
leisure boat building and security alarm manufacture and fitting. At 
the same time the company was moving into urban renewal with the 
support of grant aid from the D.O.E. while its U.K. house building 
operation was now decentralised into five regional divisions. Each 
division having its own management and marketing team and each run as 
a separate profit centre. Indeed after a review in 1987 the company 
disposed of its Scottish house building division which was trading at 
a loss and acquired the D.F.W. Golding Group, a southern based house 
building firm. 
Like Bellway, Leech builders had by the early 80's expanded 
outside the North East. Expansion into these ·other regions taking 
place via the acquisition of small local companies and their land 
banks. Ball(64) estimating that in 1979 the company had a huge land 
bank and ranked fifth in a U.K. league table of building firms by 
housing output. Yet despite its relative importance Leech was still 
very much a family firm with William Leech retaining important share 
holdings. However, by 1985 Leech builders had itself been acquired by 
the Beazer Group(6S) a U.K. house building, construction and property 
investment conglomerate with major house building and building 
materials interests in the U.S.A. 
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7. Craml ington in the Context of National and Regional Policies. 
During the Second World War the State had intervened to direct 
the location of industry, to control supplies and regulate output. In 
addition, by 1944 the public mood was; 
"anti-fascist, libertarian, egalitarian, even utopian, 
blending belief in military victory with reform, equality 
of sacrifice with faith in models derived from 
Roosevelt's New Deal or Russia's socialist 
appearance ... (66 ) 
This pressure of public opinion making it difficult to return to the 
policies and conditions of the 1920's. The 1944 White Paper on 
Employment(6l) therefore committed the government to the principle of 
maintaining a stable and full employment economy and made 
recommendations towards this goal. Broadly the White Paper suggested 
that the basic industries should be strengthened and supported so that 
they reach the highest degree of efficiency. Furthermore domestic 
expenditure should be maintained at a high level and new enterprises 
should be encouraged to locate in the former distressed areas. The 
White Paper explaining the inter-war depression in terms of the over-
dependence of certain regions on a few basic industries such as coal, 
steel and shipbuilding. 
Following the White Paper the Distribution of Industry Act 
sought to redress the balance of industrial activity amongst the 
regions by allowing the Board of Trade to intervene to influence the 
locational decisions of private capital. The Board of Trade could 
therefore assist firms with loans or grants, acquire land, construct 
advance factories in development areas and prepare sites. Both the 
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White Paper and the Act being underpinned by the principle that labour 
reserves represented potential human capital which should be set to 
work in order to increase the national wealth. 
By the early 50's the Labour government was claiming success in 
supporting the basic industries and diversifying the regional economy. 
Consequently, registered unemployment in the North East, when compared 
with the 1920's and early 30's, had fallen significantly. Yet despite 
this welcome statistic a number of contradictions were already 
becoming apparent. Both the Labour government of 1945 to 51 in its 
later stages and the Conservative government subsequently, pursued 
yarious forms of repr~ssive incomes Policy either by doing deals with 
the trade union leaders or by using the power of the State to hold 
down pay demands in the public enterprises and public services. Then 
other priorities such as public expenditure restraint, and increased 
efficiency in order to compete internationally began to take 
precedence over the former commitment to full employment. With this 
shift of emphasis the government drew back from directing industry to 
particular locations or restricting industrial growth in the South 
East and the Midlands. 
From 1957 to 1959 unemployment rose in the North East 
Development Area, however, this was seen by the Board of Trade as a 
locality problem rather than a problem effecting the region as a 
whole. Indeed as far as the Board of Trade was concerned the region 
was not relatively prosperous and the priority was to protect new and 
existing industry and manufacturing. New firms would not, therefore, 
be encouraged to set up in an area with a tight labour market. 
Consequently the "solution" to what was perceived as local 
unemployment was the 1960 Employment Act which designated development 
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districts (rather than areas) for assistance and allowed the districts 
to be removed from assisted status once labour reserves had been 
soaked up. 
When the Act came into force in April 1960 only one of the 
Northumberland sixteen exchange areas was listed as a Development 
District. This was Haltwhistle and in less than two years it was put 
on the stop list and then removed from the list altogether. Prudhoe 
was added later in 1960 but it too was put on the stop list in 1961. 
It was taken back in 1962 and kept on the Development list thereafter. 
Blyth and Seaton Delaval (including Cramlington) were admitted to the 
·list at the end of 1961 and then in May 1963 the North Tyneside area 
(including Killingworth) was added. (68 ) While such a system aimed to 
protect existing employer and labour forces and target assistance to 
small areas, it was to prove inadequate when unemployment became more 
generalised across the region. Moreover it suggested a stop go 
approach to development area status and therefore lacked consistency. 
By December 1962, unemployment was increasing both nationally 
and in the regions and could not therefore be said to be simply a 
local matter. At this stage the N.E.D.O. report on "Conditions 
Favourable to a Faster Rate of Economic Growth"( 69 ) seemed to indicate 
the way forward and reflected government thinking on regional policy. 
In short the report called for an increase in national output and 
productivity and enhancement of manufacturing competitiveness with the 
expansion of public expenditure being essential to the achievement of 
these aims. A move back to larger development areas was suggested. 
This would offer a wider choice of location and therefore increase the 
chance of attracting a larger number and greater variety of firms 
s.timulating the development of industrial complexes. These complexes 
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and other areas could then act as growth points which would suck in 
labour and lead to regional economic take off and self sustaining 
growth. 
Within the North East region the rise in unemployment prompted 
Labour politicians and trade unionists to lobby the government to do 
something. The result was the Hailsham White Paper entitled "The 
North East, a Progrannne for Development and Growth". (70) However~ 
this report had been preceded in 1963 by the North East Area Study(?1) 
which itself formed the basis for the White Paper. The study and 
White Paper representing the development and continuity of thought on 
. . . 
regional policy from ·the 40 ,. s to the 60's. 
The North East Study identified the unemployment rate, the 
participation rate and the rate of out migration as the main problems. 
It further suggested a shortfall of 130,000 male jobs in the region by 
1981. The cause of these problems being the dependence of the region 
on four major industries, namely coal, shipbuilding, steel and 
chemicals. Furthermore the study went on to say that; 
"The present nationally uneven spread economic activity 
and the wide disparity in employment opportunities are 
socially harmful and economically inefficient."(?2) 
Part of the solution to these problems was then thought to be the 
diversification of the economic structure of the region with the most 
urgent need that of attracting new industry and expanding existing 
firms. This strategy would, it was hoped, moderate the uneven 
development between the regions and equalise employment opportunities. 
However, in intra-regional terms industry and manufacturing plant were 
not spread evenly across the region. Instead; 
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"The attack would be concentrated on a growth zone 
roughly bounded by Tyneside, Teeside and the Great North 
Road."(?)) 
The downside of the growth zone proposal was then recognised in that; 
"The concentration of effort on the growth zone is bound 
to mean a relative worsening in the prospects for local 
industrial jobs in places outside it."(74) 
Fortunately, as the Northumberland County Planning Committee noted, 
the growth zone proposed in the White Paper extended as far north as 
Cramlington. In the rural zone north of the coalfield only marginal 
population change was envisaged. The rural zone providing labour for 
the growth zone and an amenity area for the population of the 
industrial south. While within the rural zone itself public 
investment would be concentrated in particular locations and the rural 
economy diversified with the introduction of forestry and tourism. 
The concern of the North East Area Study was not only with the 
attraction of new industry but. with modernisation in general. 
However, these other aspects tended to be linked . to the needs of 
industry. For example, the study called for wide ranging 
environmental improvement since the North East; 
"would not be able to attract or hold the professional, 
technical and other white collar workers on whom modern 
industrial development depends, unless they (and their 
wives) find the general environment and society of the 
region congenial." ( 75 ) 
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Moreover the image of the North needed to be positively attractive to 
help it compete with other regions. As the study noted; 
'~For a business man considering whether to go in for 
expansion in the North East rather than elsewhere, or not 
at all, even generous inducements and assurances of ample 
labour supply may not be enough to offset the effects of 
dismal town centres, decaying villages, bad roads and a 
scarred industrial countryside."(76) 
Environmental improvement was, therefore, urgent and necessary 
in order to attract industry and hold labour. However, what the study 
failed to acknowledge was that the dereliction it described was no act 
of God but the result of past policies. 
In the same way the study went on to recommend the modernisation 
and expansion of the housing stock for two main reasons. First as a 
means of retaining and attracting key workers from outside the region 
and second as a means of facilitating intra-regional labour mobility. 
Furthermore, within this expanded construction programme both private 
developers and the local authorities would have important roles to 
play therefore; 
"Part of the increased housing programme must clearly 
come from private enterprise. For economic growth this 
is important; the region needs better housing prospects 
and a wider variety of types of housing for employees of 
the middle range. This should be facilitated not only by 
steps taken nationally to ease the financing of house 
purchase and private building to let but also by greater 
readiness by local planning authorities to permit house 
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building by private enterprises on the rural fringes and 
beyond. 
But public authority must make the main contribution. 
And to increase labour mobility it will be important to 
seek ways of reducing the extent to which eligibility for 
dwellings is restricted to families already in the area, 
and on the waiting list of the providing authority."(?7) 
When the White Paper was published in November 1963 it echoed the 
philosophy and strategy of the North East Area Study. Broadly, four 
themes could be distinguished in the White Paper. 
First a need to modernise the means of communication, the built 
environment and the infrastructure of the region, with private 
enterprise playing a significant part in this project. In addition an 
increased rate of house building was called for with the local 
authorities asked to take the lead in this regard and make wider use 
of industrialized building techniques. 
Once again it was stressed that the over-riding need was to 
diversity the region's economic life by attracting new industry from 
other parts of the country. This it was hoped would provide the basis 
for self-generating regional growth, however recognition was also 
given to the fact that regional growth could not be sustained without 
na tiona! growth. In the short term though the Government would 
continue to provide finance and other assistance to encourage industry 
to the North-East pending the hoped for economic take off when the 
region would be able to stand on its own feet. 
Third, the White Paper saw the New Towns as central to regional 
development since they represented growth points within the growth 
zone. Therefore according to the White Paper, Gramling ton could; 
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"make a useful 
development."(?B) 
contribution to the region's 
Lastly the White Paper adopted the growth zone and growth point 
policy of the Area Study. This meant that public-sector investment 
was to be concentrated at particular zones and locations in the belief 
that private investment would follow. On the one hand the New Towns 
such as Cramlington would act as magnets to which residents outside 
the growth zone could move to or corrnnute from. On the other, the 
growth potential of the New Towns would be enhanced if firms involved 
in similar activities could be attracted since they would act as 
"breeders" of further economic development. Moreover, as a 
Northumberland County Planning Committee Report noted; 
"None of the other centres were strong enough 
individually to act as a magnet to growth on the scale 
required. As the industrial strength of the sub-region 
builds up led by Cramlington and Killingworth the other 
centres should find that the task of modernisation is 
made easier, for they will be operating in a developing 
area, instead of a static or declining one.(?9) 
In other words development and economic prosperity would spread 
outwards from the growth zone although how and indeed whether this 
would happen remained something of an act of faith rather than an 
· empirically validated fact. 
With the publication of the White Paper the establishment of the 
Northern Economic Planning Board and Council followed in 1964. Both 
these bodies supporting the analysis of the White Paper while 
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producing a new regional plan known as "Challenge of a Changing 
North". (BO) This plan added to the proposals outlined in the White 
Paper. In it is a concern for the quality of industrial growth and 
not just the quantity. Emphasis is therefore placed on the 
development of capital intensive and science based industries 
alongside a linked need to increase the amount of basic research done 
in the region. Furthermore, labour should be well paid with a high 
skill content and both management and trade unions should ensure that 
flexibility in the use of labour is encouraged. This being possible 
since; 
"The conditions which may have justified restrictive 
practices in the past on the part of either management or 
trade unions no longer obtain in the region. Therefore 
the need today is for fully co-operative attitudes on 
both sides of industry."(81) 
It was not only a matter of modernising the infrastructure in order to 
attract and facilitate new industry but also a question of increasing 
productivity and encouraging technical innovation. Government 
assistance to achieve these ends was therefore to be welcomed. The 
report saying that: 
"Higher productivity is, to a great extent, a matter of 
having more efficient plant. This means more investment. 
It is encouraging therefore to see the heavy capital 
investment already undertaken and in hand in the region, 
particularly by the larger industrial firms and by the 
nationalised industries; and we welcome the preferential 
treatment being given to the region, as a development 
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area, in the matter of investment grants towards the 
renewal of plant and machinery. Industry must take full 
opportunity to modernise with government assistance.(8Z) 
Lastly, in terms of sectoral balance and quality work, it was 
desirable that the region should not become a site for; 
"branch factories engaged in assembly work. It must have 
its proper share of research and development units and of 
administration.<83 ) 
8. Relocating the Working Class 
Cramlington, as we have seen, was envisaged as a growth point 
and a solution to the problem of a redundant population made larger by 
the contraction and restructuring of the coal industry. However, like 
Killingworth New Town, it was also meant to be a receiving zone for an 
overspill population from Newcastle and the northern half of the Tyne. 
In the words of the planning consultants' report prepared in 1961(S4) 
employment at Cramling~on would therefore need to cater for; 
1. Ex miners who could be adapted into semi -skilled 
work. 
2. Ex-shipyard and engineering workers who may already 
have some special skill available. 
3. Young women seeking factory work. 
The miners coming on to the labour market as the pits in the Seaton 
Valley area closed. The ex-shipyard and engineering workers coming 
from Newcastle and Wallsend and the young women coming from both of 
these localities and from Seaton Valley. 
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In this section, I therefore want to consider Cramlington in the 
context of Killingworth and the redevelopment of Newcastle since it 
was this redevelopment which in part produced the overspill population 
of these two towns. 
A reading of W. Burns' book (Newcastle, A Study in the Re-
Planning of Newcastle upon Tyne), indicates a desire to establish the 
future in the present, to do away with the old and bring in the new. 
The Newcastle housing programme therefore provided for the; 
"rnaxinnnn possible clearance of older houses, combined 
with a massive improvement programme ... (85) 
This concern to modernise the city being Underpinned, to a degree, by 
an environmental determinism which suggested that; 
"It is the mean street that produced the mean men and 
lean and tired women and tmclean children. " ( 86) 
Moreover, it was not simply the case of an "evangelistic bureaucrat" 
wanting to establish a new Jerusalem but also of an ambitious Labour 
politician, T. Dan Smith, and a city Labour group fired with a; 
"determination to resurrect the city and the region and 
to turn Newcastle into "the Brasilia of the Old 
World. ,.(87) 
Smith justifying modernisation in terms of improving the conditions of 
the working class. 
The consequent redevelopment could not therefore be piecemeal 
but had to be comprehensive and extensive. In the west of the city, 
for example, the Cruddas Park area was cleared of small terrace 
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housing and replaced with high rise flats and a neighbourhood shopping 
centre. Likewise, the centre of the city was gutted to make way for 
the Eldon Square Shopping Centre. The scale of the city wide 
redevelopment programme providing huge profits for the building 
companies at the same as it facilitated local corruption. 
The Killingworth scheme was approved by Northumberland County 
Council in August 1958 although the development process did not begin 
until the mid 60 1 s. According to the Killingworth Infonnation Digest, 
Killingworth was; 
"conceived as a hard edged 1 castle town 1 set in a 
landscape of parkland and is approached by a causeway 
access across a sheet of water as a drawbridge crosses a 
moat."(BB) 
In reality Killingworth consists of a mix of housing design. The 
Towers are made up of 740 dwellings in 27 slab blocks of six and ten 
storeys. The blocks are inter-connected by open walkways at the 5th 
and 8th floors which continue as external decks giving access to the 
dwellings. The walkways and decks are reached by nine lift towers and 
by a long walkway. Visually the towers are a blot on the landscape, a 
mass of grey concrete with windswept walkways and vandalised 
surroundings. All this is hardly surprising since the towers were 
system built junk. Of the other two housing areas the "Old Garths" 
were system built, low rise, flat roofed housing, while the "New 
Garths" was conventional housing. 
As Taylor(B9) notes two factors determined the architecture of 
Killingworth, first building firms wishing to profit from the large 
scale use of industrialised unit construction and second the 
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employment by the county of architects wedded to the utilitarian ideas 
of the modern movement as the professional fashion of the 60's. To 
this I would add lack of restraint provided either by market 
discipline or popular democratic control. 
By the late 70's Killingworth Towers had become an estate which 
was "difficult to let, difficult to live in and difficult to get out 
of". Its unpopularity meaning that only the most desperate and 
powerless people with no other housing alternative would accept a 
tenancy on the estate. What was supposed to have been an imaginative 
and futuristic city turned out to be a ghetto reflecting Damars 
characterisation, so that; 
"in one sense, the slum clearance estates have replaced 
the very slums whose problems they were meant to 
eradicate; they contain the detritus of capitalism, the 
manual working class family with low occupational skills 
whose problems tend to get swept under the carpet or 
hidden in the corner."(90) 
Or in the words of the Department of the Environment; 
"'Difficult to let' is a description in most cases of the 
process whereby certain estates progressively accumulate 
a concentration of families who are on low incomes, who 
are unemployed or who have other related social 
problems ... (9l) 
Killingworth by the 1980's, therefore, contained an over preponderance 
of a particular part of the working class, namely the surplus 
population. Friend and Metcalf describing the surplus population as; 
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"those who are long-term unemployed, most of those for 
whom periods of unemployment alternative with dependence 
on temporary or casual part-time work; those 
participating in the bottom reaches of the "black 
economy" outside the tax system; all those who are 
totally dependent on state benefits or forms of charity 
(including the mass of pensioners, the chronically sick 
and disabled, and single parent families on social 
security) ; and those people who, although in regular 
employment in labour-intensive sweated occupations or the 
state service sector, earn wages significantly below the 
national average and who live in households where the 
standard of living only exceeds the minimum poverty line 
because of the receipt of means tested benefits."(9Z) 
Moreover this surplus population did not magically appear but was 
produced by capital at a particular time so that a significant 
proportion of it was unemployed because; 
"they are marginal to the requirements of capital in 
terms of the direct production of surplus value during 
the current long wave of stagnation."(93) 
In contrast to Killingworth, a predominantly public sector New 
Town, Cramlington was to be mostly private sector and market led. The 
effect of this on the architecture of the town was to reproduce 
traditional housing forms since the guiding yardstick for the private 
developers was what had sold in the past. This traditionalism and 
resistance to the new, allied to a concern to keep costs down, 
resulted in the modification of the consultants' earlier plans. Plans 
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which had proposed a radical separation of vehicle and pedestrian 
traffic, separate garaging away from the house and communal open space 
instead of private front gardens. As Elphick notes; 
"After visits to Cumbernauld and other towns where 
segregated system had been attempted the developers were 
still tmconvinced."(94) 
In the end the Cotmty Planning Department, fearful of any further 
delay in starting the scheme, allowed the design of the town to 
confirm to the developers' wishes so that there would now be; 
"Fifteen main residential areas each one planned to form 
a series of housing groups of modest size to foster 
community spirit. In this way it is hoped to obtain all 
the advantages of village life coupled with the wealth of 
service available in a very large town."(95) 
Moreover, having grotmded the Cramlington scheme in folk notions of an 
idealised past married to the services of the present, the consultants 
explained that; 
(a) "A number of housing list and shnn clearance 
families may be attracted to Cramlington aDd by the 
availability of houses in the lower price bracket" 
and 
(b) "Slightly higher class housing will attract persons 
of a middle income bracket who will in turn vacate 
houses on Tyneside which will allow a general move 
up the scale amongst those in poorer 
accommodation." 
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But while a minority of the overspill population might be able to buy 
into owner occupation there was no simple one to one relationship 
between the global overspill figure and the number of private houses 
to be built. In other words home ownership was dependent upon 
centrality in the labour market rather than on an individual's 
membership of the overspill population as such. Moreover, no local 
authority administrative mechanism existed which could discriminate in 
favour of the overspill and allocate it to owner occupied housing. 
Members of this population would therefore have to compete with other 
potential home buyers in the Cramlington housing market. 
Consequently, the overspill population if it were to be housed at all, 
could only guaranteed accommodation in the public sector. 
The reliance on private sector housing having other effects 
apart from its inability to house the totality of the overspill. For 
example, the building and sale of housing was likely to be determined 
by a whole number of factors that were difficult to predict in 
advance. The implication of this being that there could be no 
certainty over how many houses would eventually be built for sale or 
the pace of the building programme. In turn this meant that a 
disjunction between industrial development and private sector house 
building was inevitable since the two programmes were subject of 
differing determinations. Moreover, a coincidence between housing and 
place of work was impossible to order in a free housing market so that 
a majority of Cramlington house buyers might work outside Cramlington. 
Yet bringing together an available pool of labour at Cramlington was 
central to the attraction, functioning and development of industry. 
The assembling of workers and their families in one place therefore 
depended on the provision of public housing. Indeed having or being 
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offered a job on the industrial estates secured access to 
Cramlington's public housing. 
With a nucleus of labour established the planning consultants 
expected that as industry expanded more of the overspill would be 
drawn to Cramlington which in turn would give a further boost to 
manufacturing expansion. The two processes being complimentary and 
when completed; 
"would endow the New Town with a large measure of 
independence and gradually transform the dormitory 
character which it would doubtless have during the 
initial stages of the project."(96) 
So that in the words of the Seaton Valley Town Map Cramlington would 
become a "self-supporting and balanced connnunity". The reference to 
balance indicating not only a mix of tenures but a spread of house 
type and prices in order to create an internal housing market. This 
would allow first time buyers to move up the housing ladder while 
remaining in Cramlington thus establishing a relatively stable 
population. 
At one level then Crarnlington was from the beginning intended to 
mostly acconnnodate the better off sections of the working class in 
contrast to either Killingworth or the inner area Cruddas Park estate 
in the West End of Newcastle. In the words of the S.N.A.P. report 
published in 1972; 
"New· Towns have acconnnodated some part of the suburban 
exodus but predominantly those people who are more 
skilled, more mobile or potentially successful. 
Consequently this intervention results in ever greater 
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proportions of families requiring support in the inner 
cities. (97) 
The mention of the inner city being suggestive of things to come since 
by the late 80's the Cruddas Park estate contained a large surplus 
population with SO% of the economically active unemployed. 
CONCllJSION 
It is worthwhile remembering that this chapter was titled 
"Aspects of Modernisation". In the case of the North East the 
nationalisation of the coal industry was viewed by many as central to 
the modernisation of the national economy. Moreover, nationalisation, 
when dressed in the ideology of modernity could appear to be class 
neutral and acceptable, by offering all things to all men. For 
example, for the T.U.C. and the miners, nationalisation seemed to 
provide the basis for better wages and conditions. However, an 
examination of nationalisation in the context of class forces 
indicates that it was intended as a mechgnism for defusing labour 
unrest and incorporating labour. Secondly, nationalisation was a 
precondition for financing and reconstructing the coal industry so as 
to provide a cheap source of fuel for capital in general. Therefore, 
from the start the Coal Board was not allowed to increase coal prices 
and had to borrow from the Treasury and pay interest on the loan. Not 
only that, the industry was restricted to extracting coal rather than 
being able to expand into coal distribution, mining machinery or 
chemicals. Indeed at nationalisation a bmmdary was drawn around coal 
as an extractive industry rather than extending the boundary to 
include other sectors such as power generation. Equally, the top down 
form of nationalisation which tied the industry to the state limited 
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democracy in the mines and allowed the industry to be subject to wider 
macro-economic goals. 
After the war and up to the late 1950's, the priority of the 
N.C.B. was to produce coal and.retain labour in the coalfields pending 
the reconstruction of the collieries. Both the 1950 Plan for Coal and 
the 1956 Review setting an output target of 240Mt for the 1961-65 
period. The N.E.D.A. plan and the Northumberland County Plan of 1952 
echoing the centrality of coal and recommending that competing 
employers of male labour be steered away from the coalfield. A 
strategy supported by the Northumberland County N.U.M. and coalfield 
M.P. 's and councillors. The County Plan reinforcing the policy of 
discoUr-aging alternative male coalfield employment by not endorsing 
the New Town at Holywell while supporting development further south, 
just off the coalfield at Killingworth. 
By late 1956, as coal began to be substituted by cheap oil and 
the beginnings of nuclear power, the Coal Board's output targets were 
revised downwards. Economic criteria began to replace physical 
reserves of coal as the sign of a viable pit and the Board announced 
its intention to reduce mining employment in the Seaton Valley area 
and concentrate production in modernised collieries. This shift away 
from maintaining labour in the pits, seriously undermining the 
assumptions of the County Plan and the N.E.D.A. plan. Now the concern 
of local councillors and politicians was to provide alternative 
employment in Seaton Valley. Consequently Cramlington was only able 
to come on to the development agenda with the decline of coal and the 
. displacement of mine labour. At the same time the redevelopment of 
Newcastle and North Tyneside was creating an overspill population 
needing accommodation while the private developers were building up a 
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land bank in Seaton Valley and pressing the local authorities to 
approve housing schemes. 
On the one hand, Leech builders, a central player in the 
Cramlington project, owed its early development to coal compensation 
money. On the other, Cramlington represented an investment project, 
with a precondition for its success hanging on the availability of 
mortgages for intending home buyers. 
Lord Ridley appears as a mediating and gatekeeping figure by 
virtue of his membership of the public and private spheres and by his 
interest in land ownership. With compulsory purchase powers held in 
reserve Ridley's co-operation and mediating role over land disposal 
was central. Moreover, he was also able to persoilally gain from 
Cramlington development not only by selling his land but also by 
managing shareholding in Bellway builders. In addition his position 
as a director of the Northern Rock Building Society allowed him a 
significant say in the deployment of society funds for mortgages. The 
builders themselves buying land at less than planning development cost 
and passing on infrastructural cost and added land value as cost to 
the house buyer. 
In a regional development context, Cramlington was seen as a 
growth point within a greater growth zone. The aim being to diversify 
away from coal to a wider manufacturing base and concentrate this 
development at Cramlington in the expectation of creating knock on 
economic growth effects across the sub region. Yet this growth point 
policy implied uneven development by centring resources at one place 
and not another. An argument not lost on councils in the Ashington 
exchange area, who in 1969, as the pits closed, pressed the County 
Council to; 
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"put less emphasis on the New Towns of Cramlington and 
Killingworth."(9B) 
The District Councils wanting an undertaking from the county council 
that they would not persuade industrialists to locate in the New Towns 
to the neglect of the rest of the county. The county council's 
disingenuous reply indicating that locational decisions lay with 
industrialists themselves taking into consideration the relative 
advantage of particular places. 
While the economic ripple effects of the growth point policy 
remained unproved a justification for diversifying the industrial base 
was that this would cushion the region against a downturn in the 
economy. A line of reasoning which would be well tested in later 
years and found wanting. 
As we have seen a major thrust of the modernisation policy, as 
embodied in the White Paper and the "Challenge of a Changing North", 
stressed increasing industrial investment, productivity increases and 
the enhancement of industrial competitiveness. However, there was no 
detailed statement of the. implications for labour of these policies. 
The assumption being that general economic growth would suck in 
displaced labour and new entrants to the labour market. 
The "Challenge of the Changing North" emphasised the requirement 
of the region to attract science based and high technology industry 
rather than branch plants. Moreover the 'North" needed to increase 
its percentage of well paid jobs with high skill content. The 
unspoken difficulty, however, was that there was no mechanism that 
could guarantee these objectives. 
Cramlington, while it was intended as a growth point was also 
meant to drop its dormitory character and become a self contained and 
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balanced community. The extent to which this would occur depended on 
the "attraction of industry on a large scale", secondly on a 
coincidence between home and workplace and thirdly on a suitable range 
and quality of jobs being available in sufficient number to allow 
homebuyers in Cramlington who worked outside Cramlington to change 
their jobs. Again none of this could be guaranteed. 
Cramlington in various planning doct.nnents, was described as a 
partnership between the private developers and the local authorities. 
However, the idea of partnership obscures as much as it reveals about 
the relationship. Clearly, the provision of investment on 
infrast~cture, council housing, schools, .l,ibraries and leisure 
facilities as well as environmental improvement was central to the 
whole project. But it was public investment without any certainty 
that the private sector would invest at the level expected. 
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CHAPrER FOUR 
CRAMLINGTON, ITS EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL STRUC'IURE 
BACKGROUND 
From around 1926 onwards a new form of stabilising the political 
system was established which lasted until the early 70's. Middlemas 
has referred to this new system as a corporatist bias which elevated 
trade union and employers' organisations from self interest groups to 
quasi-governing institutions. The viability of this corporatist 
system resting upon the participants' acceptance of an overarching 
national interest and the abandonment of an ideology of class 
interest. In essence corporatism represented an informal system of 
negotiation and mutual accorrnnodation between the state, organised 
labour and organised employers and found expression in such bodies as 
the N.E.D.C. and the N.E.D.O. set up in 1961. 
Throughout the 1940's, 50's and 60's the dominant tendency 
within all the major political parties accepted the idea of the 
"middle way" and established a post war consensus around the 
acceptance of the welfare state, a full employment economy, public 
spending and state intervention in the economy and civil society. Any 
party political arguments being about the degree and boundary of 
intervention rather than the principle of intervention. A major aim 
of government being to prevent crisis and class confrontation and 
establish institutions to further this aim. 
By the 1960's the Labour Party was predominantly an integrative 
party which from the late 30's onward~ had come to rely upon Keynesian 
ideas to underpin its political project. As Przeworski has noted; 
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"It was Keynesianism that provided the ideological and 
political foundations for the compromise of capitalist 
democracy. Keynesianism held out the prospect that the 
State could reconcile the private ownership of the means 
of production with democratic management of the economy 
Keynesianism provided the foundation for class 
compromise by supplying those political parties 
representing workers with a justification for holding 
office within capitalist society • • • It appeared that 
there was something to be done, that the economy was not 
moving according to natural laws, that economic crises 
could be attenuated and the waste of resources and the 
suffering alleviated if the State pursued anticyclical 
policies of demand management The government had the 
capacity to close the 'full employment gap' to insure 
that there would be no unemployment of men and 
machines.(!) 
Against this background of acceptance of Keynesian economics the 
immediate post war period saw the beginning of Marshall Plan aid for 
Europe. The Marshall programme forming a central element in the 
restructuring of the European economy in the interests of American 
business. Moreover, by helping to revive the European economies and 
by funding non-communist trade unions, the Marshall Plan aimed to 
secure Europe from the communist threat and prevent the economic 
deterioration that would; 
"breed demands for socialist planning and workers' 
control".(Z) 
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With the stabilisation of post war capitalism rmder American 
hegemony the western economies boomed between the years 1950 and 1973. 
In the Advanced Capitalist Cormtries wages and productivity rose at 
nearly 3~ per cent per year while labour markets remained tight. Thus 
according to Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison; 
"Rising wages were important for markets primarily 
because workers' additional spending accormted for the 
bulk of the growth in consumption expenditure. Rising 
spending on consumer goods in turn allowed the industries 
producing them to grow more or less in line with those 
producing means of production. Indeed, an important 
element of the boom was the mass production of durable 
goods and the improvement of the technologies required to 
produce them ... (3) 
It was in this context of political compromise, rising real living 
standards and the spread of consumption goods that commentators(4) 
could talk of the arrival of the affluent society. Capitalism had 
been tamed and transformed. The alternation of boom and slump was a 
phenomenon of the past. 
In place of the old owner-entrepreneurs it was suggested that 
the control of corporate business was exercised by non-owning 
executives whose priorities now included the maintenance of corporate 
growth, employee welfare, customer service and social responsibility 
rather than the pursuit of profit maximisation. These managers 
forming not so much a new ruling class as a professional strata. 
Power being distributed among these and other social groups throughout 
society in a cormtervailing fashion with no set of interests 
dominant.(S) 
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Indeed modernity was said to be characterised by an ever increasing 
reduction in inequalities of income and opportunity with manual 
workers now able to secure "middle class" incomes. At the same time 
the intermediate strata was expanding both in relative and absolute 
terms while the working class was considered to be disappearing as the 
old smoke stack industries declined. The course of industrial 
development and technological progress abolishing fragmented, 
repetitive and alienating work tasks. In future capital would require 
labour with high technical skills and knowledge while workers would 
enjoy greater autonomy, job variety and opportunities for initiative, 
creativity and co-operative working. The primary function of 
management also changing from maintaining discipline and extracting 
effort to collecting and sharing information and providing advice and 
support.C6) 
Alongside the supposed overcoming of alienation within the 
workplace change was also occurring in the physical environment. Old 
working class areas were undergoing redevelopment while new suburbs, 
estates and towns were created. These old areas had sustained a 
particularistic working class culture of solidarity and labourism. 
Within the new corrnnunities on the other hand social existence was 
atomised. Status concerns replaced the old ethos of solidarity while 
the inhabitants of the new areas abandoned old political and class 
loyalties and took on middle class values. According to Abrams; 
"The old working-class ethos is being eroded by 
prosperity and the increasing fluidity of our society. 
People now know they can improve their lot by their own 
efforts. And as they succeed, they change their values 
and cease to identify themselves with the class from 
which they sprang ... ( 7 ) 
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Butler and Ro~e(S) suggesting that the fall in Labour voting was 
significant in the New Towns and in constituencies with extensive 
housing programmes. A chain of reasoning therefore concluded that 
economic prosperity and increasing social mobility had led to the 
embourgeoisement of the working class which in turn produced a decline 
in the Labour vote. 
At another level the embourgeoisement thesis was also a 
refutation of Marx. For instead of the increasing immiseration which 
Marx had predicted, the working class was better off then it had ever 
been. Instead of intensifying polarisation between the bourgeoisie 
and proletariate the working class was being progressively integrated 
into the social system. Instead of the working class acting as the 
gravedigger of capital its revolutionary potential had been 
dissipated. 
It was just such a negation of the working class as a collective 
agent of change which was accepted by Crosland in his book 'The Future 
of Socialism'. He notes for example that Marx's; 
"prophecies have been almost without exception falsified, 
·and his conceptual tools quite inappropriate ... (9) 
Then, looking forward to continuing economic growth and consensus 
politics, he had this to say; 
"One cannot imagine today a deliberate offensive alliance 
between Government and employers against the unions on 
the 1921 or 1925/26 or 1927 model, with all the brutal 
paraphernalia of wage cuts, national lockouts, and anti-
union legislation; or, say a serious attempt to enforce, 
-182-
as so often happened in the 1920's a coal policy to which 
the miners bitterly objected."(lO) 
And he went on; 
"The Conservative Party lacks the essential tribute of a 
connter revolutionary party, a faith, a dogma, even a 
theory. 
pragmatic 
The British Conservative is essentially 
his attachment is to the status quo 
whatever the status quo may be. This is particularly 
true today • • • therefore it was never likely that the 
Conservatives would destroy the hard core of the 
achievement of the post war Labour Government and even it 
we suffer several more years of Conservative rule, I 
would expect 75% of the reforms to remain intact ... (ll) 
On one side there is the confident assertion that ideology had 
ended and that we are all middle class now. On the other continuing 
industrial and technological progress humanises the labour process and 
transforms the capital labour relationship. Crosland speculating that 
the politics of consensus and Keynesian economic management would 
continue into the indefinite future. 
In an attempt to evaluate the "embourgeoisement thesis" 
Goldthorpe and his colleagues published the Affluent Worker Study in 
1969. (lZ) This study concluded that most manual workers thought of 
their work as mere labour. As work which gave them little 
satisfaction. Their jobs were monotonous, routine, lacking in 
responsibility and as often as not carried out tmder hard physical 
conditions. When asked "what is it that keeps you here", the 
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relatively high level of pay was the most important reason for 
remaining at work. 
Thus the increasing affluence of the manual workers was at the 
expense of performing jobs which had little reward except money. In 
contrast most of the white collar workers felt that their jobs were 
intrinsically satisfying. 
Furthermore, the way the manual workers earned their wages 
involved a high degree of overtime and shift working. White collar 
work, however, was typically a nine-to-five affair. This difference 
in working arrangements having detrimental effects on the health and 
family life of the manual worker. 
Moreover, white collar workers had greater job security and 
chances for promotion than the manual workers. They felt that by 
individual effort they could get ahead, earn increased income and 
better their position. By comparison the manual workers recognised 
that they could only improve their wages and conditions through trade 
union membership. 
When the social networks of the manual workers were examined it 
was found that most associated either with kin or with fellow manual 
workers. Few had contact with or membership of middle class 
organisations. 
In contradiction to the predictions of Abrams, Butler and Rose 
support for the Labour Party was still apparent amongst the manual 
workers and had not been dented by affluence. 
Goldthorpe therefore had this to say; 
"A factory worker can double his living standards and 
still remain a man who sells his labour to an employer in 
return for wages; he can work at a control panel rather 
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than on an assembly line without changing his subordinate 
position in the organisation of production; he can live 
in his own house in a "middle class" estate or suburb and 
still remain little involved in white-collar social 
worlds."(l3) 
In general the Affluent Worker Study concluded that there was no 
evidence to suggest that increased affluence led to the 
"embourgeoisernent" of the manual working class. As Goldthorpe says: 
"the direction of these changes, we would suggest, is 
not towards middle classness, but rather towards what 
might be termed a more 'privatised' mode of living ... (14) 
While alongside this home centredness was a concern for individual 
betterment and an instrumental orientation towards work and to the 
Labour Party. In other words voting labour was conditional rather 
than deriving from class sentiment. It was a vote based on ca~culated 
self interest and therefore unstable since potentially another Party 
could make a deeper appeal to individualism and attract this section 
of working class support. 
But while Goldthorpe offered a soft critique of the 
embourgeoisement thesis Westergaard conducted a frontal assault on 
notions of the "affluent society", "post-capitalism" and so on. For 
example he notes that within these problematics; 
"Htmches, impressions and assumptions have been given 
parity with facts. Minor changes have been magnified 
into major ones, uncertain indications into certain 
proof. Evidence consistent with several interpretations 
has been treated as if only one were possible."(lS) 
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He then goes on to conclude that; 
"the structural inequalities of capitalist society remain 
marked. Disparities of economic condition, opportunity 
and power persist - modified if at all only within fairly 
narrow limits. There is no built in automatic trend 
towards diminishing class differentials.(16) 
The so-called increasing equality of wealth was a product of a 
selective use of data. Working class children still had little chance 
of entering university while social mobility was limited and covered 
fairly short distances. Instead of a plurality and dispersal of power 
there was a clustering of power so that; 
"the dominant grouping is that of a small, homogeneous 
elite of wealth and private corporate property 
politically entrenched in the leadership of the 
Conservative party;, strongly represented in, or linked 
with a variety of influential public and private bodies 
its members sharing for a large part a common, 
exclusive educational background, and united by fairly 
close ties of kinship and everyday association ... (l7) 
The split between ownership and control holding little 
significance with the recognition that directors and top management 
were also major shareholders operating under the need to maximise 
profit. 
A1 though the years from the 1960's onwards witnessed a growth in 
white collar and service employment and a decline in manual work, this 
trend, Westergaard contends, cannot be equated with the disappearance 
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of the working class. Furthennore, nruch service employment was low 
paid, low status and low skilled while there was no guarantee that 
while collar workers would retain their relative status and privilege. 
&:[ually, many clerical workers faced pressures from re-organisation, 
new technology, rationalisation and productivity drives which placed 
them in a similar position to semi-skilled manual workers. Indeed 
Westergaard goes further and rejects the equation that increased 
affluence automatically produces a conservative orientation. White 
collar workers cannot therefore be written off as essentially or 
irredeemably status obsessed conservatives. As Westergaard notes nruch 
of the "embourgeoisement" debate rests on an assumed relationship 
between consumption and consciousness. Not only do we know little of 
this relationship but consciousness and voting intention are more than 
a product of consumption. 
Lastly, although agreeing that the closed, homogeneous, one 
industry town is no longer typical Westergaard views this occurrence 
with equanimity. Parochial solidarity he suggests was the antithesis 
of class solidarity while the history of the labour movement was an 
attempted process of overcoming sectional and parochial loyalties in 
favour of broader unity. The decline of localism is therefore 
paralleled by the struggle for national unions, industry wide 
agreements and a widening of working class horizons and standards of 
comparison. 
Meanwhile in a later essay Westergaard(lB) criticised not only 
the interpretation presented in the Affluence Worker Study but also 
·the methodology employed. In the first place the assertion that work 
relations were no longer a source of social tension was unwarranted 
since it ignored the brittle nature of the "cash nexus" and the fact 
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that wage disputes may raise wider issues of control, authority, and 
government economic policy even if only temporarily. 
Second, the stress on a complacent, self absorbed and 
unreflective "affluent worker" was one sided to the point of 
caricature. Instead, economic resentment and critical attitudes were 
more widespread among the working class including its affluent 
segments than allowed for by Gold thorpe and his colleagues. These 
critical elements co-existing with; 
"attitudes that involve a practical, everyday acceptance 
of established institutions."(19) 
In other words working class consciousness contained a quasi ideology 
the elements of which were; 
"contradictory and lacked coherence and partly for 
that reason, its political potential was uncertain, 
ambivalent and to a considerable extent latent."(ZO) 
Furthermore, individualistic goals were not foreign to the 
working class and its organisations either in the past or the present. 
However what characterised such organisations was: 
"a diagnoses of society which concluded that those and 
other goals are both interdependent and impossible to 
attain without some general restructuring of 
society."(ZO) 
Finally, .th~ conditional and limited commitment of the affluent worker 
to the Labour Party and the trade unions was as much an expression of 
disillusionment with these organisations as it was a reflection of an 
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instnnnental outlook. At a more frmdamental level the "Affluent 
Worker Study" operated within a simple traditional proletarian, 
privatised worker distinction. These ideal types structuring the 
research findings and distorting reality. 
At issue in the embourgeoisement and affluent worker debates was 
the nature of the working class and the future of the labour movement. 
The inconclusiveness of the debate reflecting both contradictory 
reality, different interpretation of evidence and different 
epistemological starting points. Consequently, Goldthorpe stresses 
the privatised, instrumental, affluent worker who is implicitly 
conservative yet still labour voting while Westergaard, although 
acknowledging these elements, was concerned to highlight critical 
expressions, discontents and radical potential. 
The purpose of this chapter is not to examine subjectivity. 
However, the discussion so far should alert us to the fact that no 
easy assertions can be made claiming that home ownership, or other 
consumption item, causes the· affluent manual worker to politically 
realign in a conservative direction or espouse middle class values. 
Likewise Westergaard's contribution should make us think twice before 
bracketing off white collar workers as essentially conservative. 
The effect of these debates for a study of Cramlington tending 
to problematise any assumption that from its outset, in the middle of 
the 60's, it was the locale of a Conservative voting relatively 
affluent manual working class who were made to vote Conservative by 
the fact of being owner occupiers. In this context it is instructive 
that. 57% .of the affluent worker couples studied by Gold thorpe in 
1962/3 were house owners or buyers. A majority of these workers 
(slightly less than 79%) intended to vote Labour in the 1964 election. 
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Indeed, when the affluent manual workers association with white collar 
workers was held constant "indicators of affluence (including home 
ownership) ceased to be related to vote in any systematic manner ... (21) 
I will return to the issues of consumption, class and 
subjectivity in a later chapter. For the moment my intention is to 
provide a "class map" of Cramlington by drawing upon evidence from 
·early surveys. Then to follow this up by considering the relationship 
between housing and labour. Lastly I will identify changes in the 
employment structure of the town, and by means of examples, examine 
the career of incoming industries. 
F..VIDENCE FROM EARLY SURVEYS 
In 1966, 1968 and 1975, the County Council carried out social 
surveys in the Cramlington New Town area. The results of these 
surveys are instructive since they allow an insight into the social 
structure and economic base of the town. 
The 1966 survey< 22) divided the Development Area into new and 
old areas (see map 1) with the new areas (zones 07, 08 and 09) 
comprising two private estates and a new local authority estate. In 
the remaining zones making up the old areas, 73.5% of the housing was 
rented from the local council, 11.8% rented privately, 9.7% rented 
from the N.C.B. and 5% rented by virtue of employment. By contrast 
the new areas consisted of 60. 2% owner occupied housing and 39. 2% 
council housing. 
In 1966 the origin of the migrants to the New Town was as set 
out in Table 1. 
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Table 1 Origin of Migrants 1966 Survey 
(Private Estates) (New Local 
Zone Authority Estate) Total 
07 08 09 
Tynes ide 41% 31% 55% 39.9% 
S.E.Northumberland 35% 33% 31% 34.1% 
Co. Durham 7% 17% 9% 10.9% 
London and 
the South 9% 15% 10.1% 
Other 8% 4% 5% 5% 
Overall 39. 9% of new residents came from Tynes ide, 34 .1% from 
South East Northumberland, 10.9% from Co. Durham and 10.1% from London 
and the South. In zone 09 (the local authority estate) 95% of new 
residents came from South East Northumberland, Tyneside and Durham, 
whereas the two private estates had a significant if small percentage 
of people corning from outside the North East. 
The 1966 survey then went on to ask the reason for moving to 
Crarnlington. Within the new local authority estate employment was 
given as the primary reason for moving whereas housing was cited as 
the main attraction by a majority of residents on the private estates 
(see Table 2, p.192). 
With regard to place of work the 1966 survey considered new and 
old areas and found that Crarnlington provided employment for a 
minority of its resident workers, with 38.8% of workers from the old 
areas and 25.3% from the new areas employed at Crarnlington. Thirty 
four percent of workers travelled to work in Newcastle and North 
Tyneside, i.e. the areas where many of their families had moved from. 
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Table 2 Reason for }bvi.ng to Cram.1ington 1966 survey 
(Private Estates) (New Local Authority Estate) 
Zone No. 07 08 09 
Elnployment 21% 35% 48% 
Housing 50% 42% 18% 
Journey to Work 16% 10% 
OpportUnity to 
live in a new town 9% 8% 
Other 4% 5% 14% 
When a comparison was made between the old and new areas marked 
differences in job type and socio-economic status were evident (see 
Diagrams 1 and 2) • Twenty four percent of workers in the old areas 
worked in mining compared with only 10% in the new. There was a 
slightly higher proportion of workers from the new areas in 
manufacturing industry, i.e. 29% as against 21% from the old areas. 
There was a higher percentage of workers from the new areas in all 
"service" categories with the exception of building construction. The 
new areas had 15.4% in the higher socio-economic categories, i.e. 
managers and professional workers compared with 1.6% in the old areas. 
Non manual work, i.e. (clerical and administrative) was also more 
prevalent in the new areas although there was a higher proportion of 
jUnior grade white collar workers in the old areas. Lastly, the new 
areas had a higher percentage in the foreman and skilled manual worker 
category while semi-skilled and unskilled workers predominated in the 
old areas. 
Although the 1966 survey noted high levels of male employment, 
the percentage of females in work was similar for both new and old 
areas at 31.5% and 32.1% respectively. Questions were therefore 
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designed to assess the availability for work of female labour. The 
result was that amongst non-employed women in the new areas the rnnnber 
who expressed an interest in working was high. Fifty-six percent 
would have liked a part-time job and 7% a full time job. 
However; 
"most of these women were prevented from taking a job at 
the present time because of family commitments (i.e. 
caring for young children) and lack of nursery 
facilities.C 23 ) 
In the old areas 63% of women not in employment were not interested in 
employment. Thirty-three percent would have liked a part-time job and 
4% a full-time job. The survey therefore considered that; 
"the demand for work is significant particularly amongst 
the young women on the new estates. However, very few 
women are interested in full-time jobs the great majority 
wanting part-time jobs which allow them some time at 
home."C 24 ) 
Once again a division between the old and new areas was apparent when 
the type of job which the women wanted was compared. In the new areas 
the majority of women (72. 7%) sought jobs in the shop, office and 
professional sectors whereas 33% of women in the old areas were not 
particular what jobs they did, while 15% wanted shop work and 23.4% 
factory work • Significantly, only 3.3% of women in the old areas 
.. 
expressed a preference for professional work against 13.6% in the new 
areas. Likewise 41% of women in the new areas wanted office work as 
opposed to only 12% in the old areas (see Table 3). 
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Table 3 Percentage of Waoen Interested 1966 survey 
in Particular Types of Work 
Type of Work New Old Areas Areas 
Shop Work 18.2% 15% 
Office Work 40.9% 11.7% 
Factory Work 7.6% 23.4% 
Catering Work 1.5% 5% 
Domestic 1.5% 5% 
Professional 13.6% 3.3% 
Not Particular 12.1% 33.3% 
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TIIE 1968 CRAMLINGTON SURVEY 
The 1968 surveyC25 ) rather than comparing new and old areas 
co~idered the new private housing and local authority estates (see Map 2). 
Even at this relatively early stage of the town's development clear 
differences emerged between the local· authority and private housing 
sectors. For example, within the owner occupied sector 16.7% of the 
working population worked in Cramlington compared with 55.6% from the local 
authority housing area. The majority of workers from the private housing 
area (60.9%) working in Newcastle and North Tyneside in contrast to 21.4% 
of workers from the council housing area (see Table 4). 
Table 4 Place of Work 1968 Survey 
Local Authority Private Housing Total New Town 
Housing Area Area 
Place of Work Males Females Total Males Females Total Males Females Total 
-% % % % % % % % % 
Cramlington 57.4 48.5 55.6 13.4 23.5 16.7 24.6 27.5 25.6 
Rest of 
Seaton Valley 5.0 3.0 4.5 1.4 0.6 1.1 2.3 1.0 1.9 
Blyth 5.7 4.5 2.2 2.4 2.3 3.1 2.0 2.8 
Ashington, 
Bedlington, 
Morpeth and 11.5 3.0 9.7 3.1 4.1 3.4 5.2 3.9 4.8 
Newbiggin 
Whitley Bay, 
Tynemouth 9.8 12.1 10.3 21.5 23.5 22.2 18.5 21.8 19.5 
Longbenton 
and Wallsend 
Newcastle 8.2 21.3 11.0 39.6 37.0 38.7 31.7 34.4 32.4 
Gosforth, 




Outside Country 3.0 0.6 
Indefinite 1.6 3.0 1.9 
3.4 1.2 2.7 







Total Persons 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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In terms of worker concentrations the owner occupied area was 
the location of higher socio-economic groups with lower categories 
concentrated in the local authority area. Within the private housing 
sector 66.6% of employed women worked in the junior non-manual 
category while the majority of women in the local authority area were 
spread across semi and unskilled manual and junior non manual groups 
(see Table 5). In the words of the survey report; 
"the junior non-manual workers are the largest single 
group in the private housing area whilst in the local 
authority area foremen and skilled manual workers 
predominate. In fact the private housing area 
predominates in all non-manual groups, while the reverse 
is true in the local authority area."(26) 
Table 5 
Socio-Economic Group 
Employers and Managers 
Professional 
Intermediate Non-
Manual and Own Account 
Junior Non-Manual 
Personal Services 
Foremen and Skilled 
Manual 
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Information on the previous tenure of residents resulted in the survey 
concluding that; 
"The town is proving to be a great attraction to people 
who have never had a home of their own before, over a 
quarter of households having previously lived in 
privately rented property and one fifth being newly 
married couples setting home for the first time and 
attracted by reasonably priced housing."(Z7) 
Again clear differences emerged between the two survey areas 
when previous tenure and place of residence was examined (see Tables 6 
and 7). Forty one percent of the local authority residents formerly 
lived in council housing, 30% lived in privately rented property and 
11% owned their own homes. This compared with 33% of private 
residents who previously owned their own home, 26% who lived in 
privately rented property and 27% who were newly married couples. 
Previous place' of residence (Table 7) indicating that the local 
Table 6 Previous Tenure 1968 Survey 
Local Private Total 
Authority Housing New 
Housing Area Town 
Area 
% % % 
Owner Occupied 10.7 33.0 26.6 
Rented from Council 41.0 9.8 18.8 
Rented Privately 30.2 26.0 27.2 
Rented from N.C.B. 12.7 1.6 4.9 
Rented through Employer 2.7 2.5 2.5 
Others* 2.7 27.1 20.0 
Total HOuseholds 100.0 100.0 100.0 
*Others include newly married. 
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Table 1 Previous Place of Residence 1968 Survey 
Local Authority Private Total 
Previous Place of Housing Area Housing New 
Residence Area Town 
% % % 
Newcastle C.B. 8.7 25.6 20.7 
Tynemouth C.B. 6.7 5.5 5.8 
Gosforth U.D. 5.2 3.7 
Longbenton U.D. 10.1 7.2 
Newburn U.D. 0.7 1.9 1.5 
Wallsend M.B. 5.4 6.3 6.0 
Whitley Bay M.B. 1.3 6.0 4.7 
Ashington and Newbiggin U.D.'s 
Bedlington U. D. 2.2 1.6 
Blyth M.B. 3.3 2.3 
Morpeth M.B. 0.8 0.6 
Seaton Valley U.D. 70.4 14.1 30.4 
Castle Ward R.D. 1.4 1.0 
Rest of Northumberland 1.4 1.0 
Rest of N._ Region 1.5 1.0 
South Tyneside 0.7 5.8 4.3 
Rest of Durham 1.6 1.2 
London and South-East 3.4 2.7 2.9 
Scotland 1.1 0.8 
Midlands 1.3 0.6 0.8 
Rest of U.K. 0.7 3.0 2.3 
Overseas 0.7 0.2 
Total Households 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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authority area now took 70% ·of its residents from the Seaton Valley 
Urban District compared with 14% in the private housing sector who 
came from this area. Twenty three percent of the council estate 
residents came from North Tyneside and Newcastle a decrease of 32% on 
the 1966 figure of 55% of council households who migrated from these 
localities. However, when the Private sector area was taken into 
account, then in comparison to 1966, Cramlington had strengthened its 
ties with North Tyneside and Newcastle by drawing 61% of its residents 
from these areas. 
THE 1975 CRAMLINGTON SURVEY 
By 1975 the town had grown to approximately 6,600 dwellings of 
which 13% were sampled to produce detailed and comprehensive survey 
results. However, rather than simply going over the ground of the 
1966 and 1968 surveys the 1975 survey< 28) attempted to assess how far 
Cramlington had attained its objectives. But first it confirmed the 
trends identified in earlier surveys. For example,_ about half of 
Cramlington' s working population commuted to Tyne and Wear. Four in 
every five of these commuters lived in Cramlington's private sector. 
About one third of the working population both lived and worked within 
Cramlington with one in every two of this group located in the local 
authority sector (see Table 8). 
The origin of households moving to Cramlington indicated that 
52% moved from Tyne and Wear while 21% came from South East 
Northmnberland. A high proportion ( 46% of local authority sector 
households moved from Blyth Valley and Wansbeck districts compared 
with housing association and private sector households (both 15%). 
Eighteen percent of households came froni outside the counties of 
Northmnberland, Durham and Tyne and Wear (see Table 9). Overall, 
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however, when a comparison was made with the 1966 survey the 
proportion of incomers from Tyne and Wear was increasing from 40% in 
1966 to 52% in 1975. 
The former tenure of households moving to Cramlington showed an 
increasing proportion coming from the private rented sector with 38% 
of total families originating from this tenure, the equivalent 1968 
figure having been 27%. About 28% formerly owned their own 
accommodation, approximately 19% of households were former cormcil 
tenants and 8% had lived with relatives (see Table 10). Nearly a 
quarter of all private sector households had moved to Cramlington on 
marriage. 
The 1968 survey had remarked that non-manual groups were 
concentrated and predominated in the private sector while skilled and 
semi-skilled manual workers predominated in the local authority 
sector. The 1975 survey confirmed this observation and noted that 
approximately 50% of head of households in the private sector 
consisted of non~ual groups compared with 9% in the Local Authority 
sector (see Table 11). Both the local authority and private housing 
areas as well as the housing association sector having roughly similar 
percentages of electrical and engineering worker head of households 
with economically non-active categories being highly concentrated 
within the cormcil housing sector (see Tables 11 and 12). This last 
characteristic relating to the fact that the local authority area 
contained a high percentage of retired people (see Table 13). 
Finally, the 1975 survey considered four subjects namely housing 
moves within Cramlington, preference for work in Cramlington, car 
ownership and housewives seeking work. 
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House movement within Crarnlington was mostly within the local 
authority sector with 65% of families moving more than once. In 
contrast 84% of housing association families and 78% of private sector 
families had not moved home within Crarnlington (see Table 14). 
Nearly half of those working outside Crarnlington would have 
preferred a job within the town (see Table 15). 
More than 67% of all households owned at least one car, compared 
with a regional rate of 45% in 1974. However, this statistic 
reflected the increasing growth of Crarnlington's private sector 
housing compared with other tenures since 30% of housing association 
households and 57% of local authority households but only 19% of 
private sector households did not own a car. 
While the percentage of housewives not registered unemployed who 
were seeking work was small at 11%, 45% would have sought work given 
more favourable conditions. The 1975 survey therefore concluded, as 
had the 1966 survey, that women constituted a sizable labour pool (see 
Tables 16 and 17). 
OBSERVATIONS FROM 'IHE FARLY SURV~ 
Pulling together the information gathered from the early surveys 
of Crarnlington enables some provisional statements to be made about 
the New Town; 
1. In the old areas surrounding Crarnlington in 1966 Council housing 
was by far the major form of tenure provision. Within 
Crarnlington itself while a new local authority estate had been 
built construction for private ownership was the larger tenure 
form making up 60% of all new housing. 
2. In 1966 the old areas still had 24% of their economically active 
population working in mining. 
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3. The New Town was the location for a pool of female labour much 
of which while wanting to work was constrained by family 
commitments. Part-time work was therefore the preferred form of 
employment for many of these women. In 1975 38% of women in 
Cramlington worked full-time and 15% part-time, 33% were 
classified as housewives (see Table 18). 
4. In 1966 within the 'new areas' containing two private estates 
and a local authority estate most women who would have sought 
work wanted jobs in the shop, office and professional sectors 
rather than factory work. By contrast 23% of women in the old 
areas preferred factory work with a further 33% not particular 
about what job they did. 
5. While the New Town contained a broad range of socio-economic 
groups, women were concentrated in particular categories 
especially 'junior non-manual' and hardly represented at all in 
managerial, professional and skilled manual categories (see 
Table 5). 
6. Within the new private sector estates the majority of the 
economically active commuted to work in Tyne and Wear. In 
contrast just over half of the workforce in the local authority 
sector worked in Cramlington. 
7. Overall, in 1975, Cramlington was the place of work for a third 
of its total labour force, an increase of 8% over the 1966 and 
1968 figures. However, most managers, professionals, inter-
mediate non-manual and junior non-manual workers commuted to 
work in Newcastle and North Tynes ide (see Table 20) • The 
majority of semi-skilled workers (in 1968) being employed in 
Cramlington with skilled workers and foremen divided between 
Cramlington, Newcastle and North Tyneside (see Table 20). 
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8. Non manual workers predominated in the private sector estates as 
did the 'higher' socio-economic groups. On the local authority 
estates skilled and semi-skilled manual workers predominated. 
These same local authority estates being the location for 
'lower' socio-economic groups and the economically non-active. 
9. In tenns of declining industrial sectors and their relation to 
newer sectors the 75 survey considered that; 
"there was nothing to suggest that a significant 
number of migrants were being recruited from 
declining industries into the new manufacturing 
sector".C29 ) 
10. The private sector estates drew their population mostly from 
Tyneside while the local authority estates had higher 
proportions of their populations from Seaton Valley and later 
Blyth and Wansbeck council areas. 
11. First-time buyers and newly married couples constituted a 
significant percentage of private sector households as did 
buyers who had previously owned their own homes. Apart from 
this Cramlington drew a high' proportion of its households from 
the private rented sector. However house movement within 
Cramlington's Private Sector was limited (see Table 14). 
12. Just as socio-economic groups were differentially spread across 
tenures gross household income also varied with tenure so that 
in 1975 mean gross income for local authority households was 
£2,255 p.a., for housing association was £2,961 p.a. and for 
private sector households was £3,740 p.a. Within the private 
sector 61% of households had an income per annum of £3,000 and 
over, against 21% of local authority households. Twenty two 
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percent of local authority households had an income of less than 
£1,000 p.a. as opposed to only 2% of private sector households 
(see Table 21). 
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE EARLY SURVEYS 
While the 1966 and 1968 surveys had nothing explicit to say 
about how far Cramlington had achieved its objectives the 1975 survey 
did make a hesitant attempt at assessment. A hesitancy caused by the 
fact that the town's objectives were; 
"Often couched in a language which made judgement of 
their attainment difficult", and were "sometimes in 
' . 
. conflict with one another". ~30) 
However, insofar as Cramlington's objectives could be stated, the 1975 
survey thought that they consisted of; 
1. The creation of a new and varied economic base which would 
compensate for the decline of coal and which was not dependent 
upon any one industry. 
2. The development over time of a self contained and socially 
balanced community. 
3. The attraction of industry from outside the region. 
4. The attraction of a mix of industries capable of self sustained 
growth, that is industries not so directly affected by downturns 
in the national economy. 
5. The development of external economies with the rest of the 
northern coalfield. 
6. Providing a focus for house building and industrial investment. 
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Then having outlined what it thought were the town's objectives, the 
survey considered that the notion of; 
"general improvement emanating from a central growth 
point is not easily examined ... (31) 
Therefore on this and other matters such as the reliance upon 
"footloose" industry to create jobs or how long it would take for 
Cramlington to become self contained or the validity of the idea of 
self containment and its realisation in practice or whether particular 
industries were relatively unaffected by economic recession and if so 
which industries, the 1975 survey was diplomatically silent. A 
silence which extended to any discussion of the limits to planning in 
a free market economy. Instead the 1975 survey concluded that; 
"Cramlington directly provided new employment for only a 
minority of its migrants."(32) 
and that; 
"Apart from short distance migrants moving into 
Cramlington's local authority sector, for most residents 
the New Town's role was that of a housing estate on the 
periphery of Tyneside."(33) 
Given these observations Cramlington could hardly be said to be self 
contained. Moreover, the continuing high level of commuting had been; 
"encouraged by the tenure distribution and by either 
inappropriate jobs or migrants with inappropriate 
skills."<34 ) 
-208-
In other words, there was a lack of fit between the majority of 
Private Sector adult residents and the number and type of jobs 
available in Cramlington. In addition, the future range of job 
opportunities would; 
"detennine whether or not the pool of female labour was 
fully drawn upon ... (35) · 
When the 1975 survey looked at housing it concluded that; 
"Cramlington 1 s impact on housing has been most notable 
for the opportunities it has accorded households wishing 
tq .buy thej.r own home particularly first time buyers. 
However Cr8mlington 1 s contribution towards improving 
housing conditions was not all that significant in the 
sense that the proportion of migrant households coming · 
from houses deficient in amenities was not large. Of 
greater significan~e was the easing of congestion· 
explicable in terms of the sizable proportion of migrants 
coming from the more limited accommodation of the private 
rented sector."<36) 
This, however, was only part of the story since the survey evidence 
additionally suggested that for many migrants, who were previous home 
owners, a move to Cramlington was a step up the housing ladder. But 
when these migrants relocated to Cramlington movement within the 
town 1 s housing market was limited. The new town, therefore, 
functioned as a staging post in that many households bought into its 
housing market, then, after a period, sold up and moved elsewhere in 
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the region. The length of residence statistics bearing out this 
transitional characterisation of the town since they consistently 
showed a large percentage of households resident in Cramlington for 
less than six years and a small percentage resident for longer than 
six years. 
In the end the 1975 survey was evasive on the central issue of 
how far the town had met its objectives. An evasiveness achieved by 
silence on key matters but also by the re-interpretation of original 
objectives. Therefore the goal of self containment became a distant 
prospect that may be desirable but was not necessary. In the same 
way, while the high volume of conunuting was regrettable, no 
appropriate level of commuting could be specified in view of the non 
necessity of self-containment. Moreover, although nearly 50% of those 
who worked outside Cramlington would have preferred to work in the 
town, this depended upon appropriate jobs being available. In this 
context the town had attracted new industry and the county would 
continue its efforts to publicise the town's advantages for capital. 
But what the survey did not say was that the county could not 
determine that the demand for work in Cramlington was matched by an 
equivalent supply of jobs and even less could the county determine 
that the type of work matched skills and wants. 
In short the County Planners could not publicly admit the limits to 
planning although the survey itself was pregnant with the 
contradictions and disjunctions inherent in the form, structure and 
market context of the New Town. 
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Table 8 1975 Survey 
Comparison of Workplaces by Sector and Industry (Percentages) 
Housing Local Private Grand Total Association Authority 
Proportion of total 
workforce working in: 
Cr8mlingtori 38.3 55.6 24.7 34.3 
Tyne and Wear 45.1 20.7 . 56~8 45.9 
Elsewhere 16.6 . 23.7 18.5 19.8 




·Cramlington 58.9 73.6 36.5 51.0 
Tyne and Wear 31.4 10.5 45.7 32.4 
Elsewhere 9.7 15.9 17.8 16.6 
Total Manufacturing 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Workforce 
Proportion of dis-
tribution and service 
workforce working in: 
Cramlington 27.5 53.3 26.9 31.7 
Tyne and Wear 50.0 28.3 59.2 55.2 
Elsewhere 22.5 18.4 13.9 15.1 
Total distribution 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
and service workforce 
Proportion of public 
administration 
workforce working in: 
Cramlington 31.7 4.2 10.5 
Tyne and Wear 84.6 34.0 76.1 66.5 
Elsewhere 15.4 34.3 19.7 23.0 
Total public admin- 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 instration workforce 
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Table 9 1975 Survey 
Origins of Households Klving to Cramlington (Percentages) 
Housing Local Private Total Association Authority 
S.E. Northt.nnberland 14.6 46.2 14.7 20.8 
Rest of Northumberland 2.9 3.4 2.6 2.7 
Tyne and Wear 60.1 32.8 56.5 52.2 
Co. Durham 7.5 5.0 6.5 6.3 
Elsewhere 14.9 12.6 19.8 17.9 
Table 10 1975 Survey 
· Fonner Tenure of Households K>ving to Cramlington New Town 
Former Tenure Housing Local Private Grand Total Association Authority 
Nt.nnber % Nt.nnber % Nt.nnber % Number % 
Owner Occupied 49 14.1 . 79 10.9 923 34.9 1051 28.3 
Local Authority 113 32.5 207 28.6 376 14.2 696 18.7 
Private Rented 147 42.2 304 42.0 969 36.6 1420 38.2 
Relatives 28 8.0 49 6.8 228 8.6 305 8.2 
Other 11 3.2 85 11.7 149 5.6 245 6.6 
Total 348 100.0 724 100.0 2645 100.0 3717 100.0 
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Table 11 Occupation of Head of Household 1975 Survey 
Housing Local Private Grand Total Association Authority 
Nt.unber % Nt.nnber % Number % Number % 
Farmers, Foresters,· 12 0.6 11 0.3 23 0.4 Fishermen 
Miners and 85 4.0 46 1.1 131 2.0 Quarrymen 
Heavy Manu- 30 1.4 23 0.6 53 0.8 facturing Workers 
Electrical and 88 21.9 446 21.1 1026 25.4 1560 23.8 Engineering Workers 
Other Manu- 46 11.4 170 8.0 262 6.5 478 7.3 facturing Workers 
Construction Workers 31 7.7 97 .4.6 80 2.0 208 . 3.2 Painters, Plant 
Drivers 
Labourers 10 2.5 121 5.7 46 1.1 177 2.7 
Transport Workers 46 11.4 146 6.9 182 4.5 374 5.7 Warehousemen 
Clerical, Sales and 67 16.7 91 4.3 969 23.9 1127 17.2 Service l\forkers 
Admin/ Professional 62 15.4 97 4.6 1037 25.6 1196 18.2 and Technical Workers 
Armed Forces 5 1.2 6 0.3 23 0.6 34 0. 5 
Not working 44 10.9 793 37.5 331 8.2 1168 17.8 
Inadequately Described 3 0.7 18 0.6 11 0.3 32 0.5 or Uncompleted 
Total 402 100.0 2112 100.0 4047 100.0 6561 100.0 
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Table 12 Socio-Economic Group of Head of Household 1975 Survey 
Housing Local Private Grand Total Association Authority 
Number % Nt.nnber % Number % Number % 
Employers and 
Managers - Large 
Establishments · 
13 ' 3.2 73 3.5 285 7.0 371 5.7 
Employers and 
Managers -·Small 23 5.7 18 0.9 148 3.7 189 2.9 
Establishments 
Professional 21 5.2 6 0.3 536 13.2 563 8.6 Employees 
Intermediate Junior 23 5.7 55 2.6 376 9.3 454 6.9 Non-Manual 
Personal Service 33 8.2 37 1.8 296 7.3 366 5.6 Workers 
Foreman and 
Supervisors - 39 9.7 158 7.5 479 11.8 676 10.3 
Manual Workers 
Skilled and Semi-
Skilled Manual 182 45.3 783 37.1 1391 34.4 2356 35.9 
Workers 
unskilled Manual 8 2.0 116 5.5 46 1.1 170 2.6 Workers 
Own Account Workers 8 2.0 68 1.7 76 1.2 
with no Employees 
Agricultural 6 0.3 6 0.1 Workers 
Members of 5 1.2 6 0.3 11 0.3 22 0.3 Armed Forces 
Economically 44 10.9 793 37.5 331 8.2 1168 17.8 Inactive 
Occupation 
Inadequately 3 0.7 61 2.9 80 2.0 144 2.2 
Described 
Total 402 100.0 2112 100.0 4047 100.0 6561 100.0 
The economically inactive category includes all those who, at the time of 
the survey, were retired, permanently sick or not then seeking employment. 
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Table 13 Tenure Profile 
Housing Local Private Association Authority 
Population 1,292 6,198 11' 595 
% of population: 
economically active 2 47.9 45.7 54.0 
permanently sick 0.9 1.4 0.3 
under school age 12.4 6.4 13.8 
under 15 years of age 35.9 26.0 28.8 
at school after 16 0.5 0.6 1.0 
over retirement 3.5 15.0 2.9 
Unemployment rate 
percentage 3 2.9 6.7 1.8 
Percentage, of house 
holds with at 
least 1 car 69.9 42.9 80.3 
Notes: 
1. Source: Regional Statistics, No. 11, 1975 
2. Including those in full and part-time employment and those 
registered as unemployed. 











Table 14 Moves within Craml ington 1975 Survey 
Housing Local Private Grand Total Association Authority 
Nt.nnber % Ntnnber % Ntnnber % Number % 
Not Moved 377 83.8 731 34~6 3146 n·. 7 4214 64.2 
1 Move 44 10.9 609 28.8 661 16.3 1314 20.0 
2 Moves 13 3.2 286 . 13.5 9i 2.2 390 5.9 
3 Moves 8 2.0 243 11.5 103 2.5 254 5.4 
4 Moves 122 5.8 46 1.1 168 2.6 
5 Moves 91 4.3 91 1.4 
6 Moves 12 0.6 12 0.2 
7 Moves 12 .0.6 12 0.2 
8 Moves 
9 Moves 6 0.3 6 0.1 
Total 402 100.0 2112 100.0 4047 100.0 6561 100.0 
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Table 15 Preference for Work in Cramlingtan* 1975 Survey 
Housing Local Private Grand Total Association Authority 
Ntnnber % Number % Ntnnber % Number % 
Prefer Cramlington 170 45.8 645 54.9 1942 42.0 2757 44.7 
Do not prefer 201 54.2 529 45.1 2686 58.0 3416 55.3 Cramlington 
Total 371 100.0 1174 100.0 4628 100.0 6173 100.0 
* This question was only asked of those employed outside Cramlington who 
were present at the interview. 
Table 16 Housewives Seeking Work 1975 Survey 
Housing Local Private Grand Total Association Authority 
Ntnnber % Number % Ntnnber % Number % 
Seeking Work 26 17~1 65 10.0 153 10.7 255 11.0 
Not Seeking Work 126 82.9 586 90.0 1272 89.3 1984 89.0 
Total 152 100.0 651 100.0 1425 100.0 2228 100.0 
Table 17 Housewives who would seek work 1975 Survey 
given Appropriate Conditions of Work 
Housing Local Private Grand Total Association Authority 
Ntnnber % Number % Ntnnber % Number % 
Would Seek Work 73 57.9 210 35.8 610 48.0 893 45.0 
Would Not Seek 44 35.0 181 30.9 585 46.0 810 40.8 Work 
No Reply 9 7.1 195 33.3 77 4.0 281 14.2 
Total 126 100.0 586 100.0 1272 100.0 1984 100.0 
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Table 18 Work Status - Females 1975 Survey 
Housing Local Private Grand Total Association Authority 
Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Full-Time Work 160 36.9 627 27.3 1756 43.5 2543 37.6 
Part-Time Work 80 18.5 377 16.4 581 14.4 1038 15.3 
Unemployed 10 2.4 49 2.1 23 0.6 82 1.2 
Housewife 152 35.1 651 28.4 1425 35.3 2228 32.9 
Student 3 0.6 12 0.5 57 1.4 72 1.2 
Permanently Sick 3 0.6 12 0.5 11 0.3 26 0.4 
Retired 26 6.0 566 24.7 182 4.5 774 11.4 
Total · 434 100.0 2294 100.0 4035 100.0 6763 100.0 
Table 19 Work Status - Males 1975 Survey 
Housing Local Private Grand Total Association Authority 
Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Full-Time Work 361 91.4 1631 74.0 3773 90.4 5765 85.2 
Part-Time Work 12 0.6 34 0.8 46 0.7 
Unemployed 8 2.0 134 6.1 91 2.2 233 3.4 
Student 3 0.8 24 1.1 57 1.4 84 1.2 
Permanently Sick 8 2.0 73 3.3 23 0.5 104 1.5 
Retired 15 3.8 329 14.9 194 4.7 538 8.0 
Total 395 100.0 2203 100.0 4172 100.0 6770 100.0 
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Table 20 1968 Survey 
Correlation between Socio-Economic Group and Place of Work 
(Males and Females in the New Town) 
Place of Employers Profess- Inter-. Junior Foremen Semi- Others 
Work and ional mediate Non- and Skilled 
Managers Non- ·Manual Skilled Manual 
Manual Manual and 
and Own Agaric-
Account ultural 
% % % % % % % 
Cramlington 




Blyth, 10.6 3.1 15.5 2.1 8.3 11.3 11.9 Newbiggin 
and 
Morpeth 
Newcastle 25.6 81.3 51.2 43.3 26.1 16.7 
Whitley Bay, 
Longbenton, 




Castle 6.4 9.4 17.8 6.2 5.6 6.0 Ward and 
Newburn 
Others 4.3 6.2 4.4 5.1 9.5 1.9 7.1 
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 '100.0 
(No.) 56 44 70 214 195 77 29 
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Table 21 Household Gross Inc<-* 1975 Survey 
Housing Local Private Grand Total Income per Annum Association Authority 
Nt.nnber % Number % Number % Number % 
Under £1,000 26 6.5 456 21.6 80 2.0 562 8.6 
£1,000 but less 28 7.0 225 10.7 182 4.5 435 6.6 than £1,500 
£1,500 but less 49 12.2 213 10.1 205 5.1 467 7.1 than £2,000 
£2,000 but less 121 30.1 573 27.1 878 21.7 1572 23.9 than £3,000 
£3,000 but less 140 34.8 377 17.9 1836 45.4 2353 35.8 then £5,000 
£5,000 and over 23 5.7 79 3.7 627 15.5 729 11.1 
No reply 15 3.7 189 8.9 239 5.9 443 6.7 
Total 402 100.0 2112 100.0 4047 100.0 6561 100.0 
* "Gross income" is income before all deductions. It includes all 
benefits, interest payments, grants and rental payments. 
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HOUSING AND LABOUR 
The previous survey evidence pointed to a disjunction between 
living and working in Cramlington especially with respect to private 
sector residents. At the same time there was a problem of ensuring 
that house building and factory construction was synchronised so that 
in 1964 Elphick noted that; 
"Factories are being constructed ahead of housing and it 
is imperative that housing both local authority and 
private is started this year if the population is to be 
accorrnnodated near their place of work ... (37) 
The residential/place of work disjunction and the synchronisation 
problem reflecting the predominance of the private housing market and 
its relative autonomy from and disarticulation with the local labour 
market. Yet assembling a pool of labour was a necessary factor in 
attracting industry to the town and it is in this context that the 
local state became central in providing affordable housing for the 
workers on the industrial estates. But this function was itself not 
without problems, a joint committee report describing the council's 
thinking in this way; 
"The District Council were extremely anxious to meet the 
needs of incoming workers and in the past when suitable 
houses had not been available they had bought them from 
the private developers for re-letting to key workers. In 
aqdition the need to sustain an expensive building 
programme to provide a 'pool' of rental accommodation was 
a heavy strain on local financial resources ... (38) 
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The demand for cormcil accommodation coming not only from 'key 
workers' but also arising from demographic change, slum clearance and 
the alleviation of overcrowding. In order to deal with these demands 
and financial pressures the district cormcil adopted three strategies. 
First it went into· partnership with other local authorities and 
reached an agreement with Dorran Construction Ltd to provide 713 
industrialised houses for rent, 400 of which would be sited at 
Cramlington. These houses being earmarked for key workers. However, 
in April 1967 Dorran Construction went into liquidation and by 
September a £1.4 million tender from Bell and Leech was accepted for 
the completion of the programme. Only 13 houses having been built by 
Dorran before their liquidation. 
Second, the Cramlington Joint Committee in November 1967 
resolved to ask; 
"the North East Housing Association or a similar 
organisation to rmdertake the provision of rented 
accommodation should the need arise ... (39) 
The cormcil accepting responsibility for the housing of key 
workers nominated by industrialists and the Association providing for 
other industrial or white collar workers who did not want to buy a 
house. Therefore by 1969 the Cormty Cormcil annormced the N.E.H.A.'s 
intention to build 1, 770 houses with the first phase of 317 houses 
starting in 1970. But by 1972 the Association had decided not to 
proceed beyond the first stage although they would consider further 
development; 
"in the event of future industrial expansion and an 
upsurge in demand for rented housing ... (40) 
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Third, the district cormcil was itself a source of mortgaging 
facilities for potential buyers, with money coming from central 
government, so that between 1967 and 1971 £1.7 million was provided as 
mortgage loans. However, as a source of all mortgages only 5% of 
Cramlington's owner occupiers received mortgages from the local 
·authority. Nevertheless · the distr:i.ct cormcil considered its 
contribution to mortgage finance important and pressed central 
government to increase its quota of mortgage frmds. The response of 
the Parliamentary Secretary concluding that; 
"as part of an economy exercise the money available for 
mortgage advances had been reduced from £130 million to 
£30 million for 1968/69 therefore the quota award to the 
district cormcil for 1969/70 was £40,123 ( a reduction of 
75% on the previous year)."(41) 
This decrease in local authority mortgage frmds causing the 
cormcil to complain that; 
"a slowdown in the rate of private house building means a 
slowdown in the development of the town as a whole ... (42 ) 
In short the relative autonomy of the private sector housing market 
increased the need for public sector housing provision in order to 
ensure a "pool of labour" assembled at a particular place. However 
the financial strain this imposed on the district cormcil in tum 
forced it to seek partnership arrangements with other local 
authorities and a housing association in order to provide rented 
accommodation. The reality being that public sector housing did not 
stand on its own but was closely linked to local manufacturing 
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industry to the extent that the district council undertook to house 
workers nominated by industrialists. Indeed the provision of housing 
both private and public was held out to industrialists as an 
additional reason for locating in Cramlington. Once set up on the 
industrial estates the ability to nominate workers for housing gave 
company personnel officers, if they decided to activate it, an 
additional source of control over the workforce. MOreover, the fact 
that employment would also guarantee a house, gave Cramlington an 
added attractiveness for labour compared to other areas. 
As we have seen there was a measure of overlap between working 
and living_in Cramlington even within the private housing sector. For 
the County and District Councils the construction and sale of private 
housing was a priority so that in 1969 the Joint Committee noted that; 
"the private developers had sold 1338 houses of which 
1163 were completed. Sales were running at the rate of 
40 a month and it was most important that this momentum 
should continue."<43) 
In the event the momentum did not continue. New house building 
reaching a peak in 1976 and declining thereafter especially between 
the years 1980 and 1986 (see Table 21A). This slowdown in private 
sector housing was then reflected in revised time-scales and 
population targets. The actual population of the town in 1988 
standing at 29,000 and an estimated population for 1996 suggested as 
35,000 to 37,000. In other words the estimated population for 1971 of 
39,000 would still not be achieved twenty five years later. Attempts 
at making long term population estimates were therefore abandoned and 
short term estimates scaled down. Essentially housing output was 
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determined by fluctuations in the market and this in turn meant ever 
shifting population estimates and time-scales for the completion of 
schemes. 
Likewise when the time arrived in 1981 to think about the 
development of the North East sector of the town, market 
considerations were to the fore. The views of the private developers 
were sought by the County Planning De~tment and in an echo of the 
earlier discussions of the sixties the private developers' primary 
concern was that; 
"their building activities should not be unduly 
restricted and that they should be as free as possible to 
develop in response to changes in the housing 
market."<44) 
The Planning Department going on to say that; 
"it is recognised that the builders should have 
reasonable flexibility in their activities but the 
resulting development should not be determined solely by 
market forces. Planning and social factors also need to 
be taken into account."(45) 
What is significant here is the dominance of the market rather 
than its sole determination and the acceptance of this dominance by 
the planning department so that planning's role was to modify and 
negotiate with capital in order that planning and social concerns were 
taken into consideration. The result was a phasing of development 
which would attempt to synchronise the building of housing, schools 
and community buildings. Moreover, the better more expensive housing 
would occupy the; 
-225-
"more attractive sites with existing landscape 
features."C 46 ) 
While in order to meet the demands of the private developers; 
"the majority of the sites have been identified for 
medium density housing in the medium price range 
comprising mainly one and two storey detached and semi-
detached houses with some terraces ... (47) 
Despite this dominance of medium price housing, it would be incorrect 
to see the private housing sector as homogenous since Leech and Bell 
built new · houses ranging in pri~e . from £34, 500 to £79, 000 (1988 
prices)C48 ) while the private housing market had houses for resale in 
a range of £16,950 to £59,950 in 1988. C49 ) The private sector was 
therefore differentiated by price reflecting both the house type and 
differential capacity of individuals to enter the housing market. 
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EMPWYMENT IN CRAMLINGTON 
According to Census of Employment figures (see Tables 22, 22A 
and 22B) employment in manufacturing reached a peak in 1974 and then 
declined to 1976 followed by an upswing in 1977. Between 1978 and 
1981 manufacturing employment shrunk by 32% with a loss of 
approximately 2,400 jobs. The addition of 660 manufacturing jobs over 
the next three years to 1984 hardly compensating for the past losses. 
The job losses affecting all categories of labour whether full-time 
males, full-time females or part-time females with the full-time male 
job total in 1984 down 29% from the peak year of 1975, full-time 
female jobs down 31% from 1974 and part~time female jobs down 70% from 
a small 1974 base figure. 
Confidential information from the County Planning Department 
(see Table 22C) confirmed the trends revealed by the Census of 
Employment. The Planning Department figures showing employment on the 
industrial estates doubling between 1971 and 1974. Then, apart from 
an upturn from 1975 to 1977 jobs were lost at a steady rate to 1982 
when once again there was a positive upwards movement representing a 
jobs gain. However, by 1987 the jobs total for the industrial estates 
was almost the same as the figure fifteen years earlier in 1972. 
But even within the manufacturing sector job change was uneven. 
For example Wilkinson Sword reduced its entire male and female 
workforce by approximately 68% between 1973 and 1984 with the most 
dramatic reduction taking place from 1978 to 1981 (see Table 23). On 
the other hand Dunlop had increased its total workforce by 17% between 
1973 and 1984 although its 1984 total employment figure was a 
reduction of 8% from 1978 (see Table 24). Within the textile sector 
total jobs decreased by 19% over the 1973/84 period but full-time 
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males disproportionately bore the brunt of this decline with male 
employment shrinking by 43% and full-time female employment increasing 
by 43% (see Table 25) • Over the same period Fasson Adhesives had 
increased its total workforce by 48% (see Table 26) while Commercial 
Plastics had cut back its labour requirement from 1,643 in 1978 to 
1,006 in 1984 or a drop of 39% (see Table 27). A cut which in this 
instance represented a 49% contraction in full-time female jobs and a 
35% contraction in full-time male jobs although the loss of full-time 
male jobs was greater in absolute terms, i.e. 432 against 183 full-
time female posts lost. 
Distinctions can therefore be recognised between one plant and 
another in terms of those that had shed labour' those that had 
retained labour and those that had increased the numbers they 
employed. Equally, variations between plants is apparent with regard 
to the scale, timing and tempo of job loss although the period from 
1978 to 1981 witnessed a particularly severe and across the board 
shake out of manufacturing labour. 
Declining employment in industries such as cutlery and razor 
blade manufacture and new employment opportunities in more recently 
established pharmaceutical plants can be identified. In addition the 
manufacturing jobs total showed positive blips in 1974, 1977 and again 
in 1984. Overall, however, the direction of change was negative with 
manufacturing employment declining by 23% during the period 1973 to 
1984. This suggests that new incoming manufacture was not mnnerous 
enough or sufficiently labour intensive to replace the jobs being 
lost. Indeed today' s new employer was often tomorrow's closure or 
shedder of labour. Therefore the wnrho Company, for example, when it 
took over Brentford Nylons Cramlington plant in 1977 employed 1700 
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people but by December 1984 it had reduced its workforce by cutting 
400 jobs. 
The 1974 job total was 11,738 of which manufacturing jobs made 
up 70% of this total. By 1984 the total jobs figure had dropped to 
10,729 but manufacturing jobs now constituted only 54% of the total 
(see Tables 28 and 28A). 
Over the ten years between 1973 and 1984 employment in services 
had increased from 21% of total employment to 41%. Within this 
category of 1 services 1 female labour predominated while part-time 
female labour made up 36% of employment in services (see Tables 29 and 
29A). ·But like manufacturing the service sector should not be seen as 
I' .' • 
an undifferentiated category. Therefore although service employment 
doubled between the years 1973 and 1984 employment within the state 
sector decreased by 46% between 1978 and 1984 (see Table 30). Also, 
the majority of women were concentrated in four services categories, 
namely shopwork and distributive trades; hotels, pubs, restaurants and 
catering; professional and scientific ser\rices and insurance, banking 
and business services (see Tables 31, 32, 33 and 34). 
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Table 22 :&nployment in Manufacturing Industry at Cr:amlington 1973/84 
Date Males Males Females Females Total Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time 
1973 5,164 10 2,055 238 7,467 
74 5,765 15 2,206 254 8,240 
75 5,861 7 2,007 105 7,980 
76 5,259 11 1,804 106 7,180 
77 5,519 13 1,889 181 7,602 
78 5,450 12 1,889 183 7,534 
81 3,831 11 1,122 172 5,136 
84 4,184 4 1,530 76 5,794 
Table 23 :&Dployment in Cutlery and Razor Blades 
at Cr;un] ington 1973/84 
Date Males Males Females Females Total Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time 
1973 1,000 1 374 41 1,416 
74 959 1 440 20 1,420 
75 828 0 333 4 1,165 
76 840 0 340 0 1,186 
77 811 0 340 0 1,151 
78 800 0 331 6 1,137 
81 393 0 131 0 524 
84 338 0 122 0 460 
Table 24 Fmployment in Rubber Products at Cramlington 1973/84 
Date Males Males Females Females Total Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time 
1973 272 0 13 8 293 
74 350 0 15 0 365 
75 375 0 14 5 394 
76 331 0 12 9 352 
77 354 0 1 10 365 
78 362 0 2 9 373 
81 314 0 11 12 337 
84 329 0 12 4 345 
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Table 25 Employment in Textiles at Cramlington 1973/84 
Date Males Males Females Females Total Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time 
1973 1,450 0 539 2 1,991 
74 1,811 0 481 2 2,294 
75 1,975 0 456. 4 2,435 
76 1,155 0 286 6 1,447 
77 1,297 0 395 7 1,699 
78 1,218 0 422 7 1,647 
81 856 3 367 95 1,321 
84 832 0 773 0 1,605 
Table 26 Employment in Fonoulated Adhesives/Sealants 
at Cramlington 1973/84 
Date Males Males Females Females Total Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time 
1973 170 0 21 4 195 
74 208 0 21 4 233 
75 217 0 18 5 240 
76 231 0 26 5 262 
77 247 0 24 4 275 
78 252 0 20 7 280 
81 245 0 20 6 271 
84 262 0 24 2 288 
Table 27 Employment in Plastic Processing at Cramlington 1973/84 
Date Males Males Females Females Total Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time 
1973 891 3 244 62 1,200 
74 958 4 265 67 1,294 
75 879 0 245 19 1,143 
76 917 1 241 10 1,169 
77 970 1 260 21 1,252 
78 1,244 0 374 25 1,643 
81 726 0 180 3 909 
84 814 0 191 3 1,006 
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Table 28 Total Employment at Cramlington 1973/84 
Date Males Males Females Females Total Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time 
1973' 6,746 154 2,657 972 10,529 
74 7,398 . 146 2,945 1,249 11,738 
75 7,591 169 2,717· 1,208 11 '685 
76 7,211 191 2,663 1,316 11,381 
71 7,354 201 2,821 1,510 11,886 
78 7,432 242 2, 716 1,460 11,841 
81 5,774 201 2,071 1,671 9, 717 
84 6,267 220 2,570 1,672 10,729 
Table 29 Employment in all 'Services' at Cramlington 1973/84 
Date Males Males Females Females Total Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time 
1973 743 138 585 722 2,188 
74 714 126 715 983 2,538 
75 1,051 158 699 1,096 3,004 
76 1,052 178 840 1,196 3,266 
77 998 186 911 1,314 3,409 
78 1,290 229 817 1,267 3,603 
81 1,481 188 918 1,475 4,062 
84 1,647 204 1,013 1,583 4,447 
Table 30 Administration including National and lDcal. Government, 
Police and Fire Services at Cramlington 1973/84 
Date Males Males Females Females Total Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time 
1973 277 5 55 39 376 
74 208 3 56 21 288 
75 553 3 81 56 693 
76 540 14 77 57 688 
77 459 19 82 71 631 
78 699 13 70 28 810 
81 503 9 75 20 607 
84 321 3 84 34 442 
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Table 31 Employment in Distributive Trades at Cram1ington 1973/84 
Date Males Males Females Females Total Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time 
1973 197 26 158 210 591 
74 . 153 27 169 239 588 
75 147 48 132 256 583 
76 166 66 167 266 665 
77 135 57 172 286 650 
78 137 102 178 340 757 
81 171 59 162 383 775 
84 398 39 231 384 1,052 
Table 32 Employment in Hotels/Pubs/Restaurants and 
Catering at Cram.l.ington 1973/84 
Date Males Males Females Females Total Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time 
1973 18 49 29 130 226 
74 27 58 45 134 264 
75 30 61 32 173 296 
76 31 50 34 207 322 
77 33 55 44 230 362 
78 33 58 26 260 377 
81 38 64 45 299 446 
84 54 87 86 274 501 
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Table 33 Professional and Scientific Services (including Fducation 
and Medical Services) at Cramlington 1973/84 
Date Males Males Females Females Total Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time 
1973 164 1 284 244 693 
74 180 1 371 411 963 
75 182 7 387 498 1,074 
76 182 7 404 346 939 
77 200 11 453 360 1,024 
78 231 21 377 350 979 
81 439 25 386 445 1,295 
84 479 38 464 789 1,770 
Table 34 Insurance, Banking, Business and U!asing Services 
at Cramlington 1973/84 
Date Males Males Females Females Total Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time 
1973 13 2 10 6 31 
74 24 1 20 13 58 
75 29 2 16 18 65 
76 21 8 17 26 72 
77 28 1 16 26 71 
78 22 0 20 13 55 
81 54 0 54 47 155 
84 120 6 92 35 252 
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CASE S'IUDIES 
Brentford Nylons/Lonrho Textiles 
Christmas 1975 was not a happy time for the workers at Brentford 
Nylons 1 Cramlington. plant, one of the North Fast 1 s biggest textile 
complexes. In mid December Brentfords decided it needed to cut its 
two thousand strong workforce by a third. It was then a case of last 
in first out. All those workers with fewer than thirteen weeks 
employment with the company were dismissed and a further two hundred 
made redundant, a total of six hundred workers in all. The remainder 
of :the workforce. faced the prospect of three day working until the 
beginning of February 1976 when the company assured them of a return 
to full-time working. The factory union convenor hoping that 
following the redundancies and a period of short time working "things 
would get a lot better".(SO) But for the present; 
"We 1 ve got no choice but to accept these redundancies, 
its a matter of making sacrifices in order to save the 
majority of the jobs."(51) 
Furthermore he had held talks with a sub-corrnnittee of Blyth Valley 
Council and concluded that; 
"they are concemed, but short of buying two million 
nylon sheets there is nothing really they can do ••• it's 
now a case of waiting to see what will happen." (SZ) 
What happened was a decision by Brentfords' divisional board of 
directors to extend the three day working to at least mid-February. 
Explaining this delay of a return to normal working a company 
spokesman said that; 
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"Sales are still below target and no big orders have been 
received."(S3) 
For the unions this decision was a bitter pill to swallow. A T.G.W.U. 
shop steward remarking that; 
"Words can't express how disgusted I am • • • we were 
promised a return to normal working on Sunday and the 
workers had built up their hopes. 
completely dashed."(54) 
Now they've been 
Negotiations between management and unions followed with the 
company planning a phased return to five day working by the end of 
February and then only guaranteeing full-time work for a further two 
months. For the union this was yet another reversal; 
"We wanted the five day week guarantee to be extended 
until the smnrner holidays. Then at least people who work 
at the factory would be assured of decent holiday pay. 
But we just couldn't get that sort of deal."(SS) 
Worse, however, was to come, for in the midst of the phased return to 
' temporary' full-time work came the news that the company had been put 
in the hands of the Receivers. 
What had led to the downfall of Brentfords, a privately owned 
and secretive family firm, was a combination of external pressures and 
internal responses and decisions. First, generalised recession with 
customers cutting back of spending contributed to a drop in sales. 
Second, other textile groups developing and promoting new lines in 
printed and polyester cotton sheets ate into Brentfords already 
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declining market share. Third, Brentfords had concentrated on the 
British market and failed to develop overseas markets. Brentfords 
was, therefore, faced with a crisis of falling sales, falling profits 
and shrinking cashflow despite prices 50% below those of competitors. 
The company's response was to invest in new machinery in order to 
produce new product lines so as to compete with competitors' new 
products. But in order to buy new machinery, in a context of falling 
sales and profits, money had to be raised by some means. That means 
was through saving on the wages bill by cutting the labour force, by 
borrowing from the bank and by delaying paying bills. However, this 
was a high risk strategy and when creditors, particularly Barclays 
Bank, lost confidence in Brentfords' capacity to turn the company 
around it called in its loans. Unable to repay loans while continuing 
to trade the company asked to be taken into receivership. 
This time it was not only the workforce but also the local 
Brentfords' management who were shocked since; 
"the first time the local management knew of the decision 
was. when a telex message from the main board was handed 
to Mr. Gosling, the deputy managing director, saying that 
the directors had asked the firm's bankers to call in the 
receivers ••• only the day before local management had 
been saying that orders were picking up and the future 
was brighter than for some time."(56) 
In the· face of the uncertain future the T.G.W.U. convenor signalled 
the unions' position; 
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"It's up to us now to prove to the Receiver that we are 
people of commonsense, fully prepared to co-operate with 
the local board and to prove to him that the factory can 
be a major success. We are going to have to sell 
ourselves to him in this way ... (57) 
Effectively, Brentford Nylons was now on the open market and 
waiting to be bought. The local authority, fearing that the company 
might close for the want of a buyer, offered the inducement of a rates 
exempt year in the hope of encouraging a purchase. The main union at 
the plant, worried by reports that both the Spirella Group and 
Courtaulds had shown an interest in the company, feared wage 
reductions and asset stripping if either took over Brentfords. 
It was against this background that the local T.G.W.U. branch 
and Brentfords Cramlington management presented a forty-two page 
business plan to Eric Varley, the Industry Minister, proposing a joint 
management worker purchase of Brentfords. This was followed up with a 
purchase bid of £11 million of which £3 million was a loan from 
merchant banks and the remaining £8 million a loan request to the 
Department of Trade and Industry under the Industries Act. 
Yet despite these moves the Government, on the 26th June 1976, 
announced that it had agreed to sell Brentford Nylons to the multi-
national Lonrho Corporation for £9.8 million. The purchase price 
being met equally by Lonrho and the D.T.I. with the D.T.I. advancing 
Lonrho a secured loan of £4.8 million free of interest for the first 
year of the loan period. Commenting on the deal, Edward du Cann, a 
Conservative M.P. and a director of Lonrho, said that; 
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"We have a perfect right to use the facilities of the 
Industry Act and the Government is ready to trust us. We 
did not go to the Government they came to us through the 
Receiver. He made it clear that the money was there for 
a potential buyer whoever it was."(58) 
But the Government's acceptance of the Lonrho bid did not come 
as a surprise to the Joe Wright the T.G.W.U. convenor at Brentfords. 
He had attended a meeting with the junior industry minister Lord 
Melchett on the 24th May and recalled that; 
"Lord Melchett wanted our views on Lonrho and we said if 
they are interested in us we are interested in them 
we stressed our anxiety to co-operate and asked for 
assurances that the buyer would take on the company as a 
whole including factories at Cramlington, Felling and 
Greenock, retain existing wage levels and guarantee job 
security."(S9) 
Blyth Valley council in the person of its leader Councillor 
George Adams continued to be worried about job prospects. Asked about 
the deal he hoped that; 
"In view of the substantial loan from public funds, the 
Government had made it clear to this company that they 
expect everyone's job to be preserved."(60) 
For Edward du Cann speaking on a flying visit to Newcastle the deal 
with Lonrho would; 
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The Minister of State for Industry responding to left criticism 
claimed that Lonrho had made the only meaningful offer and in the 
circumstances the Government; 
"felt this was the most appropriate and cheapest way of 
saving jobs ... (67) 
This statement along with the support for Lonrho from the regional 
leadership of the T.G.W.U., the Northern group of Labour M.P.'s and 
the Brentfords workforce effectively put an end to further questioning 
of the deal. 
Now that the Lonrho take-over operation was complete the 
T.G.W.U. felt reassured by the company's positive statements regarding 
job security. The fact that the deal included the Felling and 
Greenock plants as well as Brentfords' retail outlets was an 
additional cause for optimism. Furthermore, the administrative and 
management staff necessary for the whole operation would be based at 
Cramlington. This led the local T.G.W.U. convenor to remark that; 
"These are very genuine people. We won't be run by 
remote control as in the past."(68) 
At first T.G.W.U. optimism seemed well founded. In August 1977, 
the Evening Chronicle was able to report that over the last year 
Lonrho had taken on four hundred workers bringing the Cramlington 
labour force to 1,700 aqd the number employed at Felling to 350.(69) 
By March 1978 it was a different story but one with a familiar sound. 
Lonrho intended to permanently close the Greenock and Felling 
factories, temporarily close the Cramlington factory for two weeks and 
then put the plant on a three day week until the end of May. The 
-247-
unions' response was one of resigned acceptance, the T.G.W.U. convenor 
stating; 
"If we went on strike or held a sit in we wouldn't get 
paid. Three days work is better than nothing. But the 
workers are very bitter about the whole thing. They 
remember the Lonrho directors coming up to see us when 
the company took over and promising job security."(70) 
Speaking in 1984 and looking back over the previous eight years, the 
managing director of Lonrho's Crarnlington operation had this to say; 
"In some ways it was worse than starting on a green field 
site because we inherited negative standards and 
from the workforce and that was expectations 
unacceptable. However, an eight year programme of 
efficiency drives, product development and an expansion 
of our retail sector is now paying off. Productivity has 
been built up and now it's reasonable. We have got back 
into profitability." ( 71) 
This increase in productivity had been achieved by first closing 
the Greenock and Felling plants and concentrating production at 
Crarnlington. Then the Crarnlington labour force was reduced in size. 
Yet in 1984 the company had 670 of its 690 looms running whereas two 
years earlier only 440 looms were operating. In August 1977 the 
Crarnlingtori plant employed 1700 people but by December 1984 the figure 
had fallen to 1287. So by 1984 the company was producing more with 
fewer workers. At the same time a rolling investment programme was 
steadily allowing new technology to be installed. For example in 1982 
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a new computer system automatically monitored the performance of all 
the looms, carried out work studies and set work loads for operators 
as well as controlling the dispensing of dyes. By itself this 
technology was responsible for pushing productivity up by 20%. 
Meanwhile in the hemming department an automated system saved time but 
increased the machinists ' workload by manoeuvring large pieces of 
material into place ready to be stitched.(72) 
The general picture then was one of rising investment in new 
technology, an increasing subordination of worker to machine, rising 
productivity and a declining number of workers employed overall. 
Exquisite Knitwear 
While Brentford Nylons was taken over by Lonrho, Exquisite 
Knitwear's Cramlington plant went down without a trace in 1976 with 
the loss of 150 jobs. Only six years earlier it had been a different 
story. Then, having just moved into a Department of Industry advance 
factory at Cramlington, Exquisite received 3,500 applications for the 
first 60 jobs it advertised. In a publicity leaflet designed to 
recruit its labour force the company offered a bright secure future; 
"Above all else, a job at Courtaulds Exquisite Knitwear 
factory offers you security with a good weekly wage and 
employment throughout the year. " ( 73) 
Shortly afterwards the company opened another knitwear plant at 
Ashington. By 1976 Exquisite had nine U.K. production units located 
in Northern Ireland, the North East, Leicester and the London area. 
But Exquisite, being part of the Courtaulds group, was only a small 
cog in a much bigger operation. In April 1976 only six years after 
opening the workforce received the news that the Cramlington plant was 
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to close. None of the workers would be transferred to other 
factories. Sir Arthur Knight, the chairman of Courtaulds, explained 
the situation as follows; 
"Our warehouses are full and one cannot go on making 
stock in an industry where we cannot predict what the 
customer with wish to buy in eight months time. Indeed 
the particular fabrics knitted at Cramlington have been 
among the worst hit in a badly hit sector of the textile 
trade The Company had hoped the market would have 
improved. It had not and there was no sign of a large 
upturn in the near future. This particular part of the 
business could not be separated from the general fortunes 
of the U.K. textile industry and the problems the Company 
had at Cramlington reflected difficulties throughout the 
group."(74) 
CourtaUlds' troubles, a symptom of which was overstocking, can 
be traced back to several sources. First, the boom years of the late 
50's and 60's saw Courtaulds expanding rapidly through takeover and by 
investing in new plant and machinery. New factories were set up at 
Skelmersdale and Spennymore for example. In many of these 
developments the company took full advantage of any grants and 
financial assistance available. At Spennymore, for instance, the 
company received £6 million in the form of grants while at Cramlington 
a different form of assistance was available in the shape of a D.T.I. 
advance factory unit. Lord Kearton, then chairman of Courtaulds, 
described the logic behind the company's acquisitions in Lancashire; 
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"We'd become very concerned by the way in which 
Lancashire was made up of a mnnber of small firms. We 
thought we'd try to bring together a large grouping to 
provide a major cotton spinning combine, much bigger than 
anything existing and of considerable strength. We'd no 
save Lancashire attitude. What we were concerned about 
was making Courtaulds more dynamic and more prosperous 
and developing its export trade.(75) 
By 1974 the C.I.S. report had this to say of Courtaulds; 
"In its short history it absorbed more than 800 
companies. Today it runs 500 manufacturing nni ts in 230 
different locations, it has 100 factories outside the 
U.K.; it has 21 major subsidiaries in Britain and another 
three in France, one in Canada, two in the U~S.A., two in 
Australia and three in South Africa."(76) 
But just as the 50's and 60's witnessed Courtaulds expansion the 
"developing countries" were installing capacity in textile production 
many with the aid of I.M.F. and World Bank loans. Then came the 1973 
Arab oil price hike and economic recession as the world market shrank. 
Production for the domestic and European market was being undercut by 
cheaper textile goods coming from the far east. An import process 
encouraged by the very structure of British textile retailing. As 
Allan Nightingale, head of Courtaulds' textile division, explained; 
"Our retailing sector is such as that we can suck in 
imports like nobody's business."(??) 
Ian MacArthur, director of the British Textile Confederation, adds; 
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"Fourteen buying groups account for 55% of cross counter 
sales. A foreign salesman can make two calls a day for 
seven days and have access to 55% of the market ... ( 7S) 
With a shrinking market and increasing import penetration Western 
textile producers faced a huge over-capacity crisis. Looking back on 
three years, Sir Christopher Hogg (present Courtaulds Chairman) 
described the company's response; 
We bit the bullet and emerged blinking into the sunlight. 
He took out a lot of capacity which immediately helped 
others."" ( 79) 
The effect this action had on jobs was horrifying. Between 1973 
and 1984 Courtaulds scrapped 60,000 jobs mainly in Britain's already 
hard hit old industrial areas as it contracted the British end of the 
business by £750 million. Among the casualties of the restructuring 
in response to crisis was Exquisite Knitwear's Cramlington and 
Ashington plants followed by Courtaulds' modern plants at 
Skelmersdale, Spennymore, Northern Ireland and Preston. Ironically, 
the Spennymore plant when it opened had been the jewel in the crown of 
Co. Durham's modernisation strategy just as Exquisite Knitwear's 
Cramlington and Ashington plants were hailed as part of 
Northl.nllberland' s success story in attracting new employment to . the 
county. But while the union and the workforce at the Spennymore plant 
refused to accept wage cuts, short-time working, reductions in the 
workforce and plant closure even going so far as to initiate a 
campaign to save the factory, the Cramlington and Ashington workers 
offered no resistance. It was a choice between dying on your knees or 
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standing and fighting. But whatever the choice factory closure and 
loss of jobs seemed inevitable. 
With hindsight the scrapping of capacity can now be seen as one 
element in a wider restructuring and re-organisation strategy so that 
by 1988 the talk in the Courtaulds' boardroom was not of the hlD1lai1 
costs involved in such a strategy but of a slimmed down and 
rejuvenated British textile industry. A rejuvenation which had a 
number of aspects to it. First the junking of capacity and shedding 
of labour. Second, the widespread adoption by Courtaulds and others 
of new technology. Third, changes in the retailing and market end of 
the textile circuit production and fourth a shift to "offshore 
production". Considering a number of these factors in greater detail 
in order to bring out their inter-linkage. 
Walk along Northumberland Street in Newcastle and you find 
"Next" clothes store. Around the corner at the Monument was "Next to 
Nothing", selling similar clothes at half the cost. The difference is 
that fashion has moved on and clothes that were in "Next" have been 
shifted to make way for new i terns and new ranges. The emphasis is now 
on design, colour co-ordination, fast turnover and the ever incessant 
stimulation and refinement of consumers' wants and desires. 
It is at this point that the industries shift into high 
technology articulates with the new technology in the high street. 
For as a result of investment in West German, Austrian and Italian 
machinery the industry has been able to take advantage of the new 
technological developments ~n the high street which have spread beyond 
Next to big chain stores such as Marks and Spencer. 
In real terms the introduction of new technology means that a 
store can run out of a fast sellirig item on a Tuesday and use its 
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electronic point of sale machine to order a new batch which will 
arrive in some cases before the weekend. For more complex clothing 
products the response time of the industry is just four weeks. 
The effect of this has been to neutralise the cost advantage of 
the third world and newly industrialising countries in certain 
segments of the market. For example, a supplier in Hong Kong would 
take eight to twelve weeks to supply an item that would take four 
weeks to obtain from a domestic manufacturer. 
Going hand in hand with this fast response time is greater 
attention to design, packaging and marketing so that all the big 
textile companies are building up design teams. The logic behind this 
development connecting with the need to win and keep markets. AB 
Allan Nightingale explains; 
"There are two defences against low cost importers, the 
use of teclmology to speed up response time and to reduce 
costs and greater differentiation through good 
design."(SO) 
However, it is in those clothing elements requiring a high labour 
component that far east producers have an advantage. Seventy percent 
of the U.K. shirt market, for example, is dominated by far east 
imports. The problem here being that labour is needed to sew on the 
collar and sleeves. But again Courtaulds along with other European 
manufacturers are working on a robotics project which will undertake 
sewing t~sks and in this way compete with low labour cost producers. 
In the meantime another response to the far east producers has 
been to make items with a relatively high domestic labour cost 
component " "offshore". Courtaulds, for example, already manufactures 
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underwear in Morocco, bras in Tunisia and knitwear in Portugal. These 
items then find their way back on to the U.K. market. In other words 
what was once produced by Courtaulds at Cramlington and Ashington is 
now produced by Courtaulds in Portugal. 
Ronson Products 
In 1967 the Ronson Corporation of America established a 
subsidiary, Ronson Products, on the Bassington Industrial Estate in 
Cramlington. Another subsidiary plant was opened at North Shields. 
The Cramlington factory assembled electrical shares and hairdriers 
while the North Shields plant assembled lighters. By 1971 the 
Cramlington workforce numbered 500 with another 250 employees at North 
Shields. Of these 750 Ronson employees 500 or 66% were women. 
By February 1981 the Cramlington plant had closed. However, 
over its fourteen year history the plant, in the columns of the local 
press, became synonymous with trouble. Some episodes stand out. 
December 1971, for example, saw the breakdown of pay talks with 
the Cramlington management refusing to go to arbitration. Weekly 
wages with bonuses for assembly workers stood at £19 for men and £14 
for women. The T.G.W.U. was asking for an increase of £4 per week 
across the board on basic rates. 
official said that; 
Explaining the claim a T. G. W. U. 
"We are asking for a wage increase in order to bring 
Ronson's basic rates of pay into line with a reasonable 
living wage."(Sl) 
Now that the pay talks had broken down the workers' response was to 
impose an overtime ban and stage lightning stoppages. In other words, 
to disrupt the attainment of normal output. The company in turn 
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justifying its offer of a £1.25p wage increase in terms of the costs 
it could bear. According to the managing director; 
"The company could not afford the increases being claimed 
and many companies who had conceded large wage increases 
had later to make redundancies in order to prune 
costs ... (BZ) 
The implication was clear. If you press for higher wages than the 
amount offer, redundancies will inevitably follow, therefore moderate 
your demands or suffer the consequences. Nevertheless the workforce 
.pressed on with its overtime ban and campaign of stoppages. The 
company reacting by laying off fifty-three workers on the grounds of 
falling output. This in turn provoked a stay away from work by all 
the assembly workers at the Cramlington plant and sympathy action from 
the North Shields workers who walked off the job. The workers from 
both factories then voting by a three to one majority in favour of 
staying out for one week and demanding that their claim go to 
arbitration. Effectively both factories were now at a standstill. 
The only people turning up for work being staff, technicians and 
skilled workers at Cramlington. 
At the end of the week's stoppage the company agreed to take 
back the fifty-three workers it had laid off and re-open wage 
negotiations. Eventually the union settled for something less than 
its £4 per week claim and the company something more than its initial 
offer of £1.25p increase.(82) 
Two years later in January 1974 a strike by thirty-one A.U.G.W. 
electricians and engineers at the Cramlington factory entered its 
twentieth week. Again it was a case of low pay. 
A.U.E.W. divisional officer explained that; 
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This time the 
"The men are concerned about the low level of wages paid 
by Ronson and the Government Phase III policy which 
restricts any immediate increase."(84) 
During their twenty week strike the servicing and setting of 
machinery was done by management staff. Even so production was down 
by 20%. Finally, another compromise pay deal was worked out and the 
men returned to work. 
Spring 1975 brought the first hint that the Ronson company was 
in trouble. But the signs were contradictory. On the one hand a new 
extension to· the Bassington · factory at . Cramlington was nearing 
completion, on the other one hundred redundancies were announced 
almost all of them women. The managing director blamed falling sales 
for the redundancies; 
"Sales have been falling and the V.A. T. increase from 
eight to twenty five percent on electrical goods like 
hair driers and shavers which we make here, will hit us 
even harder Like many companies we have cash flow 
problems. We are over manufacturing, not selling and not 
getting money in."<85 ) 
Once again the local authority was taken by surprise, the Mayor of 
Blyth saying; 
"Only a fortnight ago there was a meeting of 
industrialists in the area and they were fairly 
optimistic about the future. This has come out of the 
blue."< 86) 
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Meanwhile the job centre manager was pointing to changed times; 
"A year or two ago we could have placed women in jobs 
almost straight away in this area. But times have 
changed. It will take several weeks now ... (87) 
Over the next five years the main union, the T.G.W.U. 
reluctantly acquiesced in what was to be a steady trickling away of 
jobs so that from a high point of 500 employees at the Bassington 
factory in 1975 the workforce had contracted to 258 by 1980.(88) But 
what the union was not prepared to go along with was inadequate pay 
and differential treatment so that in April 1980 production workers 
began what was to be a twelve week strike. 
situation the T.G.W.U. branch secretary said; 
Commenting on the 
"Management had been warned that if other sections got a 
pay increase our members would also expect it. The 
craftsmen have just been given a rise linked to a 
productivity deal so now we want a fair crack of the 
whip. The management says there is a money crisis and we 
do accept there are cash flow problems at Ronson. But 
our members are fed up being treated like second class 
employees ... ( 89 ) 
Then in the middle of the strike came the news from Ronson's Surrey 
headquarters of a series of belt tightening measures including 
redundancies at Ronson's Isle of Wight factory, cuts in advertising 
and the cancellation of all but vital incoming supplies. Clearly the 
company's position was worsening. 
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It was against this background that following negotiations with 
a representative from Ronson's headquarters that the T.G.W.U. accepted 
a flat rate pay deal rather than the productivity deal it had wanted 
and called off the twelve week strike. 
By now the writing was on the wall and in November 1980 Ronson 
announced the closure of its Cramlington factory as part of a last 
ditch rationalisation plan. A plan that meant that the shaver 
assembly unit and 125 jobs were to be transferred to the North Shields 
factory. The remaining 133 workers became redundant. A company 
spokesman explaining that; 
"The difficult trading position had intensified and the 
attempt at reorganisation was to put as many sections as 
possible in one place and prevent resources being thinly 
spread ... (90) 
The chairman of the regional T.U.C. commenting on the restructuring 
after a meeting with Ronson's English management; 
"They are strictly interested in cash savings not about 
the fate of workers thrown on the scrap heap • • • I 
would now plead with Ronson U.S. to overrule their 
British management and consider other options."(91) 
That plea fell on deaf ears and the Cramlington factory closed 
although not before the workforce had won better redundancy payments 
by threatening to stop machinery leaving the doomed factory. 
But the Ronson story did not end here for in August 1981 it was 
the turn of the North Shields factory to suffer uncertainty. This 
time the company's bank, Barclays, had called in the Receiver 
considering that; 
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"their support for Ronson had reached a level well beyond 
nonnal banking limits."(92) 
Ronson it now transpired had accumulated a £9 million debt. Part of 
the explanation for that debt could, as the Financial Times observed, 
be accounted for by the fact that; 
"The U.S. parent company is believed to have borrowed 
heavily from Ronson Products U.K."(93) 
The first move the Receivers made was to cut another 627 jobs from 
Ronson nationwide with 77 jobs going at the North Shields factory. 
All· this added to the air of uncertainty and speculation. For the 
workers who had moved from Cramlington to the North Shields plant this· 
. was the second time in the space of a year that they had received 
redundancy notices. It was no big surprise but that did not stop 
feelings of resentment; 
"Everyone knew that the company was having difficulties 
so it wasn't really a big shock. But the thing that 
upset me was the lack of help they are offering people 
who have been made redundant. A simple letter explaining 
our rights more fully would have made things easier." C94 ) 
The Regional T.U.C. voiced its fear about asset stripping and 
confidently expected the downturn in lighter sales to pick up. The 
first priority of the Receiver, however, was to sell Ronson as soon as 
possib;Le.. In September 1981 Ronson Products U.K. was sold for an 
undisclosed amount to what the Financial Times described as "a little 
known private company called Carwain ... (9S) Its chairman, a Mr. 
Jeffrey Port, had been discharged from bankruptcy in 1979 and now 
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operated form a suite in Grosvenor House, Park Lane in London's West 
End. Even a public relations company fronting for Mr. Port had to 
admit that; 
"it hadn't heard of Carwain 1.mtil last week."(96) 
When Mr. Port did speak he talked of saving jobs by his own personal 
efforts. Meanwhile Ronson U.S. was quick to spot an opening when it 
saw one and sold some of its subsidiaries in Canada, Mexico and Italy 
to Carwain for £1.6 million and its Australian subsidiary for an 
undisclosed sum. Explaining these moves Ronson U.S. said that; 
"The sale would reduce its debit, provide additional 
working capital and enable to to concentrate its funds 
and resources in its more profitable U.S. division."(97) 
But the ink had hardly dried on the U.K. deal when in October 1981 
Carwain announced that all manufacturing would cease at Ronson's main 
plant at Leatherhead and the building and eleven acre site go up for 
sale. Some work would be transferred to North Shields and the 
workforce of 120 would eventually double. 
The workforce never did double and in July 1982 ten months after 
Carwain had bought the company the North Shields factory was in the 
hands of the Receiver for a second time. The union fears about asset 
stripping had been fully borne out. 
With hindsight falling lighter and shaver sales in a static U.K. 
market was only a symptom of Ronson's problems. It was indicative of 
the inroads being made into the U.K. market by cheap throwaway 
lighters and shavers and refillable lighters from European and 
Japanese manufacturers. And for this state of affairs British 
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management was to blame. For according to the managing director of a 
large retail tobacconist chain; 
"Traditional makers of lighters, pens and shavers (such 
as Ronson) have shown no entrepreneurial ability in 
recent years and adapted too late to product technology 
and market trends."(98) 
Dunlop 
The Dunlop Company located its Industrial Hose making facility 
at Cramlington in 1965. By 1975 the Cramlington operation employed 
394 people. Ten years later in August 1985 the number stood at 264. 
But in order to appreciate the fate of the hosemaking plant and the 
downward trend in the numbers employed it is necessary to have some 
understanding of the recent history of Dunlop as a whole. 
During the 1960's Dunlop, expecting an increase in demand for 
car tyres, increased its manufacturing capacity accordingly. Then in 
1971 Dunlop set up a trading union with Pirelli. Unfortunately for 
Dunlop the market did not develop as expected. The widespread 
introduction of radial tyres to replace the traditional crossply 
roughly doubled the average life of a tyre. Then the 1973 oil crisis 
upset all car production forecasts. On top of this Dunlop's major 
European competitors had also been building up manufacturing 
facilities. Finally the union with Prielli became an additional 
burden as Pirelli itself struggled to cope with declining sales and 
both compaTiies failed to agree on strategy. 
Throughout the 1970's the European tyre industry was marked by a 
crisis of overcapacity. It was a buyers' market with car and truck 
makers taking advantage of overcapacity to bid tyre prices down. This 
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in turn intensified producers' problems by pressing on profit margins. 
Yet while overcapacity characterised the industry, Dunlop's U.K. tyre 
operation also suffered from the fact that the tyre manufacturers 
including Dunlop were increasingly supplying the U.K. market from 
their own plants in the E.E.C. As Labour Research pointed out; 
"The fact that gives greatest need for concern is that of 
the £48 million worth of motor car tyres imported from 
the E.E.C. last year half came from sources owned by the 
seven manufacturers operating in the U.K. If the U.K. 
manufacturers continue to seek to raise their 
productivity· ·in Britain while at the same time supplying 
an increasing proportion of a static market from their 
own plants outside the U.K., the result will be even 
greater reductions in the U.K. labour force."(99) 
As a consequence Dunlop carried out a major cutback in its U.K. 
tyre operations. In the period from January 1979 to January 1982 
Dunlop closed two of its four U.K. tyre plants at Speke in Liverpool 
and Inchinnan in Glasgow, halved its workforce at Fort Dtmlop in 
Birmingham and marginally increased the workforce at Washington, Co. 
Durham. Then in 1983 it closed a third tyre factory at Cork in the 
Irish Republic. In the five years up to 1983 Dunlop reduced the 
workforce in its U.K. tyre division from 11,3000 to 3,500. 
At the same time Dunlop sold some of its overseas assets, 
legacies of its colonial past, using the cash to lessen the debt 
burden incurred largely from losses in its European tyre business. 
But despite these cost cutting and asset realisation measures 1983 saw 
Dunlop reporting losses of £26 million from its European tyre 
operations. During 1982 its debts rose by £55 million to £418 
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million. This meant that the group's operating profit of £49 million 
was eaten up by interest charges on its debt. In fact the plight of 
the company was reflected in its share price which at £2.35p a share 
in the late 60's touched 39p in 1982.(100) 
It was at this point in September 1983 that Dunlop decided to 
sell its West German and British tyre interests to a Japanese company, 
Sumitomo Rubber. But now another problem appeared on the horizon. 
For as the Financial Times noted; 
"Having rid itself of its European tyre albatross City 
analysts now believe that Dunlop could quickly become an 
attractive target for a takeover bid ... (10l) 
That was in September 1983, by January 1985 Sir Michael Edwards, 
the new Dunlop chairman, had negotiated a complex refinancing package 
in an attempt to reduce the company's debt. Under the arrangement a 
consortium of fifty-three banks would convert some of their loan debt 
to equity shareholding while other institutional investors would also 
become shareholders. With the rescue package agreed and a 
shareholders' meeting arranged to rubber stamp the proposals the 
multi-national conglomerate B.T.R. moved in and bought 28% of Dunlop's 
preference shares. In the words of the Financial Times B.T.R. now had 
a "hammerlock on Dunlop's future". (102) Either Dunlop's directors, 
shareholders and bankers accepted B. T.R. 's takeover bid, or, as a 
shareholder controlling 5% of the votes, B.T.R. could block the 
refinancing package and cause financial disaster. Finally, after 
seven weeks of manoeuvring B.T.R. succeeded with its takeover bid of 
£101 million. 
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From the moment B.T.R. gained an interest in Dunlop the trade 
unions and the Northern group of Labour M.P.'s expressed concern about 
jobs. Don Dixon, the M.P. for Jarrow, saying that; 
"We are very worried that jobs in the North may be put in 
jeopardy by a company decision taken outside the 
region. (103 ) 
It was not only a case of jobs at the Cramlington plant being in 
question. Dunlop had other facilities at North Shields, at Team 
Valley Gateshead, at Walker in Newcastle and at West Chirton and 
Snnderland. 
With. fears of job loss uppermost the Northern . Labour M.p. 's 
pressed Norman Tebbit, then Trade and Industry Secretary, to launch a 
Monopolies and Mergers Connnission inquiry into the B.T.R. takeover. 
That request was turned down. 
As developments in the tyre division illustrate Dunlop itself 
was not averse to job cutting. But it was not only in the tyre 
division that jobs were being lost. Following a restructuring plan 
for the Industrial and Hydraulic Hose division annonnced in 1981 the 
Walker works was shut in 1985, with a loss of forty jobs, the 
remaining sixty workers being transferred to the Cramlington plant. 
At the same time another thirty-three jobs went, nineteen at Team 
Valley and fourteen at Cramlington.(104) 
Yet while Dunlop rationalised its various divisions the trade 
unions' fear of B.T.R. turned out to be well founded. Following the 
B.T.R. takeover another sixty-five workers were made redundant at the 
Team Valley works in July 1985. Then, having promised the unions that 
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·they would honour agreements made during the Dunlop era, B. T.R. gave 
three months notice of their intention to pay only the legal minimum 
res.Ioodancy payments. This represented a considerable loss of money 
compared with the Dunlop redundancy scheme. Two months later in 
August 1985 the company announced a cut of one hundred and eighteen 
jobs at the Cramlington plant, reducing the workforce from 382 to 264. 
Inciuded in the redundancies were 73 shopfloor workers, 38 clerical 
staff and seven engineers. The sugar on the pill being that they 
would receive the original "Dunlop" redundancy benefits if they left 
immediately. Clearly the shift to mininnnn redundancy payments was, 
apart from money savings, an exercise in arm twisting designed to 
encourage the workforce to leave quickly and quietly. 
Connnenting on the redundancies the managing director of the 
Industrial Hose division explained that; 
"The company's industrial hoses had been sold at a loss 
in some markets. Therefore it had been decided to cease 
selling products at such low prices. The aim is to sell 
products at a profit even if this means losing market 
share. We will therefore concentrate in the future in 
selling in one or two markets. From now on the company 
will concentrate on Europe and strongly reduce its 
presence in the U.S.A. where it had not been very 
profitable.ClOS) 
All this of course was very much in line with the B. T. R. 
philosophy and practice. A philosophy summed up in the company slogan 
"growth is the goal, profit is the measure, security is the result" • 
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In practice each B. T.R. subsidiary and within that each division is 
allocated an annual profit target measured as a ratio of return on 
sales rather than return on net assets. Then each division files 
monthly reports to the B. T.R. head office in London and these are 
tracked against the profit plan for the year. Within B.T.R. 
responsibility is devolved downwards to divisional managers to meet 
their annual profit targets. Targets which are set deliberately high 
in order to stretch the company divisions.C106) 
Clearly then it is a case of security for some. Security so 
long as you meet profit targets. Moreover, with this system in place 
there could be no talk of cross subsidies, no possibility of 
profitable divisions diverting resources into less profitable or less 
making divisions. Each element had to stand on its own two feet. 
With hindsight there was nothing inevitable about the B. T.R. 
takeover. In fact the takeover can be seen as an unintended 
consequence of the Dunlop decision to sell the tyre division and its 
success in negotiating a refinancing package. But with the takeover 
labour faced an employer more ruthless than Dunlop. In the words of a 
G.M.B.A.T.U. national officer; 
"Industrial relations-wise B. T.R. is still in the dark 
ages ... (107) 
Yet the Economic Development Committee of Labour controlled Newcastle 
City Council was more than willing to do business with this specimen 
of macho capitalism. In July 1986, after several years of 
negotiation, the committee's chairman, David Slesenger, was reported 
as having clinched a deal with Dunlop Oil and Marine to site a new £10 
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million plant making offshore oil pipelines at the old Walker Naval 
Yard now transformed into an Offshore Technology Park. A deal won in 
competition with other areas notably Dundee.(108) 
While Newcastle's Labour Council was willing to co-operate with 
B.T.R •. so apparently was the A.U.E.W. since it signed a single union 
agreement covering the new facility. Under the terms of the agreement 
the company recognised only the A.E.U. while the A.E.U. agreed to 
flexible working and agreed to accept A.C.A.'s arbitration and 
decisions in any dispute.(l09) 
Given a background of co-operative Labour councils, compliant 
unions, a central government willing to "take on" labour and, 
according to B. T.R. "productivity and wage rates which now compare 
better internationally"(llO) B.T.R. could now talk about; 
"bringing back to the U.K. some production which it had 
moved overseas."(lll) 
The message to its remaining Cramlington workers, to trade union 
officials and Labour councillors was clear. Maintain compliance and a 
favourable environment for profit making and we will consider 
recapitalising your locality. 
Burroughs Electronics 
In 1973 with much pomp and ceremony and with Viscount Ridley in 
attendance, Burroughs opened its new factory making printed circuit 
boards on a 26 acre site at Cramlington New Town. Two years earlier 
.the company had inspected sites in Scotland, South Wales, Northern 
Ireland and at Belmont in Co. Durham before finally deciding to locate 
at Cramlington. This decision surprising Co. Durham councillors and 
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officials who, after two months of negotiation, thought they would be 
welcoming Burroughs to Co. Durham.(112) 
At the opening of the plant Mr. Eddie Milne, M.P. for Blyth, 
announced that; 
"Burroughs 1 arrival in Cramlington represented another 
landmark in Northumberland 1 s battle against fudustrial 
recession and its fight for full employment."(ll3) 
Other officials hoped that Burroughs would draw in more high 
technology firms to the New Town. Indeed Burroughs with its promise 
to employ a workforce equally split between men and women of whom 15% 
would be graduates was the kind of company county planners wanted to 
see established. The women coming from the locality and destined to 
sit at workstations assembling circuit boards which would then be sent 
out to other Burroughs plants in the U.K. 
Moreover it was not simply the insertion of another production 
facility into the Town which was significant but also the fact that in 
1981 the company introduced new work practices such as quality 
circles, performance and evaluation programmes and employee suggestion 
programmes aimed at; 
"solving problems, improving products, reducing costs and 
increasing production."(114) 
In other words harnessing human creativity in a way which furthers 
company goals and encourages employee identity with the firm. 
By March 1982, however, Burroughs announced that 170 jobs would 
go from its Cramlington plant with the remaining 50 jobs being phased 
out over the following six months. In the words of a Financial Times 
reporter what had happened was that; 
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"Burroughs ••• tried for many years to turn itself into a 
small I.B.M., copying the giant in many respects and, 
while specialising in some market segments, attempting to 
compete against it across almost the whole market. This 
. clearly did not work and the company shocked Wall Street 
in July 1981 when it reported a 12% decline in second 
quarter net income (as result of falling sales). In 
response Mr. Blumenthal the company's chairman launched a 
major restructuring progrannne designed to "improve the 
company's operating effectiveness, asset management and 
return to investors."(llS) 
The practical effect of restructuring being to discontinue some 
product lines, concentrate on other areas, develop new lines and cut 
duplication by U.S. and U.K. plants. Consequently the Cramlington 
factory was closed and sourcing of circuit boards for the remaining 
U.K. plants undertaken by Burroughs' factory at Carlsbad, New 
Mexico. (ll6) 
CONCLUSION 
In the previous chapter I noted that Cramlington was intended to 
accommodate the more affluent sections of the working class. While 
this statement is true at one level the previous survey evidence 
allows more particular observations to be made. Thus, the development 
of the New Town simultaneously restructured the class composition of 
what was still in 1966 a predominantly mining area by drawing in 
professional, 'white collar and skilled workers. But as we have seen 
even within the New Town the differing occupational groups were not 
randomly dispersed across tenures so that higher socio-economic groups 
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concentrated in the private sector while lower socio-economic groups 
clustered in the local authority estates. The skilled manual workers 
achieving representation in all tenures. Moreover, this pattern 
persisted across the 1966 and 1975 surveys suggesting systematic 
structuration rather than a one off finding. 
Cross cutting occupational divisions was a gender division so 
that women were heavily concentrated in "feminised" and semi -skilled 
occupations. Both the 1965 and 1976 survey finding substantial 
"labour pools" of women. The existence of these "pools", I would 
suggest, being in part a function of patriarchy which fixed women to 
the household, in part due to a lack of child care and in part owing 
to the fact that Cramlington was unable over a period of time to 
provide the volume of shop, office and professional work sought by the 
women. That was one side of the coin the other being that as a 
reserve army of a particular type, women's experience was conditioned 
by the needs of both home and work as witnessed by the large demand 
for part-time work. But in the old mining areas, compared to the New 
.-town, the force of patriarchy was stronger as indicated by the 
relatiyely high percentage of women ( 63%) not interested in work 
outside the home. Class having a limiting and conditioning effect 
upon the type of job women from the old and new areas sought. In 
general the two populations consisting of private sector and public 
sector residents related to separate labour markets. The majority of 
private sector owner occupiers working in and connnuting to Tyne and 
Wear while just over 50% of the workforce in the council housing was 
employed within Cramlington. Likewise while Tyne and Wear was the 
point of origin for most private sector housing residents the local 
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authority estates drew the majority of their residents from the Blyth 
and Seaton Valley areas. 
As I noted in the last chapter the developnent of Cramlington 
was first and foremost dependent upon the decline of. coal and ·the 
green light which that gave to the. establishment of alternative 
employment on green field sites on the coalfield. However, the fact 
that roughly 70% of the New Town's housing was private rather than 
local authority can be accounted for by a number of factors. First, 
State encouragement of owner occupation via tax relief and the 
discouragement of other tenure forms such as private renting. Second, 
the availability of mortgages, the overall rise in real wages during 
the late 50's and 60's and the steady year on year increase in dual 
income families. In addition the builders Leech and Bellway were able 
to ensure that land was released for house building purposes on which 
they made considerable development gains. 
For the most part, Cramlington functioned as a dormitory estate 
on the periphery of Tyneside and while attracting first time buyers it 
was, in 1975, largely a staging post on the path to a better house 
elsewhere. Therefore although the Town failed to meet many of its 
original objectives as laid down by the Co-Planners the objectives 
themselves became redefined and vague making it impossible to measure 
the Town's success. But insofar as many of the private sector 
commuters would have wished to live and work in Cramlington then their 
preference was not being met nor could it be in a relatively free 
market. 
While the local and central State supported the development of 
owner occupation and local authority housing it was also central in 
providing grants to industries such as Lonrho and Boots P.L.C. 
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Equally it was the State which undertook the provision of 
infrastructure, roads, schools, libraries and comnrunity buildings. 
These State inputs facilitating the capitalist accumulation process. 
In contradiction to Crosland's model of a smooth running 
capitalist economy the various case studies of particular industries 
indicate the inherently crisis ridden character of capitalism. Crisis 
arising from competition ·and acting as a spur to restructuring. 
Within this environment labour is simultaneously a necessary part of 
capital and against particular capitals in its struggle to defend or 
improve wage levels, working conditions and customs and practice. 
These struggles at times constituting part of crisis. But while 
labour as a global category is essential for capital particular 
labourers may not be. In that sense the position of labour is 
characterised by insecurity as capital expels workers, closes plant or 
re-organises work practices to escape crisis. Moreover, if labour is 
necessary for capital then capital is necessary for labour. Without 
capital no production/work can take place. Labour is then redundant 
and dependent upon various forms of welfare organised through the 
State or, in times past, through charities, churches and trade unions. 
In order to escape unemployment, labour and its representatives often 
appear as supplicants willing to prostrate themselves in the face of 
capital. However, the dull compulsion to achieve a "living wage" or 
improve conditions of work is ever present although whether the 
compulsion turns to action is a contingent matter. For its part 
capital can play one locality or region off against another for its 
presence and, with the globalisation of capital one country/state off 
against another. 
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From 1973 to 1984 manufacturing employment on Cramlington' s 
industrial estates declined by 23%. However, over the same time 
scale, employment in services increased in both absolute and relative 
terms. Given the differing relations of the two populations of public 
and private sector residents to the local labour market we could 
expect this fall in manufacturing employment to impact more upon 
Cramlington's council house tenants. It is to this and other issues 
which I will turn in the next chapter. 
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CIIAP.rFB FIVE 
SOUTII EAST NORTHDMBElU.AND IN mE 1980 Is 
BACKGROOND 
The previous chapter noted that the post war years were 
characterised by a settlement organised arormd Keynesianism, 
corporatism and an extensive state welfare system. By the late 60's 
and 70's this settlement was breaking down as the Wilson, Heath and 
Callaghan governments attempted to cope with multiple crises. A key 
element of the settlement being limited economic and social gains for 
the working class as a result of class compromise. But equally it was 
the same settlement which drew capital, the State and the Tory party 
into. a 'series of arrangements, alliances and compromises resulting in 
relative class stalemate. 
The years 1975 to 1979 marked the beginning of a turning point 
as Thatcherism strove to establish ascendancy in the Tory Party and 
forge a right wing bloc capable of breaking the fetters of the post 
war settlement. Once in office the Thatcher government set about 
creating a new social base for the Tory party through the development 
and promulgation of "popular capitalism" as an alternative to the 
welfare state. This strategy involved a wide spread of initiatives 
which, to quote Jessop et al, included; 
"the private appropriation of public assets through the 
privatisation programme (and parallel share issues), the 
sale of council owned housing and the individualisation of 
collective forms of provisions through the abolition of 
SERPS, the creation of private pension plans, the opting 
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out of affluent parents from the local authority 
controlled education system, the increasing support for 
private health care and so forth."(l) 
In a similar vein Forrest and Murie(Z) have referred to council 
house sales at discounted prices and the encouragement of home 
ownership via tax relief on mortgages as "subsidised individualism". 
Whitfield estimating that; 
"Between 1979 and 1991 the average discount rose from 31' % 
to 52% giving purchasers financial discounts worth £15,893 
million, or an average of £10,388 per purchase" 
and that; 
"Mortgage tax relief has increased fivefold in the 1980's, 
costing the Treasury over £40 billion ... (3) 
While the decollectivisation of welfare provision formed one 
strategic thrust the Thatcher project ranged deep and wide as it 
sought to transform the social, economic and political landscape. 
Therefore although the absolute sale of public assets formed one 
element in the project the forced contracting out of services to 
private firms, compulsory tendering and the sale of public land and 
buildings constituted yet another element. 
As well as the "drive to privatise" the actually existing 
welfare state has been systematically underfunded and made subject to 
spending cuts and spending limits. Consequently it has been a decade 
of crisis management of the public welfare infrastructure, patch and 
repair and increasing shabbiness so that by the l ate 80' s it was 
estimated that it required;C4) 
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(a) £1.9 billion to deal with a backlog of repairs to N.H.S. 
buildings. 
(b) £4 billion to repair school buildings. 
(c) £36 billion to repair 2.9 million houses in sub-standard 
condition in England and Wales. 
Likewise on a national scale new council house building for rent has 
virtually ceased while it is the better council housing which is being 
bought producing a creeping residualisation of the council house 
sector. In addition, the average unrebated weekly council house rent 
increased from £6.20p in 1979 to £23.72p in 199o.CS) The cumulative 
effect of spending cuts, economic rents and deteriorating fabric 
making the public welfare system less attractive and encouraging the 
individual to go private. The underfunding of the N.H.S. and 
consequent waiting lists for treatment having the same effect. 
Gamble(6) has characterised Thatcherism as representing a "Free 
Economy and a Strong State". The strong centralised state being 
instrumental in carrying through the privatisation project, 
disciplining and monitoring elements of the surplus population and 
containing and overcoming the resistance thrown up as the Thatcherite 
project proceeds. Privatisation, contracting out of services and 
competitive tendering themselves constituting ways of disorganising 
labour. 
Central to the post war settlement was the commitment to 
maintain full employment. But for the neo-liberals of the new right 
the government's responsibility was to; 
"prevent the consequences for prices and profits of, in 
their words, 'overfull' employment." ( 7) 
-282-
From this perspective unemployment is necessary for the operation of 
the market and has the secondary effect of weakening trade unions and 
deterring labour. Similarly the role of the Thatcherite state was 
to; 
"get the labour movement and the progressive legislation 
enacted at its behest during the post war boom off the 
employers' backs."(8) 
Indeed restraining and pacifying labour by legislation, fear and 
coercion was a prerequisite to pushing through privatisation 
particularly in the mines. 
Alongside privatisation has gone a process of deregulation both 
in the finance sector, stimulating the credit boom of the late 80's, 
and in relation to the labour market. Thus David Marsland, Deputy 
Director of the Social Affairs Unit, argues that; 
"In the labour market as much as any other sphere, 
dogmatic egalitarianism reduces opportunities and causes 
inequities. A free market undistorted by State wage 
controls could enable the young, blacks and women to price 
themselves back into employment and afford them the 
opportunity to compete for better jobs and a better 
life. ,.(g) 
Such a statement acting as a justification for the elimination of the 
Fair Hages Resolution, the abolition of wages councils, the reduced 
role of the factory inspectorate and the marginalisation of the trade 
unions. Therefore from the standpoint of the new right deregulation 
of the labour market was the equivalent of liberating the poor. But 
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deregulation was only one aspect of strategy for in the words George 
Gilder; 
"What the poor need most of all in order to succeed is the 
spur of their poverty."(lO) 
Incentives are therefore necessary not only in terms of benefit cuts 
to the poor to force them to work but also tax cuts to the rich, to 
encourage them to work harder. 
Lastly the Thatcher Government sought to promote both multi-
national inward investment and the small business sector while turning 
the M.S.C. in~o an organisation for the enhancement of labour 
flexibility. 
The overall Thatcherite project was then ideologically 
articulated around the key themes of individual freedom and choice, 
family values, law and order and making Britain great again. Moreover 
this combination of ideology, policy and action can be thought of as a 
particular accumulation strategy quite distinct from what had gone 
before. Therefore with the benefit of hindsight Crosland can be seen 
to have severely underestimated both the capacity of the Tory Party to 
renew itself and its determination to dismantle the post war 
settlement. 
The new accumulation strategy having contradictory effects while 
working on existing social and spatial divisions so as to deepen and 
widen them. Various commentators have therefore talked of a North 
South divide, a contented majority and an increasingly impoverished 
minority. The Church of England report "Faith in the City" describing 
the situation in this way; 
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"Rich and poor, suburban and inner city, privileged and 
deprived, have been becoming sharply separated from each 
other for many years and ••• the impoverished minority has 
become increasingly cut off from the mainstream of our 
national life These trends add up to a pattern 
warranting the label polarisation in a new, comprehensive 
and intractable form."(ll) 
While the North South divide was the primary distinction, 
particularly in relation to regional unemployment rates, just as 
significant were divisions between different places within regions. 
The North ·containing relatively prosperous centres such as Hexham 
· alongside uneinployment blackspots like the Meadowell Estate in North 
Tyneside. The South having extensive pockets of high unemployment, 
especially in inner London Boroughs such as Hackney, co-existing with 
prosperous Milton Keynes. 
One of the aims of this chapter then is to establish whether 
Cramlington New Town contained its quota of new poor and to explain 
the significance of this development. 
The paradox is that at a time of increasing social polarisation 
and a reinvigorated class politics of the right a number of writers 
have talked of the working class as undermined, ineffective or 
disappearing. In order to substantiate this thesis a number of 
claims are made. Hobsbawn(lZ) for example notes the decline of 
traditional male industry and a shrinking working class alongside the 
growth of white collar and public sector employment together with the 
increased participation of women in the labour market. Forms of 
political consciousness emphasising solidarity have therefore given 
way to; 
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"the values of consumer society, individualism and a 
search for private and personal satisfactions above all 
else."(13) 
In a similar fashion Lukes says that; 
"the distinction between manual and non-manual labour is 
less and less relevant, labour or work itself and the 
sphere of production, seems to be becoming less central to 
the identity and consciousness of workers, while 
consumption, especially with respect to housing and 
transport, has become more central to their basic 
interests."C14) 
The claim therefore is that the 1970's and 80's witnessed a 
decline in manufacturing jobs and a substantial reduction in the 
number of workers in all manual categories. Alongside and associated 
with this change has gone a falling away of the Labour vote. At the 
same time the years from 1951 to 1981 saw an expansion on a national 
scale of professional, white collar, technical and administrative 
occupations. But whatever the job work was said to be less 
significant as a source of personal identity and commitment. 
Moreover, from a neo-Durkheimian perspective, the old moral systems 
were giving way to egoism and greed as the organisations, social 
networks and communities sustaining the values of co-operation and 
solidarity were weakened and disorganised. 
While these problematics stressed changes at the base leading to 
a recomposition of the social division of labour as explanations for 
the decline of the Labour vote and the retreat of the Labour movement, 
other connnentators focused on the sphere of consumption. Saunders, 
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writing from a Weberian standpoint, suggesting that since housing is 
an important source of accumulation then; 
"Social and economic divisions arising out of the 
ownership of key means of consumption such as housing are 
now coming to represent a new major fault line in British 
society and privatization of welfare provision is 
intensifying this cleavage to the point where sectoral 
alignments in regard to consumption may come to outweigh 
class alignments in respect of production."(l6) 
Dunleavy(l7) arguing that consumption cleavages between those able to 
afford private provision and those dependent upon the state for 
collective provision produces a range of consumption interests. The 
individual, therefore, occupies a specific consumption location and 
will tend to align politically with the Party which best supports 
his/her consumption interests. The effect of consumption on voting 
being a cumulative matter so that individuals who are home owners, use 
private forms of education and health provision and are car owners 
increasingly tend to vote Conser-Vative rather· than Labour. These 
consumption effects occurring independently of social class and 
explaining both the consolidation of the Conservative vote and class 
dealignment, i.e. the transfer of a percentage of working class votes 
to the Tories. Duke and Edgell concluding that; 
"Political party alignment is influenced more by overall 
consumption location than by social class."(lS) 
For the moment I want to put these arguments to one side, before 
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returning to them, in order to consider significant change in 
Cramlington and Blyth Valley. 
In the previous chapter I noted the view of the Lonrho 
management speaking in 1984 that they had inherited a work force which 
displayed negative attitudes and standards. The point, however, was 
that these unacceptable orientations had been checked and reversed. 
But underlying this change in shop floor behaviour was a politics of 
anxiety fear and vengeance. The Personnel Manager at ColliDlercial 
Plastics explaining things in this way; 
"For years management has not been allowed to manage. It 
was ·a matter of powerful trade unions and interfering 
Labour Governments. But the climate's changing thanks to 
the Conservatives. We now have the chance to get back in 
the driving seat and call the shots. It's like getting 
your own back I suppose."(19) 
Sir Douglas Wass, the former head of the Treasury, saying that in his 
opinion; 
"What has emerged in shopfloor behaviour through fear and 
anxiety is much greater than I think could be secured 
through co-operative methods ... (20) 
And it was precisely fear tactics that were on display at Cascade U.K. 
Ltd, another American subsidiary company based at the Bassington 
Industrial Estate Cramlington. In March 1985 the A.U.E.W. imposed an 
overtime ban in pursuit of a 15% pay claim. The Company's response 
was to organise a postal ballot asking the workforce to accept a 2% 
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pay increase. But the day before the ballot was to be held a Company 
letter sent to each individual worker warned that a vote against the 
company offer and a refusal to restart overtime would meari the; 
"phasing out of the Cramlington factory."(21) 
For the Personnel Manager at Connnercial Plastics the workforce 
had to realise that the Company was now an independent "profit centre'' 
of its parent company F.O.R.B.O. of Switzerland. Therefore if 
Commercial Plastics made a loss it would not be bailed out as it had 
been in the past when it was part of the Unilever group. 
However, it was not only a case of the workers "learning to 
stand on their own feet and doing without handouts". The time was now 
favourable for a push on pay and working arrangements. For ideally 
Commercial Plastics would have liked to see; 
"A lowering of the basic rate for the lowest paid workers 
currently earning £120 per week and an increase in 
differentials and responsibility payments. Second we want 
to create a general craft worker combining the skills of 
electricians and mechanics. Third we will require 
machinists to set and maintain their own machines without 
recourse to craft workers. Last we will soon be fitting 
monitoring equipment to the machines in order to measure 
performance and this should give us greater control over 
production and effort. Indeed the installation of new 
technology has already allowed us to cut 75% of our 
clerical and accounts staff and will give us the 
opportunity to change work practices and quality targets 
in other departments including the factory floor ... (22 ) 
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The name of the game was increasing productivity at the expense 
of labour. Indeed the workforce at Commercial Plastics had been cut 
from a high of 1,300 in the late 70's to 700 by 1987. The Personnel 
Manager suggesting that the number of employees would never again 
exceed 800. By itself this reduction in manpower going some way to 
explaining productivity increase. 
The labour force at Corrnnercial Plastics consisting mostly of 
male workers with a large percentage in their late 40's and early SO's 
working in a plant which operated around the clock on a three shift 
system. A fact which went some way to accounting for the absence of 
female process workers for according to the Personnel Manager; 
"they didn' t want to work night shifts. " ( 23) 
Now while Commercial Plastics, like so many capitals in 
Crarnlington, located there in the early 70's and represented the 
"first round of investment", the second round of large scale 
investment carne with the establishment of plants for the 
pharmaceutical companies of Boots, Bristol Myers and Merck Sharp and 
Dohrne. However, at the opening of the Bristol Myers plant the 
Personnel Director made it clear that this was really a relocation of 
plant within the national economic space from Langley and Ruislip in 
the South of England to Crarnlington in the North.<24) Explaining the 
move he stressed the need to update buildings and plant and noted the 
"ludicrous land prices" in the South of England which had discouraged 
relocating in the South. Furthermore, relocating at Crarnlington would 
give the Company access to; 
"a large pool of (mostly female) labour ... (2S) 
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needed to work on the six pharmaceutical and fourteen toiletry 
production lines. 
But what was striking was the scale of investment and government 
assistance at these plants relative to the numbers employed. 
The Bristol Myers plant representing a £5 million investment but 
employing 250 people, thirty of whom had moved with the company from 
the Thames Valley. <26 ) The new addition to the Boots plant costing 
£13.7 million but only adding 53 jobs to the existing workforce of 
eighty.<27) Indeed the Boots Company at Cramlington was one of the 
largest recipients of government aid in the region for the period 1974 
to 84 receiving a total of £5.4 million in Regional Development Grant 
and Regional Selective Assistance.< 28) 
This second round of investment representing capital intensive 
processes employing relatively few people compared with undertakings 
such as Lonrho Textiles or Commercial Plastics. Yet as we have seen 
firms such as Commercial Plastics were not only cutting back on labour 
but also seeking to erode demarcation vertically between skills and 
horizontally between jobs in order to achieve greater worker 
flexibility while attempting to decrease the pay of the lowest paid 
grades. Company representatives explaining how tea breaks had been 
cut and time-keeping tightened up. <29 ) The example of "Cascade" 
indicating not only the readiness of capital to threaten and ratchet 
up the stakes but also to favour overtime rather than taking on 
additional labour. 
Efforts to get more out of labour, or to creat~ greater labour 
flexibility, or to threaten closure and cut wages rates are of course 
nothing new. The argument here though is that the Thatcher 
governments by strengthening the hand of capital, demonising the trade 
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unions and approving the macho management of Edwards at British 
Leyland and McGregor at British Coal created a climate which 
facilitated and legitimated "screwing down the workers". 
EMERGING SOCIAL DIVISIONS 
At its inception Cramlington New Town was hailed by the County 
Planners as a place for successful living based on a foundation of 
home ownership. But as I have also indicated the Town from the outset 
contained a substantial element of council housing. One of these 
estates known as Shankhouse consists of 480 houses of traditional fom 
and construe tion built in the early 70's. A period when owner 
occupation was becoming dominant both nationally and in Cramlington. 
(a) Shankhouse in Relation to all Other Blyth Valley Council Estates. 
By utilising data from the 1981 census small area statistics 
Shankhouse can be located in relation to other Blyth Valley council 
estates (see Table 35). Enumeration districts AM02, AM03 and AM06 are 
those which comprise Shankhouse. Some radical differences from other 
Blyth Valley council estates are immediately apparent. First there 
are clear demographic differences. For example the proportion of 
children in Shankhouse is by far the highest and is nearly 50% greater 
than the next highest score and is more than twice the average value. 
Over 80% of Shankhouse holds contain children while no other Blyth 
Valley council estate has a proportion which exceeds 50%. Likewise 
the fertility rate for Shankhouse (i.e. numbers of children age 0-4 as 
a percentage of numbers of women age 15-44) is much higher being 
· anything 1,1p to four . times the next highest level and more than six 
times the average level. 
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Table 35 Shankhouse Es1lrte In Rel..-tlon 'to all other Blytb Valley Estlrtes 
:t a,lldren 1,2 
:t F<!nsloners 3 
Fertility rate 4 
% Male U.E. 5 
% Fe'IIOie U.E. 6 
%Adults Econ001icolly 
Active 7 
Total R:>pulatlon 11 
S Households a.mer-
occupled 13 
:t Households L.C. 
Tenonts 14 
S lbuseho Ids otner 
Tenants 15-18 
S lbuseho I ds densIty 
per roan greater 
than 1 20,21 
:r: Households Single 
person 22 
:r: fbuseho I ds 6 or ror-e 
people 23 
% Households no car 24 
% Households 5 or-
more r"'OOOS 26 
:r: Households only 
pensIoner-s pr-esent 27 
:r: fbusehol ds with 
children 28 
Total fbuseholds 29 
:r: lbuseho I ds headed by 
single par-ent 30 
:r: Adults Mlgr"'nt In 
Last Year 31 
:r: Total Married 11anen 
Working Fuii-TI""' 44 
:r: Tota I MarrIed 11anen 
Working Par-t--Tl""' 45 
:r: T ota I Househo I d Spaces 
purpose bu I I t f I ats 46 
S Households containing 
ch II dren headed by 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The proportion of pensioners on the estate is very low at less 
than a third of the next lowest and less than an eight of the average 
level. 
If we consider economic activity again Shankhouse stands out. 
No other area has an unemployment rate for men and women which is as 
high as the Shankhouse rates and this difference is particularly 
marked for women. 
Clearly, if a Shankhouse household is fortunate enough to 
contain a full-time bread winner they are likely to be male with the 
woman tied to the house by domestic and childcare responsibilities. 
The low economic activity rates for women indicating a low number of 
dual income households. A significant finding given the importance of 
two household earners in moving many working class families above the 
poverty line. 
While Shankhouse contained many households with children it also 
scored high on households containing children headed by a single 
parent with approximately 17% or 79 households falling into this 
category. If movement on to the estate is considered by looking at 
adults migrant in the last year then 14% of all adults had come to 
live in Shankhouse within this period. This was the highest movement 
figure for any Blyth Valley council estate in 1981. 
This comparison of cormcil estates suggesting that Shankhouse 
displayed higher rates of rmemployment for both men and women than any 
other estate, a smaller percentage of married women working than most 
other estates, a greater percentage of households with dependent 
children an~ a significant number of single parent families. 
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(b) Shankhouse Estate in relation to all other areas in Blyth Valley. 
A cluster analysis was used to group characteristics so as to 
compare Shankhouse with all other areas in Blyth Valley and not just 
council estates. Table 36 gives the result of this analysis for all 
ordinary enumeration districts in Blyth Valley. 
Cluster I contains most of Blyth Valley's council estates. This 
cluster had relatively high rates of unemployment, a low proportion of 
households with children and very high proportions of pensioners. 
Cluster 2 although mostly owner occupied housing contained some 
local authority housing and was a sort of midway between cluster 1 and 
3 with a male unemployment rate of 10% and a female unemployment rate 
of 5%. Again this cluster had a significant proportion of households 
containing pensioners but relatively low proportions of children 
compared with clusters 3 and 4. 
Cluster 3 was predominantly the owner occupied cluster and 
showed low levels of unemployment, low proportions of pensioners, high 
car ownership, very high economic activity rates for women in general 
and married women in particular and a high proportion of households 
containing children. 
Cluster 4 contained the Shankhouse enumeration districts 
together with some other Blyth Valley enumeration districts and some 
North Housing Association stock in Cramlington. This cluster had 
very high unemployment rates and low female activity rates but its 
demographic profile was much the same as Cluster 3 with even higher 
fertility rates and proportions of children and households containing 
children. 
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(c) Sbankhouse Estate in relation to other Cramlington Wcalities. 
Table 37 gives scores on the same set of 1981 census indices for 
localities within Cramlington (see localities map). East Cramlington 
includes good quality council housing built by Seaton Valley U.D.C. in 
the 1950's and Mayfield Dale and Mayfield Glade which are more recent 
Seaton Valley new town council estates. Parkside consists of housing 
built by the private developers Leech and Bellway since the mid 70's. 
Beacon Hill is a mix of housing association and owner occupied stock 
with housing association property dominant. 
East Cramlington shows the signs of an older population with a 
higher percentage of penSioners than any other locality, a lower 
fertility rate and the lowest percentage of households with children. 
When these localities are compared in terms of the percentage of 
married women working full and part time, the Parks ide figure stands 
at 37% and 19% while the Shankhouse figure was 11% and 14%. But it is 
the unemployment rates for both sexes which really signify the 
difference between the localities with Shankhouse having a male and 
female unemployment figure of 28% and 17% while the equivalent 
Parkside figures were 3% and 6% respectively. 
Apart from housing the only other consumption item compared 
across localities was car ownership and here again the figures are 
striking with 53% of Shankhouse households and 56% of East Cramlington 
households not owning a car, compared to only 9% of Parkside 
households. Although the 56% figure for East Crarnlington may be in 
part a function of the large mnnber of pensioner households in this 
area. 
The other notable feature revealed in this comparison of 
localities is the selective clustering of households with children 
headed by single parents in the non-owner occupied tenures. Moreover, 
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Table 36 Shankhouse in relation to all other areas in myth Valley. 
Total Enumeration Districts (64) (54) (45) (11) 
CL.1 CL.2 CL.3 CL.4 
% Children 1,2 18 24 30 36 
% Pensioners 3 25 17 3 6 
Fertility' rate 4 19 21 39 54 
% Male Unemployed 5 18 10 5 21 
% Female Unemployed 6 8 5 5 12 
% Adults Economically Active 7 53 62 76 65 
Total Population 11 325 415 530 601 
% Households owner-occupied 13 19 56 96 4 
% Households L.C. Tenants 14 69 27 1 69 
% Households other Tenants 15-18 12 17 3 28 
% Households density per room 
greater than 1 20,21 3 3 1 4 
% Households Single Person 22 28 21 9 10 
% Households 6 or more people 23 3 3 1 4 
% Households no car 24 65 42 13 54 
% Households 5 or more rooms 26 44 61 69 73 
% Households only pensioners 
present 27 32 24 5 11 
% Households with children 28 26 35 63 65 
Total Households 29 151 154 178 182 
% Households headed by 
single parent 30 5 3 3 11 
% Adult Migrant in last year 31 9 8 15 14 
% Total Married Women working 
full-time 44 17 25 35 18 
% Total Married Women working 
part-time 45 20 23 22 21 
% Total Household spaces purpose 
built flats 46 10 7 3 0 
% Households containing children 
headed by single parent 47 17 9 5 17 
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Table 37 Cramlington I..ocalities 
Beacon Shankhouse Parkside East 
Hill Cramlington 
% Children 1,2 33 
% Pensioners 3 6 
Fertility rate 4 38 
% Male Unemployed 5 13 
% Female Unemployed 6 9 
% Adults Economically Active 7 72 
Total Population 11 3173 
% Households owner-occupied 13 32 
% Households L.C. Tenants 14 5 
% Ho~eholds other 
Tenants 15-18 64 
% Households density per room 
greater than 1 20,21 3 
% Households Single Person 22 13 
% Households 6 or more 
people 23 
% Households no car 24 
% Households 5 or more 
4 
35 
rooms 26 60 
% Households only 
pensioners present 27 8 
% Households with children 28 53 
Total Households 29 1071 
% Holiseholds headed by 
single parent 30 8 
% Adult Migrant in last year 31 17 
% Total Married Women 
working full-time 44 33 
% Total Married Women 
working part-time 45 19 
% Total Household spaces 
purpose built flats 46 1 
% Households containing children 
children headed by 
single parent 47 15 
% Working ex. dist. of 
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it is apparent that those economically active and living in council 
housing are more locally committed in relation to employment than 
those in the owner occupied sector. This difference is apparent when 
the figures for working . away from the district of residence for 
Shankhouse and Parkside are compared. No less than 73% of 
economically active owner occupiers in Parkside work outside Blyth 
Valley compared to only 11% of the economically active in Shankhouse. 
According to the 1981 census 49% of the economically active 
heads of households in East Cramlington were social class III manual 
(Registrar General's Classification) with 41% in social classes IV and 
V. In Shankhouse 57% of economically active heads of household were 
in social class III manual and 28% in social classes IV and V. But 
within Parkside 36% of economically active heads of household were in 
social class III manual and only 10% in social classes IV and V. This 
distribution confirming the earlier surveys and indicating that social 
classes IV and V were overwhelmingly located within the council house 
sector. 
(d) ConclusiODB from tbe 1981 Census and Derived Cluster Analysis. 
Attempting to set Shankhouse in a comparative context begins to 
illUminate features, raise questions and, when taken in conjunction 
with the evidence from the previous chapter, suggest processes at 
work. 
When Shankhouse is compared with all other Blyth Valley housing 
estates it ranks as the most deprived estate as indicated by its 
umemployment rates for men and women. 
Comparing Shankhouse with all Blyth Valley Enumeration Districts 
again reveals Shankhouse, along with a number of other council 
estates, to be a deprived locality. 
-30Q-
If Shankhouse is set beside other Cramlington localities again 
it shows up as the locality with the highest rates of unemployment. 
Horeover, by comparing unemployment rates in the 1975 survey and the 
1981 census then although the rates have increased in both the owner 
occupied and local authority housing sectors, they have increased from 
different base points. The result was that the Parkside unemployment 
rates in 1981 at 6% for men and 3% for women stood at a level 
equivalent to those that had occurred on the local authority estates 
six years earlier. Heanwhile, in this six year period from 1975 
unemployment levels on the local authority estates had increased 
disproportionately to produce a widening gulf between the localities 
of Parkside, East Cr'amlington and Shankhouse. If we demographically 
compare Shankhouse and Parkside, then although both localities have a 
similar profile the percentages of married women working full-time are 
very different at 11% and 37% respectively. Now because of the nature 
of the data we cannot be sure of the extent to which these married 
women are also mothers of young children. However, asSt.nning that 
there is considerable overlap between working and motherhood, then the 
differences in employment rates for these two sets of women cannot be 
explained by the fact of childbirth alone. 
On the one hand these 1981 census derived figures appear to 
indicate a situation of emerging and deepening social division between 
tenures. On the other they require an explanation as to 
determination. 
I would say that the primary determination for the difference in 
unemployment rates between localities has to do with the fact that 
each locality stands in a different relationship to the employment 
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system. Second, the difference between economic activity and 
unemployment rates for the local authority estates of East Cramlington 
and Shankhouse may have a time component to it. The East Cramlington 
population representing an older generation of workers who entered the 
labour market at a time of a demand for labour and retained a place 
within it. Third, the difference between unemployment and economic 
activity rates for women in Shankhouse and Parkside although primarily 
determined by the women's relationship to separate employment systems 
may be associated with other variables. These variables may include 
earlier pregnancy, larger families, the availability of and capacity 
to afford child care and the ease with which one group may leave and 
re-enter ~he labo~ m.arket. · 
FinAlly., the observed socio-economic differences largely overlap 
and vary with tenure. The most deprived population located in council 
housing and the relatively well off inhabiting owner occupied 
accommodation. 
(e) The Shankhouse Housing Records Survey 
In order to gather more information regarding Shankhouse a 
housing records and household survey was conducted in 1986. 
Of the 447 households for which tenancy records were available, 
137 or 31% were in receipt of standard housing benefit, 139 or a 
further 31% were in receipt of certificated housing benefit and 171 or 
38% were not in receipt of housing benefit. Thus a majority of nearly 
two thirds of households were in receipt of housing benefit. Table 38 
shows the household composition of tenants in receipt of housing 
benefit. 
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Table 38 Composition of Housing Benefit Households 
Number Percentage 
Single Person 43 15.6% 
Couple Only 28 10.1% 
Couple and Dependent Child 137 49.6% 
Single Parent plus child 17 6.2% 
Couple plus Dep. plus Non Dep. 22 8.0% 
Single plus Dep. plus Non Dep. 3 1.1% 
Couple plus Non. Deps. 12 4.3% 
Single plus Non Deps. 6 2.2% 
Multiple Adults 7 2.5% 
Other 1 0.2% 
The main feature to note about these figures is the fact that 65% of 
housing benefit dependent households contain dependent children. 
The amount of households with rent arrears stood at 223 at the 
time of the survey. This meant that approximately half of the 
households on the Shankhouse estate had rent arrears. Table 39 gives 
details of the amount of arrears. The extent of arrears indicating a 
generalised inability to make ends meet. There was an apparent 
relationship between length of . residence on the estate and the 
existence of rent arrears with a majority of those in residence for 
more than two years having arrears. In part this accumulation in one 
place of families with arrears was a function of a council policy 
which prohibited housing transfer to other localities while rent 
arrears were outstanding. 
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Table 39 Classified Arrears 
Number Percentage 
No Arrears 224 50.1% 
Less than £10 7 1.6% 
£10 to £20 18 4.0% 
£21 to £50 55 12.5% 
£51 to £100 58 13.0% 
More than £100 84 18.8% 
As well as individual tenancy records an examination was made of 
allocation records since the first lettings on the estate in 1976. 
Table 40 compares the profile of the 59 households granted tenancies 
in 1976 with the 72 households given tenancies in 1985. The figures 
show that the most recent tenants tend to be young; unemployed; single 
parents and new householders. These trends deepening the extent of 
social deprivation on the estate and increasing social polarisation 
between Shankhouse and other localities. 
Table 40 A Coolparison of 1976 and 1985 Iettings 
1976 1985 
Couples and children 78% 46% 
Single Parents 11% 32% 
Childless Couples 11% 22% 
Previous Householders 78% 54% 
One Worker 70% 30% 
Two Workers 20% 10% 
No Workers/Unemployed 10% 60% 
Male under 28 29% 48% 
Female under 23 14% 44% 
(f) The Shankhouse Household Survey 
This survey for the Blyth Valley Housing Department was carried 
out in July, August and September of 1986. At the time of its 
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execution there were 427 occupied dwellings in Shankhouse. A response 
was obtained from 301 households, i.e. 70%. 
Dealing first with household structure. Only 13% of the 
households surveyed did not contain a dependent child. The majority 
(i.e. 82%) of households containing children were two parent 
households. Only 9% of households contained more than two adults and 
the proportion of single person households at 3% and couple only 
households at 6% was low. The estate was therefore found to be 
comprised mostly of family households with a relatively high 
proportion of single parent headed households. 
The economic characteristics of the households seemed to suggest 
a worsening of the esta~e.' s position· in the· years since the 1981 
census. For example 55% of the households surveyed· contained no full-
time earners and 50% contained no earners at all. Just 8% of 
households had more than one full-time earner and· 17% had another 
earner working part-time. 
The economic status of household heads is given in Table 41. 
From this it is apparent that less than half (i.e. 45%) of household 
heads were in employment while 36% were unemployed. 
Table 41 Economic Status of Household Heads 
Temporary sick 

















The household survey found that the occupation structure of the 
estate was biased downwards with 66.4% of heads of household in the 
semi and unskilled manual category. Furthermore, when the educational 
background of the adult population was investigated the absence of 
educational attainment was striking. Only 4% of adults had stayed on 
at school after the minimum leaving age. Half lacked educational 
qualifications of any kind and the only significant qualifications 
held were C.S.E.'s held by 40% of the adults. Another 14% had '0' 
levels, 2% had 'A' levels and just 14% had served a recognized trade 
apprenticeship. 
The income levels of the households were low. National average 
earnings for men at the time of the survey were approximately £180 per 
week and household incomes somewhat higher given double earner 
households. Just 7% of the households surveyed had incomes of this 
£180 per week level or higher including incomes of resident non 
dependents. Only 3% attained this level when resident non dependent 
incomes were excluded. 
The most common benefit received by households was child 
benefit, a non means tested benefit. However, 20% of households in 
which there was a full-time worker were in receipt of Family Income 
Supplement, a figure indicating a significant level of low wages. 
Slightly more than 50% of surveyed households received Supplementary 
Benefit. 
When the age of household heads was considered then 44% were 
aged less than thirty and approximately 80% under forty years of age. 
These figures confirming the general picture of a young population. 
Moreover there were found to be fewer earners in households headed by 
under 25's (68% had no earner) and over 50's (71% had no earner) 
-306-
compared with households headed by those between 26 and 50 where 42% 
had no earner. This same relationship appearing again when benefit 
dependency was taken into accormt with proportionately more younger 
and older households benefit dependent (see Table 42). 
Table 42 Benefit Dependency by Age of Head of Household 
Age of Head of Household Percentage 
Less than 20 83.3% 
20 to 25 59% 
26 to 30 57.3% 
31 to 35 52% 
36 to 40 48% 
41 to 50 34.8% 
50+ 71.5% 
The final subject covered in the survey was adults with 
relations working in the coal industry. Forty percent of adults in 
Shankhouse had fathers working in coal. Therefore to a large degree 
the estate was populated by miners' children. 
~ IN THE BLYlll AND CRAML.INGTON EMPLOYMENT OFFICE AREAS 
The previous section had identified the Shankhouse estate as a 
particularly deprived locality. The population of Shankhouse 
originating mostly within the boundaries of the Blyth Valley Urban 
District Council. An administrative area coinciding with the Blyth 
and Cramlington E.O.A.'s. 
Within the Blyth E.O.A. the adult unetnployment figure followed 
the upward regional trend and rose from 2,273 to 2, 591 between July 
1984 to July 1985 (see Table 43) bringing the male unemployment rate 
to nearly 20% or one in five of· the total resident male workforce. 
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Table 43 Unemployment Statistics Blyth E.O.A.* 
Ntnnber Unemployed Total 
Male Female Total Vacancies 
July 1984 1565 708 2273 88 
August 1590 704 2294 82 
September 1698 758 2456 75 
October 1722 710 2432 103 
November 1764 678 2442 88 
December 1785 666 2451 99 
January 1985 1830 673 2503 92 
February 1805 666 2471 75 
March 1750 666 2416 190 
April 1831 671 2502 285 
May 1791 691 2482 242 
Jnne 1765 677 2442 196 
July 1897 694 2591 187 
August 1885 659 2544 170 
September 1948 701 2649 148 
Table 44 Age and Duration of Unemployment Blyth E.O.A.* 
Number Unemployed 
Under 19 20-29 30-44 45+ Total 
Males - Jul~ 1984 
Up to 6 weeks 50 68 39' 41 198 
6 - 26 weeks 63 112 92 132 399 
26 - 52 weeks· 70 99 66 66 301 
52+ weeks 42 194 180 251 667 




Males - Jul~ 1985 Duration 
Up to 6 weeks 82 95 80 153 410 + 107% 
6 - 26 weeks 78 132 108 83 401 + 0.5% 
26 - 52 weeks 62 94 77 66 299 0.7% 
52+ weeks 30 242 218 297 787 + 18.0% 
252 563 483 599 1897 
% Total incr. July 84 
July 85 For Age 12% 19% 28% 23% 22% 
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Table 45 Unemployment Statistics Cramlington E.O.A. * 
NUmber Unemployed 
Male Female Total 
Total 
Vacancies 
July 1984 1262 673 1935 64 
August 1244 694 1938 87 
September 1323 772 2095 87 
October 1271 731 2002 113 
November 1245 713 1958 122 
December 1275 713 1988 92 
January 1985 1333 727 2060 49 
February 1279 709 1988 79 
March 1256 704 1969 59 
April 1286 720 2006 90 
May 1288 728 2016 111 
June 1259 739 1998 119 
July 1332 749 2081 83 
August 1341 732 2073 103 
September 1640 837 2477 121 
Table 46 Age and Duration of Unemployment Cramlington E.O.A.* 
Number Unemployed 
Under 19 2Q-29 30-44 45+ Total 
Males - Jull 1984 
Up to 6 weeks 41 64 58 37 200 
6 - 26 weeks 69 111 91 67 338 
26 - 52 weeks so 73 69 65 257 
52+ weeks 40 150 149 128 467 




Males - July 1985 Duration 
Up to 6 weeks 71 66 56 51 244 + 22.0% 
6 - 26 weeks 92 108 89 57 346 + 2.4% 
26 - 52 weeks 36 81 62 53 232 - 11.0% 
52+ weeks 26 153 163 169 510 + 9.2% 
225 408 369 330 1332 
%Total incr. July 84 
July 85 For Age 12.5% 2.9% 0.5% 11% 5.9% 
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Tab le 47 Desf"f nat"f on of Schoo l Leaven fn Blyt-h Val leY* 
October 1985 Hillcrest Ridley Tynedale Sub- Astley Cram, Sub , Grand 
Total Total Total 
Continuing 6th 69 51 120 47 98 145 265 
Form Education 23 . 8% 
Entered F. T. 4 25 12 41 30 43 73 114 
F.E. Courses. 10 . 2% 
Entered 2 41 44 87 53 52 105 192 
Employment 17 .3% 
Unemployed from 6 16 22 6 15 21 43 
this Group 3.9% 
Special Measures 10 130 120 260 59 170 229 489 
44% 
No Inform. 4 5 2 2 4 9 
0 .8% 
TOTAL 17 275 243 535 197 380 577 1112 
* 
Tables 43, 44, 45, 46, and 47- Source Blyth Val ley Council . 
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Female unemployment remaining relatively stable over the same twelve 
month period at 22% of the resident female workforce. Unemployment in 
the male age group 30 to 44 experiencing the largest percentage 
increase (see Table 44). Long term male unemployment increasing by 
18% with the age group 20 to 29 particularly badly hit (see Table 
44). 
School leavers in Blyth on special measures schemes in October 
1985 constituting approximately 50% of all school leavers reflecting 
the absence of full time jobs for young people (see Table 47 ) . This 
dearth of jobs again indicated by the very low numbers of vacancies at 
job centres relative to the total unemployed so that in July 1985 
there were approximately fourteen unemployed for every vacancy (see 
Table 43). 
Within the Cramlington E.O.A., an area which included 
Cramlington New Town, Seaton Delaval, Seghill and several villages in 
the southern part of the distri ct, adult male unemployment was 
relatively stable between July 1984 and July 1985, representing 11% of 
the male resident workforce. Female unempl oyment over the same period 
rising to 8.5% of the resident female workforce (see Table 45). Male 
teenagers experiencing the highest level of unemployment increase 
(12. 5%) over the one year period (see Table 46). Short term male 
unemployment and long term male unemployment over the same twelve 
months showing the greatest per centage increases of 22% and 9% 
respect ively (see Table 46). 
Just as in Blyth a significant proportion of Cramlington school 
leavers (40%) in October 1985 were destined for special measure 
schemes (see Table 47). Likewise i n July 1985 there were twenty-five 
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unemployed adults for every job vacancy within the Cramlington E.O.A. 
(See Table 45). 
~ AT THE ID:>NOMIC BASE IN BLYIH 
My earlier comments noted that Shankhouse took the majority of 
its population from within the Blyth Valley Urban District Cotmcil 
area and that this population was much more locally attached with 
regard to employment than the Parkside population. The logic of 
attachment to place meaning that change at the economic base of 
Cramlington and Blyth heavily impacted upon the Shankhouse population 
and other locally committed groups. 
In the previous chapter I described some aspects of basal change 
in Cramlington mentioning in particular the decline of manufacturing 
employment and the rise of service sector employment within the 
context of overall job loss between the years 1974 to 1984. 
In this part I intend to situate Shankhouse and Cramlington with 
reference to change at the economic base in Blyth. 
Information provided by the Coal Board to the Borough Planning 
Department( 30) indicated that a total of 4,351 miners lived within the 
Blyth E.O.A. of which 3,917 were employed in collieries there in 1954. 
The mining workforce at this time representing 38% of male employment 
within Blyth and 29% of total employment. The other male bastion 
being shipbuilding and ship repairing employing 1,143 men or 11% of 
Blyth's male workers. A third area of significant male employment was 
transport related engaging 2,161 workers and heavily dependent upon 
the transport and shipment of coal from Blyth harbour. These three 
sectors of mining, shipbuilding and repairing and transport 
constituting 70% of male employment in Blyth and 54% of all 
employment. Indeed the collective Blyth labourer was predominantly 
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male, men outrnnnbering women in Blyth's workforce at a ratio of 3: 1, 
i.e. 10,231 males against 3,239 females with the women concentrated in 
the service sectors other than transport. 
If we move forward thirty years to look at Blyth in 1984 then we 
find that the coal industry had shrunk to 1,605 men all working at 
Bates pit (see Table 48). But even at this reduced level coal was 
still the largest employer in the town and accounted for 28% of the 
male workforce within the Blyth Employment Office Area. 
In 1954 the Blyth Dry Dock and Ship Building Co. Ltd was 
planning to build a new slipway and dry dock capable of taking 30,000 
ton tankers, to add to the five docks already in use. 0 1) Thirty 
years later shipbuilding and ship repairing was a disappearing 
activity. The numbers of men employed in this field declining from 
490 in 1973 to 197 in 1984 (see Table 49), a massive 83% loss over the 
1954 figure. The contraction of the railways during the Beeching era 
together with the decline of coal and shipbuilding having multiplier 
effects so that by 1984 the transport and communication sector 
employed 780 workers of which 714 were men. This figure representing 
12.6% of the male workforce. 
In historical terms Blyth can be seen as resting on the triad of 
coal, shipbuilding and transport related industries . All these 
sectors have now declined so that by 1984, for example, the coal 
industry had contracted from the six pits within the old 1954 town map 
boundary(32) to just one pit, namely Bates Colliery. A contraction 
which mirrored the wider decline of the Northumberland coalfield from 
67 collieries producing 12.8 million tonnes of coal and employing 
40,400 men in 1947 to five collieries employing 7,383 employees in May 
1985. 
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On the other hand the years between 1945 and 1956 witnessed the 
provision of employment for women in tailoring, rayon weaving and 
electro-plating factories at Blyth.C 33) Nevertheless the Blyth Town 
Map, prepared in 1955 as part of the Northtunberland County Cormcil 
Development Plan, drew attention to the dependency of the town on a 
"small range of chiefly male employing heavy industries. (34) The Plan 
going on to predict a shortage of male labour for at least the 
following ten years as a consequence of the construction of Blyth's 
power stations. After 196 5, however, a large new source of male 
employment was considered essential to offset the predicted rundown of 
coal and short tenn labour fluctuations in shipbuilding. 
As I have indicated in the previous chapters the rundown and 
closure of the region's pits in the 60's created an employment crisis 
for which Crarnlington was presented as the solution. Yet by 1986 
Blyth Valley M.B.C. was saying that the manufacturing plant at 
Crarnlington; 
"had proved particularly vulnerable during the current 
recession with the loss of 3,100 manufacturing jobs 
between 1974 and 1981, representing 37% of total 
employment. (3S) 
A statement which would seem to imply that the solution was in fact 
part of the problem in that Crarnlington was failing to provide jobs on 
a scale necessary to draw in surplus Blyth labour. Moreover if we 
turn to consider the employment structure for Blyth between the years 
1975 to 1984 then a number of significant features stand out. First 
is the 37% drop in total manufacturing employment from 3,275 employees 
in 1973 to 2,073 employees in 1984 (see Table 50). A decline which 
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particularly impacted upon male labour as employment contracted from 
1,837 male manufacturing jobs in 1973 to 974 male manufacturing jobs 
in 1984 so that by 1984 women just outnumbered men in manufacturing 
employment. The women mostly located within the clothing and footwear 
sector. An area which according to Blyth council; 
"had suffered instability in recent years with 
considerable job loss."(36) 
This statement borne out by figures showing a fall in employment in 
the clothing and footwear industries from 1,423 jobs in 1973 to 722 
jobs in 1984 (see Table 51). 
By 1984 the coal industry was still the major employer while 
together the coal, manufacturing and transport and corrnmmication 
sectors still accounted for 57% of male jobs in Blyth (see Tables 
48/50/52). Other sectors such as the timber, furniture and upholstery 
trades shedding 451 jobs between 1973 and 1984 (see Table 53 ) . The 
only s i gnificant areas to see any increase in male full-time 
employment being public administration, professional and scientific 
services and the distributive trades with the increases more than 
offset by male job losses in other sectors (see Tables 54/55/56). 
Thirty years on from 1954 women now constituted about half of 
the workforce in Blyth's factories, shops, offices and pubs with 43% 
of these women part-time workers (see Table 57). The great majority 
of women situated in particular fields such as shop work, professional 
and scientific services, hotels and catering (see Table 58) and the 
clothing industry. Indeed a continuing historical feature of the 
employment structure was the tendency for women to be heavily grouped 
within a narrow range of occupations and at the lower end of these 
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occupations in terms of wages or salary, status and authority. 
Moreover, the frequency of part-time work amongst women was indicative 
of their position as part of a reserve army of labour that could be 
drawn into and expelled from the workplace in times of expansion or 
recession or, in the case of public sector employment, cuts in 
government spending. 
THE CLOSURE OF BATES PIT 
On the 15th May 1985 the Coal Board announced that it intended 
to close the last pit in Blyth Valley namely Bates Colliery. It was 
not only the closure of a pit but the end of a way of life. However, 
in order to appreciate the wider significance of this event it is 
necessary to view it as a moment in the process of change which began 
with the Heath government of 1970 to 1974. 
In September 1971 the miners put in a 47% pay claim. Over the 
years of Lord Roben' s chairmanship of the N.C. B. they had seen pits 
close while they slipped down the national earnings league. The 
N.C.B. offer of a 10% pay increase was rejected and the miners voted 
for strike action. With the bulk of public opinion behind them the 
N.U.M. brought out all of its 280,000 members. The union deciding to 
accelerate the run down of coal stocks by using flying pickets to 
prevent coal supplies getting to the power stations. 
With only seven weeks supply of national coalstocks remaining, 
the miners assembled 15,000 pickets at the Saltley Coke depot in the 
West Midlands and succeeded in closing the facility. A temporary 
closure giving a symbolic victory and providing a psychological blow 
which threw the government off balance. Douglas Ifurd saying in his 
diary that; 
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Table 48 Employment in Coal Mining at Blyth 1973/84 
Date Males Mal es Females Females Total Full- Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time 
1973 1,925 0 11 6 1,942 
74 1,915 0 11 7 1,933 
75 1,908 1 12 7 1,928 
76 1,911 0 15 8 1,934 
77 1, 954 0 14 9 1,977 
78 1,887 0 14 10 1, 911 
81 1,894 1 15 7 1,917 
84 1,605 3 16 5 1, 629 
Tabl e 49 Employment in Shipbuilding 
and Ship Repairing At Blyth 1973/84 
Date Mal es Mal es Females Females Total Full-Time Part-Time Full -Time Part- Time 
1973 490 1 11 0 502 
74 176 0 10 2 188 
75 17 0 2 1 20 
76 60 1 3 0 64 
77 48 1 3 0 52 
78 171 0 5 2 178 
81 148 1 3 7 159 
84 197 0 4 8 209 
Table 50 Employment in Manufacturing in Blyth 1973/84 
Date Males Males Females Females Total Full- Time Par t -Time Full- Time Part-Time 
1973 1 ,837 5 1,310 117 3,275 
74 1,662 11 850 145 2,673 
75 1 ,325 8 800 82 2,217 
76 1,412 15 1,140 139 2, 699 
77 1, 341 8 1, 524 177 3,057 
78 1,372 10 1,242 433 3,062 
81 1,095 21 1,072 155 2, 335 
84 974 16 1,044 43 2,073 
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Table 51 Employment in the Clothing and 
Footwear Sector at Blyth 1973/84 
Date Males Males Females Females Total Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time 
1973 166 0 795 18 979 
74 48 1 293 23 365 
75 40 2 326 8 376 
76 97 1 795 64 957 
77 131 1 1,203 88 1,423 
78 130 3 915 333 1,381 
81 97 0 573 43 713 
84 83 0 632 6 722 
Table 52 Employment in Transport and Coomunication at Blyth 1973/84 
Date Males Males Females Females Total Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time 
1973 823 7 67 10 907 
74 807 5 71 11 894 
75 869 14 73 10 966 
76 802 11 63 12 888 
77 777 10 63 15 865 
78 781 4 67 18 870 
81 758 3 43 19 823 
84 714 7 42 17 780 
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Table 53 Employment in Timber, Furniture and 
upholstery Sector at Blyth 1973/84 
Dat e Males Males Females Females Tot al Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time 
1973 371 4 108 8 491 
74 362 1 92 9 464 
75 352 1 89 7 449 
76 354 2 82 10 448 
77 285 3 80 7 375 
78 293 1 73 7 374 
81 133 2 11 9 155, 
84 35 0 1 2 38 
Table 54 Empl oyment in Publ ic Admi nistrati on and Defence 
at Blyth 1973/84 
Date Males Males Females Females Total Full-Time Part-Time Full - Time Part-Time 
1973 502 5 209 253 969 
74 563 11 233 284 1,091 
75 394 8 219 54 675 
76 408 15 208 43 674 
77 5,519 13 1,889 181 7,602 
78 5,450 12 1,889 183 7,534 
81 3,831 11 1,122 172 5,136 
84 4, 184 4 1,530 76 5,794 
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Table 55 Employment in Professional and Scientific Services 
at Blyth 1973/84 
Date Males Males Females Females Total Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time 
1973 205 11 383 286 885 
74 188 4 374 319 885 
75 231 27 402 286 946 
76 199 16 349 292 856 
77 259 31 422 348 1,060 
78 242 34 433 355 1,064 
81 203 29 364 408 1,004 
84 230 53 345 422 1, 050 
Table 56 Employment in the Distributive Trades at Blyth 1973/84 
Date Males Males Females Females Total Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time 
1973 351 40 388 539 1, 318 
74 286 48 393 471 1,198 
75 321 121 399 548 1, 389 
76 321 165 377 585 1,448 
77 309 157 364 599 1,429 
78 323 129 357 610 1,419 
81 383 105 351 570 1,409 
84 436 30 516 720 1,700 
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Table 57 Total Employment at Blyth 1973/84 
Date Males Males Females Females Total Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time 
1973 7,170 198 2, 717 1,663 11,748 
74 6,980 200 2,264 1,686 11,130 
75 6,243 300 2,752 1,405 10,200 
76 6,035 346 2,462 1,619 10,462 
77 6,159 336 2,932 1, 726 11,153 
78 6,222 312 2,623 2,033 11,190 
81 5,627 321 2,311 1,814 10,073 
84 5,633 236 2,578 1,972 10,419 
Table 58 Employment in Hotels and Catering at Blyth 1973/84 
Date Males Males Females Females Total Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time 
1973 50 68 67 255 440 
74 49 63 60 270 442 
75 44 72 64 243 423 
76 46 84 58 303 491 
77 38 62 61 322 483 
78 46 75 34 324 479 
81 35 99 24 347 505 
84 32 47 25 272 374 
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"the government is now vainly wandering over the 
battlefield looking for someone to surrender to and being 
massacred all the time ... (37) 
So in order to retreat and defuse the crisis Lord Wilberforce was 
asked to adjudicate on the pay claim. He reported within the week 
reconmending 20% for the miners phased in over sixteen months. It 
was, in the words of Robert Carr, a "disaster" for the government and 
a defeat for its non-statutory incomes policy.C3S) 
By 1974 Heath had abandoned his informal wages policy and 
constructed a complex and statutory three phase incomes policy. In 
October the N.C. B. responded to the N. U. M. 1 s 40% wage claim by 
offering a package amounting to 13%. The N.U.M., recognising that the 
oil price increases following the six day war greatly strengthened the 
case for coal and their own tactical position, rejected the N.C.B. 
offer and called an overtime ban. Consequently coal output began to 
fall and by the beginning of December, in an atmosphere of increasing 
tension, Heath announced a three day week for industry in order to 
conserve coal stocks. Moreover, with the defence of phase three of 
the pay policy paramount the stage was set for a showdown with the 
miners 1 union. The Prime Minister taking advantage of the miners 1 
vote for strike action to call a general election on the basis of "who 
governs". But it was an election the Conservatives went on to lose to 
Labour by four seats, i.e. 297 against 301. 
For the next eleven years a spectre haunted the establishment. 
It was the spectre of the N.U.M. and remembered defeats. So in order 
to lay the ghosts of the past the newly elected Conservative 
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leadership set in motion an analysis of the lessons to be learned from 
the strikes of 1972 and 1974. Lord Carrington, the Energy Ministry in 
the last year of the Heath government producing a paper which 
indicated the centrality of coal in the U.K. economy together with the 
latent and sometimes decisive power of collective labour in key 
industries particularly in the energy sector. Later, the widely 
leaked Ridley report prepared in the late 70's, laid bare the thinking 
and plans of a future Conservative government.C 39 ) A highly strategic 
report it picked up on Carrington's concerns and set down a five point 
contingency plan to be brought into operation in future battles with 
the miners. In essence Ridley conceived a divide and rule strategy 
alongside the use of state power to counter and wear down the enemy. 
He therefore recorrnnended the enhancement of wages and conditions of 
electricity workers in order to avoid disruption in this sector and 
alliance with the miners. At the same time preparations should be 
made for a challenge from the N.U.M. This meant the building up of 
coal stocks, the increased use of coal imports, switching to dual coal 
and oil firing at power stations and the recruitment of non-union 
lorry drivers to move coal and break picket lines. Last but by no 
means least, benefits should be cut to striking miners and a large, 
well prepared and mobile force of police deployed against N.U.M. 
pickets. 
While preparing for power the Conservative opposition was 
concerned that in the next confrontation with organised labour they 
would be on the winning side. The Ridley plan can, therefore, be seen 
as a blue print for victory in a coming struggle. But its success 
depended upon timing and a sufficient prior weakening of the old post 
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war consensus. It was a war of position and in 1981 the Thatcher 
government, at a low point in the opinion polls, retreated in the face 
of the N.U.M.'s opposition to pit closures. But the intentions of the 
government were clear since not only did they refuse to subsidise 
British coal at West European levels they also proposed, in the 1980 
Coal Industry Act, to withdraw all operating grants to the Board 
expecting the industry to break even by 1983/84. As well as this the 
restructuring of the steel industry together with the availability of 
cheap coal imports was contracting the demand for home produced coal. 
More than ever the coal industry was becoming reliant upon a single 
customer, namely the C.E.G.B. for its product. The government 
meanwhile, through the medium of the Monopolies and Merger s 
Commission, was putting pressure on the Coal Board to reduce costs and 
change its management structure. The M.M.C. report finding 70 
collieries with operating losses of more than £10 a tonne and 
describing the closure of high cost pits as the; 
"single most effective measure in reducing costs and 
improving efficiency."(40) 
The main strategic concern for the government being that it had l i ttle 
faith in the Coal Board's ability and willingness to restructure the 
i ndustry. A problem tackled by importing Ian McGregor to chair the 
Board and allowing him to appoint manager s willing to operate the 
M.M.C. agenda and the Ridley plan. The r eplacement, in 1982, of Glynn 
England at t he C.E.G.B. by Sir Walter Marshall serving a similar 
purpose of putting in place an enthusiast of Nuclear Power and a man 
willing to go along with government thinking. 
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By 1984, with the victory of the Falklands lvar behind it and 
rising popularity in the opinion polls, the government signalled its 
intention to quicken the pit closure progrannne by installing Ian 
McGregor at the Coal Board. It was a move designed to provoke the 
mining unions. So when the Coal Board ann01.mced the closure of 
Cortonwood pit on rmeconomic grormds without going through the area 
review procedure the Yorkshire area N.U.M. called all its members out 
on strike and asked for national support. The N.U.M executive 
sanctioning area strikes but refusing to call a national ballot on the 
grormds that threatened pits had a moral right to expect national 
support. Moreover it would be rmprincipled for a majority to vote 
other members out of a job by refusing to support a national strike. 
By April 1984 all the coalfield areas except Not ts, 
Leicestershire and South Derbyshire were out on strike but the lack of 
a national ballot was to remain a handicap draining the strike of 
legitimacy and shifting the focus away from the issue of pit closures 
and the need for an alternative energy strategy. 
For a year the miners and their supporters sustained the strike 
but in the end they went down to defeat. At Bates pit about 20% of 
the workforce had returned to work during January and February 1985. 
The colliery manager speaking to the returned miners in groups of 
twenty or thirty and explaining that the pit had a good future with at 
least ten years of life including two years of development work 
provided they convinced their colleagues to come back to work as soon 
as possible.<41 ) 
With the strike threatening to slowly disintegrate the N.U.M. 
Executive decided on ·a united return to work on the 5th March 1985 
without an agreement with the Board on the criteria to be used for 
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closing a pit. Although N.A.C.O.D.S. did succeed in introducing an 
independent element into the Colliery Review procedure. 
With victory in its grasp the Coal Board now felt that it had 
the right to manage regardless of union concerns. Therefore on the 
7th May, just four months after the promise that Bates had a rosy 
future, the Coal Board announced that Bates was making a negative 
contribution to the area accounts and would become a manpower 
reservoir. An announcement that was tantamount to closure and 
proclaimed without reference to the normal Colliery Review procedure. 
The Board following up its announcement by sending out letters to 
individual miners giving notice of closure and inviting them to 
transfer to long life pits or apply for redundancy. 
Faced with the prospect of the loss of manpower and defacto 
closure the Northumberland N.U.M. applied for a writ forcing the Board 
to stabilise the workforce at 900 pending resort to the Review 
procedure. 
At the beginning of September the Review procedure was invoked 
but on the 18th October the N.U.M. appeal against closure was refused. 
The reason given being that; 
"the Board does not consider that there is any prospect of 
the Colliery improving performance and results to the 
extent necessary to achieve economic viability ... (42 ) 
A decision which was very much in line with the Coal Board's "New 
Strategy for Coal" published in October 1985. A strategy which 
abandoned the fixed output targets of previous Plans for Coal and made 
response to the market the key requirement of the industry. The 
Board's task was to meet demand at minimum cost therefore output was 
to be maximised at; 
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"our low cost collieries and open cast sites as a means of 
reducing average costs ... (43) 
For a colliery to have a secure future it must aim to produce coal at 
below £38 per tonne as opposed to the £47 per tonne at Bates pit. 
Apart from that the main customer for Bates coal was the C.E.G.B. and 
its power stations on the Thames. With operating costs at £2.53p a 
gigajoule Bates coal could not hope to compete with imported coal 
delivered to the Thameside power stations at £1.50p a gigajoule. 
Now that the Coal Board had refused the N.U.M. 's appeal and was 
intent on closure the union referred its case for keeping Bates open 
to the Independent Review Panel. The Panel reported on the 4th 
February 1986 and recommended that although Bates could not expect to 
ever make a profit it should be allowed to operate for at least two 
years concentrating on the Threequarter R. seam. If results then 
showed that the pit could make a contribution to area overheads it 
should remain in operation thereafter. Especially since closure of 
the pit would result in the loss of a substantial energy resource, 
namely the 29 million tons of recoverable reserves of coal.C44) 
The Review verdict was greeted as a vindication of the N.U.M.'s 
case. Bill Ethridge, a miner at the pit, saying; 
"this is what we were on strike for for twelve months. 
This is what we have been fighting for ... (4S) 
Ronnie Campbell, the N.U.M. Branch Secretary, adding that he believed 
the pit would "go on for twenty years". C46 ) Blyth Valley cormcil 
leader, Ian Gordon, describing the reprieve as; 
"The best piece of new I've had in eleven years ... (47) 
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It seemed for a time that the efforts and sacrifices to keep the 
pit open had not been wasted, that something of a victory had been 
won. But at the beginning of March, just four weeks after the Review 
decision, the Coal Board announced that it could not accept the Review 
Panel recommendation and therefore the Bates closure would go ahead. 
As the news was broken to the miners the men at the coal face 
stopped work in disbelief. Ken Black, a face worker commenting that; 
"We ruid our hopes raised after the Review but now we have 
been told we are finished next Friday. It doesn't bear 
thinking about. There will be a few transfers but the 
Board isn't worth working for."(48) 
The sense of betrayal spreading beyond the confines of the N.U.M. with 
Councillor Gordon summing up the feeling of many when he said; 
"I find the action of the Coal Board contemptible and 
their approach to the Review procedure farcical. I 
thought we had succeeded because of the power of the 
Review and the strength of the arguments but obviously it 
doesn't make any difference. 
I don't know how anybody can have any confidence 
whatsoever in the way this country and its industries are 
being managed. It reflects on the Government. They are 
totally dishonest. I spoke to the Energy Under Secretary, 
David Hunt, yesterday and he just stood there talking 
about his concern for the community while saying that the 
Government couldn't interfere with a Coal Board 
decision."C49 ) 
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The Observer newspaper(SO) indicating that the price from N.A.C.O.D.S. 
for staying out of the miners' strike had been a pledge by the Board 
to give "full weight" to the views of the Independent Review Panel. 
Ian McGregor telling the N.A.C.O.D.'s negotiators that it would be; 
"difficult for the Board to come up with a decision which 
ran differently to the Review."(Sl) 
The Prime Minister and the Energy Secretary, Peter Walker, assuring 
N.A.C.O.D.S. that the Review process was "sacrosanct". 
Now that the strike was over it was clear that the Coal Board 
had no intention of allowing its closure plans to be derailed. 
Moreover, even though its accounting procedures for deciding what 
constituted a viable pit were highly suspect,(SZ) the Board continued 
to rely upon them not only to close individual pits such as Bates but 
also to determine the future of the whole industry. 
Faced with the Board's determination the N.U.M. asked for and 
were refused a judicial review of the Board's closure decision. It 
was the last move in the game and with its failure the N.U.M. called 
off its campaign to keep Bates open. 
In. delivering its judgement on Bates the Board brushed aside the 
social costs of closure as not their responsibility. Wade( 53 ) 
estimating the cost of the loss of 1,513 mining jobs at £107 million 
spread over seven years or £63. 7 million for the 900 men on the 
payroll at the time of the review. The costs covering such items as 
redundancy payments, lost national insurance and income tax 
contributions, the loss of rate revenue from the N.C.B. and the 
increased take up of unemployment benefit and rent and rates rebates. 
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In the same vein this type of cost analysis could be extended to 
include mining jobs foregone and not therefore available for new 
labour, the downward multiplier effects on jobs in dependent 
industries and services and the dampening effect on the local housing 
market. Equally there may well be additional health costs as the 
psychological impact of redundancy takes its toll in terms of 
individual ill health and family well being. 
Quantifying the effects of pit closure in cost terms is 
notoriously difficult but the effects are no less real for want of 
hard figures. While at street level there was a clear appreciation of 
what the closure of Bates would mean for the Borough and its people. 
Michael Davidson, aged 30 and unemployed, putting it this way; 
'-'We have lost the shipyards and now the mines are gone. 
There just isn 1 t the work and closing Bates will make 
finding a job even more difficult."(54) 
The manager of Dewhirsts butchers shop recognising that the closure of 
the colliery would be bad for business; 
"It will be like the miners 1 strike all over again with 
trade falling off or people buying cheaper cuts of meat or 
settling for mince instead of steak."(SS) 
Sean Styles, aged 21 and on the dole, explaining that he had until 
recently worked as an engineering technician for a Wallsend firm. 
They had done a lot of work for the Coal Board but with pit closures 
their order book had shrunk and he had been paid off. In his view the 
closure of Bates would mean that; 
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"What happened to me will happen to others ... (56) 
For the local press it was as if the wheel had turned full circle and 
Blyth was going back to the thirties although this time it was hard 
to see where new jobs would come from. 
IDCAL AND COUNTY EroNOMIC STRATFx;IES 
Across the County unemployment rates varied from place to place 
with the Castle Morpeth Ponteland area showing a registered 
unemployment rate of 5% in 1986, the Blyth Valley rate standing at 15% 
and the Cramlington rate at 13%. Economic decline was therefore more 
significant for some local authorities than for others while by 1990 
the County Council felt concerned enough to produce a four year 
strategy for economic development and regeneration.< 57) 
In presenting its proposals the County Council sought to 
contextualise its strategy by pointing out that registered 
unemployment was twice the national average over a large part of the 
coalfield area with long term and youth unemployment identified as 
particular problems. For the County as. a whole male jobs had fallen 
by 14% between 1981 and 1987 while female jobs had increased by 12% 
although half· of this growth was in part-time work so that by 1987 
part-time employment accounted for 25% of jobs in the County.(58) For 
those in work male earnings ih 1985 were 10% below the national 
average and 22% below the national average for the South East. Female 
earnings were 14% below the national average and 28% below the average 
for the South East.(59) 
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Despite the establishment of Cramlington New Town there was: 
"still not enough jobs in manufacturing and services and 
the contribution of small business remained below that 
necessary for a strong and diversified economy."(60) 
Moreover, the private sector was; 
"not providing investment opportunities in sites and 
premises and action by public agencies would continue to 
be required."C 76) 
However the County had had some success in attracting; 
"high tech companies in pharmaceuticals (i.e. Boots Co. at 
Cramlington), electronics and software (i.e. Tolag 
Engineering at Cramlington). "C 62) 
A measure of success which could be built upon and which would enable 
Northumberland to cloth itself in the promotional image of "a dynamic 
technological County."(63) 
Mindful of the context of relatively high unemployment and low 
wages the aim of the economic strategy was to; 
"reduce unemployment and raise income levels through 
employment and training opportunities which meet the long 
term needs of County residents ... (64 ) 
But having proclaimed such an objective the strategy designed to 
achieve it was traditional, limited and in certain respects 
contradictory. In the words of the chairman of the Planning and 
Economic Development Committee; 
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"Tried and tested approaches will be maintained ••• and 
new initiatives only introduced where there is a 
demonstrable need and where they will not duplicate the 
work of other agencies."(65) 
The main elements of the strategy consisting of the provision of 
prestige sites and premises, the promotion of Northumberland as a 
location for industry and as a tourist attraction, contributing 
finance to bodies such as the South East Northumberland Enterprise 
Tnist and the Northern Development Company and making grants to . small 
business. Many of these elements echoing those pursued by the Borough 
of Blyth in 1932, 1956 and 1966 (see Blyth publicity extracts). 
What was new was the increasing emphasis on small business 
. fonnation while recognising that such activity was no alternative to 
the establishment of a major industry. Or as a leading NorthUIIlberland 
Councillor put it; 
"NorthUIIlberland needs a Nissan car plant."(66) 
These two aspects of attracting inward investment and helping 
small business was then reflected in the setting up of the 
Northumberland Investment Office to serve as a promotional agency and 
the NorthUIIlberland Business Centre to encourage small business and 
administer the small business grant scheme. But rather than a 
"scatter gun" approach the Investment Office would identify sectors 
with a "proven and future potential for job growth" and encourage them 
to set up in the County. The strategy prioritising the attraction of 
further phannaceutical plants, food processing and clothing 
factories.< 67) 
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On the supply side the Cormty proposed to carry out a skills 
audit and set up a data base of company requirements. The purpose 
being to match skills with those required by capital. For in the 
economy of the future; 
"the workforce will be required to adapt to frequent 
changes in the nature of their jobs and be able to offer 
more than one ski11."(68) 
Therefore having identified a shift to light industry, services and 
part-time work the Cormty' s economic strategy set out to build upon 
this shift and reinforce it. The emphasis on developing the tourist 
and heritage industry and the provision of specific training for this 
sector implying an increase in part-time and seasonal work. 
As far as regional assistance was concerned the County Council 
noted with concern the reduction in Development Area coverage and the 
fact that the County was not benefiting from either an Urban 
Development Corporation or an Enterprise Zone. 
initiatives tended to; 
Regrettably these 
"emphasise conurbations and marginalise the County."(69) 
Consequently the Cormty needed to push for European money from the 
European Regional Development Fund and the Social Fund. Equally it 
needed to involve other agencies such as British Coal Enterprises in 
economic development. The major initiative from British Coal 
Enterprises consisting of the provision of low cost loan money to 
build high specification factory and business units at "Enterprise 
Court" Cramlington. 
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Yet even as the County planned to focus on the E.E.C. it worried 
that European money would be increasingly directed to the peripheral 
regions such as Portugal, Ireland and Greece at the expense of 
Northumberland. As for small business development, the County fretted 
that the coalfield had little small business tradition and that the 
rate of small business formation was below the national average. 
The only departure from its traditional approach to economic 
development being contracts with employers receiving Council support 
to provide permanent employment to trainees after training. But even 
here there was no way of ensuring compliance given the 
unpredictability of the market. 
With an economic development budget of £490,000 the County's 
strategy could hope to do little more than paper over the cracks. In 
essence the strategy amounted to little more· than pleading with 
capital to locate in the County while small business fonnation was 
unlikely to be on a scale necessary to replace jobs lost. Rather than 
training to meet hmnan needs and expand awareness labour was to be 
moulded to meet the needs of capital. 
So much for the County's economic strategy. However the Blyth 
Borough strategy(?O) was largely a pale reflection of the County's 
only operating with a smaller budget of £240,000 in 1985/86. A key 
difference being money spent on a campaign to keep Bates pit open. But 
if the County and Borough strategies were limited their purpose was 
more than economic. The absence of jobs was a political issue. An 
issue which worried constituents and prompted local politicians to be 




Blyth possesses many attractions which are essential 
to industrial firms, and which should encourage the 
establishment of new industries. Amongst these are : 
(a) Cheap sites. 
(b) Low rates. 
(c) Low Harbour 
Dues. 


















TOWN CLERK OF BLYTH 
(MR. J, LEIGH TURNER) 
(g) Good transport facilities by road, rail and sea. 
(h) A good supply of pure water. 
(i) Efficient Municipal Services. 
(j) First-class educational facilities. 
(k) Ample open spaces for public recreation. 
(l) ConYeniently situated residential districts within 
easy reach of the i!1dustrial centre. 
It is hoped that this little book will be of service 
to the business world for which it is intended. 
Page nine 
BLYTH BROCHURE 1932. 
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The many advantages that the town is able to offer to manufac-
turers has attracted several new and light indus tries to the area-a 
most important safeguard against any_ possibility of ~epression. 
MODEHN INDUSTRY IN A MODERN SETTING 





A toum which has the advantages of both the sea and the 
country can hardly jail to be sa tisfying to its residents or 
attractive to its visitors. There is something about the perpetual 
business of the sea and the never- ending cycle of nature in the 
country which is ageless and enchanting. 
Blyth is such a town with these advantages, and it has 
more. A tradition of living and work.mg, stretching back over 
many centuries, has been cherished and refashioned to meet 
the needs of the present day. All the mighty business of those 
who go down to the sea in ships is sri// the main theme, 
amplified and broadened now by new industries which bring 
fresh insight and security. 
And side by side with the work goes relaxation, to be 
had on river or shore or in rolling countryside. Blyth ·is a 
place of activity in whatever field time or caste. demand. 
Wisely provided for in things municipal, public service or 
private enterprise, it is a community worth knowing. If this 
book can increase that knowing, it is not without value . 
WORK AND PLAY IN SOUTH HARBOUf 
BLYTH BROCHURE 19 56. 
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WE OFFER YOU ... 
EVERY FACILITY 
for the success of your business 
A PLEASANT WAY OF LIFE 
with cultural, sporting and recreational opportunities 
and 
A HEARTY WELCOME 
THE QUESTION 
OF LABOUR 
Local labour has long enjoyed ari 
excellent reputation for its dependability 
and its good record in the industrial 
relation field. More recently-as new 
employers will testify-it has· become 
noted for its adaptability. 
In recent years light industries, for 
example tailoring and the manufacture 
of pharmaceutical products, employing 
predominantly female labour have been 
successfully established in the town and 
attract many workers from the neigh-
bouring areas. 
With contraction likely in the coal-
mining industry, and upwards of 1,500 
young people entering the employment 
field each year in the immediate neigh-
bourhood, the supply of labour for new 
enterprises should present no problem. 
There is in addition a large reserve of 
female labour which would respond to 
new employment opportunities. 
We are glad you asked that question. 
We like it, and we think that you would, 
00. 
e like the shopping facilities (and so, 
oo, do many more people living in the 
urrounding areas), and on Fridays and 
aturdays these are augmented by a 
ively open-air market. 
ormal education is catered for by a 
arge grammar school, secondary and 
rimary schools. Informal education is 
vailable through the Evening Institute 
nd the Public Library. Within easy reach 
re technical colleges offering com-
ercial and industrial courses. 
WHAT'S IT 
LIKE TO 
LIVE IN BLYTH? 
We enjoy our sports-football (Croft 
Park is the home of the famous Blyth 
Spartans), cricket (Northumberland 
Cricket League, and some minor com-
binations), golf, tennis, badminton, 
bowls, archery, motoring, cycling, row-
ing, yachting, swimming, fishing .... 
We like particularly our splendid beach, 
promenade, chalets and children's play-
ground. And we feel that our easy access 
to a very wide choice of uncrowded 
countryside must be the envy of most 
other places. 
Advance factory buil 
and let by 
Blyth Corporation 
on the trading estate 
The Borough Council has a well laid out 
industrial trading estate-Kitty Brewster 
Tradmg Estate-on which factories are 
available at short notice for sale or rent 
Prices are competitive and, in additio~ 
to the Government grants for purchase 
of factories, the Council will be prepared 
to advance a mortgage loan to the 
developer. 
HOUSING FOR KEY WORKERS-
A firm providing new employment can 
rely on a ready response from the 
Borough Council to meet the needs of 
key worker houses and mi~ny are already 
provided. 
BLYTH BROCHURE 1966. 
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CLASS AND CLASS STRUCTURE 
Throughout the previous chapter material was presented which 
indicated that the establishment of Cramlington New Town helped change 
the social structure of South East Northumberland. As building 
proceeded more and more white collar, service sector workers and 
skilled workers were dr~wn into the coalfield and into owner 
occupation. In parallel with the development of the Town employment 
within the coal industry fell and from the mid 60's onwards 
Cramlington and Blyth competed for inward investment. A persistent 
theme in attracting employers being the availability of a pool of 
cheap female labour. 
At Blyth and Cramlington manufacturing plants located on purpose 
built industrial estates. However, between 1973 and 1984 employment 
in manufacturing declined at both locations. Across the County as a 
whole there was a steady consolidation of service sector employment so 
that by 1987 60% of total employees worked in services.C7l) But this 
shift from mining to a relatively small manufacturing base and an 
expanded service sector should not be interpreted as a decline of the 
working class and can only be seen as such if the working ·class is 
narrowly defined as manufacturing labour. Ari alternative is to think 
of the working class as part of capital and therefore 
"its occupational structure, mode of work and distribution 
throu8J., the industries of society are determined by the 
ongoing process of capital accmnulation."(72) 
In other words the working class is taken up, released from and 
distributed through the branches of economic activity in accord with 
the movement of capital. Suggesting that this or that sphere of 
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activity represents the working class is to freeze what is in reality 
a process. Moreover, the fact that labour can be expelled and brought 
back into work provides a basis for deriving a definition of the 
working class which is symptomatic of its condition and historically 
resonan~, namely that it is; 
"that class which, possessing nothing but its power to 
labour, sells that power to capital in return for its 
subsistence ... (73 ) 
I say historically resonant because the development of capitalism as a 
particular system of production depended upon the creation of just 
such a class. 
At the same time this definition although essential must 
represent a first approximation in an appreciation of the real since 
it would include within the working class the company personnel 
officer as well as the machine operator, the store manager together 
with the counter assistant. In order to deal with this difficulty 
Wright adds two further dimensions enabling a fuller comprehension of 
the working class. The working class is therefore those wage 
labourers who have nothing to sell but their labour power and; 
"do not control the labour of others ••• nor control the 
use of their own labour within the labour process ... (74) 
With this definition class, rather than appearing as a static 
status derived concept becomes a relational concept involving 
subordination and degrees of discretion over the work task, working 
conditions and control of investment and resources. The secretary in 
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the typing pool and the office cleaner, the filing clerk and the 
counter assistant become as much part of the working class as the 
miner and the production line worker. From this perspective the 
working class in late capitalism rather than disappearing has in fact 
expanded as capital brings more and more activities under the sway of 
the market, deskilling within the labour process proceeds and state 
functions swell to absorb and administer the surplus. 
As far as Cramlington is concerned applying Wright's criteria 
would mean that many of the workers subsumed under the categories ·of 
junior non-manual and service personnel in the 1966, 1968 and 1975 
surveys should be included in the working class while foremen, 
intermediate non-manual, professional and managerial categories would 
be excluded. Wright going on to suggest that these positions occupy; 
"contradictory locations within class relations."(?S) 
In other words such positions can be seen as objectively torn between 
the primary classes of bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie and proletariat 
according to where they lie on the dimensions of control over 
resources, over the labour of others and over their own labour. The 
.degree and extent of control bringing a set of locations 'closer' to 
one or other of the primary classes but having interests identical to 
neither. Therefore under Wright's schema the primary school teacher 
and the university professor are both "semi autonomous employees" with 
the teacher closer to the working class and the professor to the petty 
bourgeoisie. The foreman and the middle manager in a company 
occupying contradictory locations between the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat with the foreman nearer the working class and the manager 
nearer the bourgeoisie. 
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Poulantzas<76) however will have none of this and by adopting a 
narrow interpretation of productive labour comes up with a numerically 
small working class. An interpretation which I would want to reject 
not only because of its formalism but because it fails to register the 
working class as that class which has been dispossessed. It is 
precisely the notion of dispossession which Wright incorporates into 
his discussion of class. 
Another way of acknowledging the relational dynamic of class is 
by employing Friedman's(ll) concepts of central and peripheral 
workers. Central workers being those who are considered essential by 
management or those who by their strength have forced managers to 
consider them essential. Peripheral workers are expendable labour 
although whether a particular group will be laid off depends upon the 
severity of top managers' need to restructure and reduce costs. 
In Friedman's formulation while the achievement of centrality 
may or may not be a form of class struggle the retaining of central 
status- certainly is. Moreover it is a form of class struggle which 
can be seen as dual closure, i.e. fighting upwards against the boss 
and downwards against other workers often by the use of exclusionary 
strategies. Within this context we would expect a surplus of jobs to 
lessen exclusionary practices. 
The point, however, is that in order to maintain flexibility 
capital requires separate groups of workers who are paid less and who 
are expendable and a body of central workers. The former operating 
rmder a regime of direct control and the latter offered responsible 
autonomy and relative security. During recession central workers tend 
to be protected in order to secure long rrm profit when trade revives 
while peripheral workers are discharged. Ultimately though no 
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worker's future is permanently assured and former central workers, 
i.e. miners, dockers and Fleet Street printers may find their position 
eroded. Much of the population of Shankhouse consisting of unemployed 
peripheral workers unable to find a foothold in the Cramlington and 
Blyth labour· markets. 
A NEW UNDERCLASS? 
Since the 70's the term underclass has been used by T.V. and 
radio commentators, politicians, journalists and writers to refer to 
the unemployed. The concept was imported from the U.S.A. by Charles 
Murray, one of its most ardent advocates. In Murray' s(78) view a 
growing number of unemployed lack moral restraint and display values 
different from the rest of society. They embrace of cu1 ture of 
poverty which prevents them achieving success. The values 
constituting this culture include sexual promiscuity, a rejection of 
the work ethic, wanting something for nothing and involvement in 
crime. Welfare payments allegedly tending to increase the size of the 
underclass by encouraging a "dependency culture". Murray going on to 
suggest that the values of the underclass are now "contaminating the 
life of entire neighbourhoods" and are passed on from parent to 
children creating an ever expanding pool of lumpen poor set apart from 
those in work. 
As polemic Murray's representation of the underclass seems 
persuasive. But it is seriously flawed as social science. Poverty 
and unemployment are first and foremost economic and structural 
phenomena. However, the underclass thesis explains thes~ phenomena in 
terms of individual character defects which are held to pervade an 
entire population. At root such explanations amount to little more 
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than blaming the victim although in Murray's polemic the State is also 
guilty of creating the underclass by virtue of general universal doles 
undennining the ethic of self help. The logic of Murray's argument 
leading to policy measures which attempt to remoralise the poor, 
provide stringent criteria for the receipt of benefit including 
enforced 'work' programmes and cut public welfare. 
From another angle the underclass thesis serves to divide those 
in and out of work by presenting those not in work as feckless 
wasters. It is the academic equivalent of a Sun newspaper editorial 
with a similar ideological charge. But even as metaphor the term 
underclass implies a strata separate, beneath and distinct from the 
working class. Moreover, in focusing on the individual the underclass 
paradigm detracts from structural and political explanations of 
poverty and unemployment. The same individualist perspective informing 
commentaries which explain youth unemployment in terms of the lack of 
necessary skills and a proper attitude to work. Indeed it is just 
such an explanation which has shaped the State's · 'solution' to the 
problem of youth in the form of skill and work experience schemes for 
the young unemployed. 
A moment's reflection should, however, make us pause before 
accepting the underclass thesis or individualist explanations of 
unemployment and poverty. For a start every generation has seen a 
pool of unemployed and within that a sub group sometimes identified as 
the residuum, the feckless or the putrefying masses. These pools of 
labour disappearing in the boom conditions just prior to World War I 
and. post 1945. If the culture of poverty and underclass theorists are 
correct and 'don't want to work' values are transmitted across 
generations, then how are these near full employment situations to be 
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·· explained when the theory suggests a more and more rapid and 
continuous growth of lumpen poor. Likewise it is worth recalling that 
in the Willis' 1975 studyC 79 ) of working class lads leaving school 
without qualifications and with "anti-authority" attitudes all the 
boys wanted to work and fotmd work easily. The same lads leaving 
school in Cramlington and Blyth in 1985 would have had a much depleted 
chance of getting work but this first and foremost had nothing to do 
with attitude defects or the fact that they were unqualified and 
everything to do with economic restructuring and a lack of supply of 
jobs. 
In contradiction to Murray's work I would argue that mass 
unemployment is an inherent potentiality of capitalism. The 
strategies adopted by capital to maintain profitability are the "prime 
movers" in the growth of unemployment. The least competitive 
enterprises closing altogether while at other plants labour is shed or 
new technology reduces the numbers of workers needed. 
Having said that not all workers are equally secure and it is 
peripheral workers who are the first to go 'out of door'. The impact 
of restructuring additionally acting to rupture the transition from 
school to work for a section of· working class youth. To put it 
crudely many young working class people have nowhere to go whereas in 
the past ·they could have expected a job. Clarke and Willis(SO) 
suggesting further blocks to youth employment such as the collapse of 
the apprenticeship system as a consequence of the breaking down of 
unwanted divisions of labour. Second the availability of women to 
fill low paid and part-time employment and the preference of many 
employers for mature workers tied to financial and family 
responsibilities and therefore more responsive to the discipline of 
the wage. Finally the costs of redundancy payments preventing 
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employers 'shaking out' more than their immediate needs and 
substituting young workers. 
Again contrary to Murray, rather than viewing the unemployed and 
the poor as separate, they should be seen as an integral part of the 
working class, its most disadvantaged stratum. Here again the idea of 
'dispossession' is important since it reminds us that; 
"Many workers who are not 'deprived' in the official sense 
live in permanent danger of entering the ranks of the 
deprived; and that they share in any case many of the 
disadvantages which afflict the deprived."(Sl) 
Indeed the work of Brown and Harris(SZ) suggests that stressful life 
events experienced by peripheral workers and their families are more 
numerous and more severe than those experienced by central workers. 
At another level what Murray and Lewis(83 ) before him do is 
think of the culture of the poor in wholly negative and separatist 
terms. Take for example the so-called absence of a work ethic. It 
never occurs to these writers that muCh of the work that the working 
class is required to do is routine and mind numbing. It is hardly 
surprising then that the prospect of such work is met with mixed 
feelings. The Willis study(S4) validates the lads' understanding and 
by extension working class understanding of the fact that a lot of 
work is "shit". Just as the lads develop a counter culture which is 
subversive of school culture, shop floor culture contests the control 
and understanding of management even if only in limited ways. The 
question then is not one of separate cultures but of shared 
contradictions and orientations to employment amongst peripheral 
workers including the surplus fragments. 
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If we return to the Shankhouse population then clearly much of 
this population is marginal to the employment system. But marginal 
does not mean unimportant since the presence of the unemployed has 
fear inducing consequences for those in work and tends to reduce their 
resistance to the reorganisation of working practices. The reserve 
surplus population therefore serves a function of the classic reserve 
anny by disciplining labour within the workplace thereby helping to 
facilitate the accumulation process. On the other hand Bauman(85) 
questions the idea of a Reserve Army since many of the unemployed may 
never work again. For me this formulation leaves out of account the 
"demonstration" effects of unemployment on those in work and overlooks 
the fact that the emergence of a reserve surplus population tends to 
lower wages in unskilled and part-time· work. Equally it is too 
pessimistic a conclusion which neglects political and institutional 
change as a route back to near full employment. 
Rejecting the use of the term underclass because of it~ 
pathological implications leaves the Shankhouse population still to be 
designated. All of this population can be thought of as working 
class constituted by peripheral workers and a reserve surplus 
population. The bulk of Shankhouse households are then dependent upon 
welfare payments either as their only source of income or to top up 
low wages. Once "on the welfare" especially if you are unemployed, 
means attempting to exist on benefits set well below the level of the 
average wage. The point being, as William Beveridge remarked; 
"The less tolerable the lot of the idler, the greater the 
incentive to industry."C86) 
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In other words, benefits needed to be set at a level which would 
discourage those in work from leaving the labour market and encourage 
those out of work to get on their bikes and look for employment. In 
this way the benefit system was constructed to nnderpin the labour 
market and.stimulate the work ethic. 
HOUSING, PERIPHERAL WORKERS AND THE RESERVE SURPI1JS POPULATION 
The Conservative Government on coming to power in 1979 made the 
sale of conncil houses a key part of its legislative programme. The 
Prime Minister in the debate on the Queen's speech summing up the new 
age and the related philosophy in the following way; 
"Thousands of people in conncil houses and new towns came 
out to support us for the first time because they wanted a 
chance to buy their own houses. We will give every 
council tenant the right to purchase their own home at a 
substantial disconnt on the market price and with 100% 
mortgages for those who need them. This will be a giant 
stride towards making a reality of Anthony Eden·' s dream of 
a property owning democracy. It will do something else. 
It will give more of our people that freedom and mobility 
and that prospect of handing something onto their children 
and grandchildren which owner occupation provides ... (87). 
~fuile there had been sales of council houses in the past what 
was new was the scale of the expected sales and the fact that the 
right to buy was now part of a . broad strategy to reduce state 
provision across a whole range of welfare services. Moreover, as the 
reference to a property owning democracy and to inheritance indicates 
the selling of public assets was presented both as a redistribution of 
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wealth, as a chance of accumulating wealth and of becoming upwardly 
mobile by entry on to the housing ladder. At the same time 
dismantling the public rented sector was seen by the Conservatives as 
a means of weakening allegiance to the La.bo~ ~arty. The calculation 
being that more home owners would mean more acti.Ial and potential 
Conservative voters. 
It is not my intention at this point to discuss the relationship 
between home ownership ideology and political Bllegiance except to say 
that the matter is much more complicated than suggested by Tory 
statements and left frmdamentalism. For the present I want to 
consider the effects of the right to buy in relation to Cramlington, 
bearing in mind the context of cuts in expenditure on housing 
investment leading to the virtual collapse of new council house 
building. 
As of the 15th March 1988 Blyth Borough had agreed to sell 2,638 
cormcil houses representing 27% of its total stock of 9,834 public 
sector houses.C88) However the spread of sales was not uniform across 
all of the Borough's estates. Even within Cramlington, with its stock 
of good quality cormcil housing certain estates showed a higher 
propensity of sales then others. For example, Shankhouse saw only 5% 
of houses sold while at La.nercost 42% of houses moved into private 
ownership. When the Borough as a whole is examined then Shankhouse 
comes bottom of the league table for right to buy sales while Solingen 
comes top with 78% of its stock sold (see Table 59). Indeed there 
appears to be a loose relationship between unemployment and right to 
buy sales, with sales higher on those estates with relatively low 
unemployment rates. 
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Table 59 The Righi" 1"o Buy as a1" 15th March 1988 In Blyth Valley 
Housing Appl. Appl. Notices % Sold Cramlington All 
Area Stock Forms Forms Agree! ng Only Rank Estates 




Chesterhill 555 258 208 204 37% 2 5 
Cambo/Barrasford 452 122 101 99 22% 5 12 
Hostel Estate 295 125 97 96 32% 4 7 
Lanercost/Kiondyke 186 93 80 78 42% 4 
Sunnyside/ 
Nelson Village 238 49 46 45 19% 6 14 
Shankhouse 442 49 23 23 5S 8 17 
Mayfield/Sea View 242 110 88 84 35% 3 6 
East Hartford 192 37 31 29 15% 7 15 
SEATON DELAVAL/ 
.NEW HARTLEY 1,194 462 354 340 28% 9 
Seghi II 462 127 103 98 21% 13 




North Farm Areas 608 125 90 81 13% 16 
Bolam 92 80 64 63 68% 2 
Sol ingen 112 113 .92 88 78% 
Poets Estate 425 154 116 110 26% 10 
Avenues 1,095 349 262 254 23% 11 
Miscellaneous 158 32 24 21 13% 16 
Newsham 670 124 108 103 15% 15 
~pen~tate 1,542 529 462 451 29% 8 
Cowpen Farm 559 360 294 290 52% 3 
GRAND TOTAL 9,834 3,415 2, 727 2,638 
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What we seem to be seeing is.a twofold process whereby those in 
regular work or those who have retired with savings are taking 
advantage of the right to buy while those in a weak market position 
are excluded. The local authority is then left with an increasing 
proportion of its tenants who are unskilled, on low incomes, are 
irregularly employed or are dependent on welfare benefits. In short 
those marginalised in the labour market. 
In contrast to a position where owner occupation was 
predominantly a middle strata tenure, good quality council housing a 
tenure of the skilled working class and the poorest section of the 
population was catered for by the private landlord there has been a 
shift towards council housing serving only the marginalised 
. ' 
population. The right to buy adding another layer to Cramlington's 
already stratified and differentiated owner occupation sector which is 
becoming more and more the mass tenure. 
From material presented in the previous chapter it was clear 
that the provision of public sector housing for workers on 
Cramlington's industrial estates was a necessary part of the County's 
modernisation strategy. However, the Shankhouse estate came on line 
in the late 70's just as Cramlington' s industries began to shed 
workers. Likewise, in the Blyth Borough area (excluding Cramlington) 
from which 30% of the Shankhouse population was drawn, manufacturing 
employment declined rapidly between 1974 and 1984 as did employment in 
coal mining with the last pit closing in 1986. 
The fate of Shankhouse cannot then be divorced from changes at 
the economic base of which, in a sense, Shankhouse was an integral 
part. Potential labour power was therefore assembled at Shankhouse 
just when Cramlington's factories no longer needed that labour. Over 
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time existing Shankhouse tenants lost their jobs and were trapped 
within a shrinking conncil house sector, while other tenants moved 
down from owner occupation due to job loss . or divorce. But for 
workers with even a modest but regular income or where husband was 
working full-time and wife part-time, Cramlington provided an 
opportunity to enter owner occupation since in 1987 for example second 
hand link houses were selling for £22,000. ( 89) 
The concentration of the marginal population at Shankhouse is 
therefore to be explained by changes at the economic base together 
with the extension of owner occupation downwards, the effects of the 
right to buy and the collapse of new conncil house building. The 
result·being to cr~ate a widening dlvide between public sector tenants 
and owner occupiers. 
I now want to deal with a set of arguments which I touched on at 
the beg~g of this chapter and which link class to political party 
and to notions of solidarity and corrnnunity. The suggestion is that 
the Labour Party vote has declined, communities have been fractured 
and displaced and solida:r{ty is. a thing of the past. What marks 
Britain in the 1980's is the growth of an atomised and consumer 
orientated :working class which is egoistic, privatised and home 
centred. 
A number of criticisms can be made of these claims. First is 
the tieing of class to Party and by extension to a particular set of 
values. Clearly, what individuals think is important for action but 
the decline of the Labour vote is not the equivalent of the 
disappearance of the working class. Historically the formation of the 
working class preceded the fonnding of the Labour Party and if the 
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Party disappeared tomorrow the working class would continue to exist. 
Indeed there is a level at which it is beside the point what the class 
either individually or collectively thinks as expressed through the 
vote or in any other way. This level is captured in the distinction 
between a class "in itself" as a class "for itself".C90) The working 
class "in itself" is an objective collectivity and is the outcome of 
dispossession and lack of control in the workplace as distinct from a 
class "for itself" which is bound up with contents of consciousness. 
If we attempt to think of class only in content of consciousness terms 
we miss the objectivity of class and are left reliant upon self 
reporting for establishing class. 
B~t what of the characterisation of the working class as 
privatised, home centred and pecuniary instrumentalists. How valid is 
this picture in reality and how adequate the means at arriving at such 
a characterisation. For a start it is worth remembering that 
approximately two thirds of the population Who voted in recent general 
elections did not vote Conservative. Second, in 1988 the British 
Social Attitudes Survey repor.ted that;-
and; 
"despite all the exhortations over the last eight years 
only a minority of the public embraced the enterprise 
culture."(gl) 
"to the extent that attitudes have moved they have become 
less sympathetic to the central tenets of the Thatcher 
·revolution."(gz) 
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This does not seem to be the story of a working class convinced of the 
values of Thatcherism and devoid of altruism. 
As to the shift towards privatism and home centredness 
Marshall (93 ) and his colleagues, on the basis of an extensive 
nationwide sample, reported that work although not central was 
important in most people's lives. Indeed very few people could think 
of an activity that was more important to them than work. But while 
work was not central neither was home and there appeared to be; 
"no wholesale retreat into the home as an alternative or 
compensatory source of meaning and fulfilment." (94) · 
In fact given the degree to which residence had become dissociated 
from local sources of employment it was striking to find that; 
"half of those in employment· can number friends among 
their workmates and that over 80% of these friendships are 
subsequently pursued in non-work contexts."(95) 
Moreover, the fracturing of community and the atomisation of 
individuals is only one side of the story and leaves out of account 
attempts to reconstruct community and re-establish friendship networks 
and associations. 
But if the "pessimistic" characterisation of the working class 
is invalid it is so because of the inadequacies of ideal type and 
dualist thinking which helps constitute that characterisation. Here 
the assumption seems to be that a "heroic" and fully class conscious 
working .class existed sometime in the past but no longer exists. 
Reasons are then found to explain this deviation from the past in 
terms which produce yet another ideal type working class only this 
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time it is an egoistic and privatised collectivity. Error is 
therefore piled upon error since, I would argue, the working class as 
a collectivity has never been wholly revolutionary nor wholly 
egoistic. 
Added to the one sidedness arising from ideal type analysis 
there is also the deficiency flowing from dualistic thinking. This 
means that either work or home is considered central with one sphere 
ruling out the other. Given such a choice it would be easy to present 
the home owning population of Cramlington as privatised and home 
centred but it would be largely a product of methodology. For as 
Marshall' s(96) work testifies the posing of work against home is 
really a false choice which is borne out by the fact that individual 
·respondents did not think in these absolutist terms. 
HOUSING CLASS AND CONSUMPITON 
If we think back to Wright's analysis of class it was clearly 
rooted within the relations of production broadly defined. Weberian 
sociology by contrast concerns itself with market capacity and with 
the many sources of stratification and division which are held to 
cross cut occupational class. In this . context Rex and Moore ( 9 7) 
argued that a distinction can be made between "housing classes" and 
"production classes". From the labour market people derived their 
occupational class location and from the housing market their housing 
class location. The two systems operating separately so that it was· 
possible for people having the same occupational location to have 
different housing class locations. For example, a miner who is in a 
Coal Board house is in a different housing class location to a miner 
owner occupier. Rex and Moore going on to distinguish six housing 
classes comprising outright suburban owner occupiers, mortgaged 
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suburban owner occupiers, conncil tenants in good accorrnnodation, 
council tenants in short life accommodation, landlords of inner city 
subdivided houses and tenants who rent privately. 
Now the immediate problem with the Rex and Moore typology is 
that it is really a number of tenure categories. As such the typology 
could be expanded to include people in housing association houses, bed 
and breakfast accommodation and warden assisted accommodation, etc. 
Working in the same mode for Cramlington we could make ever 
finer distinctions between owner occupiers in terms of quality, price, 
location and size of house and call each category a housing class. 
But this is to confuse class in the sense of a grouping with similar 
properties with class at the level of meaning. If, for example, we 
return to Marshall' s(9B) work it is apparent that most people see 
class solely as a fnnction of occupation and not housing. Therefore 
to talk of "housing classes" is to impose a manufactured construct 
upon reality. 
Nor is it sensible to designate home owners as a distinct 
"property class". Not only are home owners internally diverse but as 
Sannders conceded in his self critique "class relations are 
constituted only through the social organisation of production"(99) 
and hence it is confusing and invalid to extend class to housing. 
All this is not to say that distinctions are not made both 
between owner occupiers and tenants and within these two categories. 
However the key concept here is that of status. In the public sector, 
for example, housing officials routinely make judgements about who is 
and is.not_respectable with the respectable getting the most desirable 
houses • (100) At the same time home ownership for some is a way of 
demonstrating "respectability" and of affirming achievement and status 
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position. As one of Cramlington' s owner occupiers of a top of the 
range Bellway house remarked; 
"Keeping . up appearances are important and we wanted 
something we could bring our friends to ... (101) 
EcJ.ually since the same Bellway house in Cramlington was £20,000 
cheaper than one in Gosforth you could give the appearance of being 
worth more than you were. 
For those who had fallen out of owner occupation into the 
council house sector due to job loss it was not only the absence of 
employment that came as a blow. As one respondent said; 
"We thought when we decided tO buy that we were getting on 
in the world. Now I don't know. It's like we have taken 
a step down and are back where we started."(l02) 
While a council tenant reflecting on those who had bought their 
council houses commented that; 
"They start hanging new front doors and have double 
glazing fit ted. · It 's as if they 1 re too good for us 
now."(103) 
On the other hand someone who had just exercised their right to buy 
felt that; 
"It won 1 t make any difference, neighbours will still be 
~eighbours."(l04 ) 
The same person referring to owner occupiers at the north end of 
Cramlington as "snobs". All these comments indicating that status 
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concerns were current in Cramlington. Although whether these concerns 
are ultimately important is another question. 
What is important though is the coupling of status concerns to 
consumption. Within Cramlington, for example, both Leech and Bellway 
builders have show houses. However, it is not just bricks and mortar 
that is being sold, it is an image and a lifestyle which these homes 
signify. Consumption giving the illusion of freedom and choice but it 
is a choice and a freedom within limits. The limits set fundamentally 
by income and resources and by production and what is produced. After 
all for £80,000 there are only two similar styles of new detached 
house available at Cramlington. Also, if we dig a little deeper it is 
apparent. that th~ very act of consumption produces its own need. Once 
. the owner occupier has experienced the pleasures of a separate utility 
room, the en-suite shower room and the two car garage, they are locked 
into a set of needs from which there is no turning back and which are 
constantly stimulated by, amongst other things, endless house and home 
magazines. Within this circuit the propensity is to consume ever 
more. A propensity which in the Thatcher era was given every stimulus 
possible and which was equated with freedom itself. Therefore work 
might be the realm of non-freedom but real freedom was to be had in 
the sphere of consumption. A potent ideology but one which neglected 
to mention that our choices are constructed and our freedom has 
limits. Indeed in terms of freedom to consume the reserve surplus 
population is relatively unfree and consumption in general dependent 
upon exploitation in production. 
While the idea of home owners as a distinct "property class" was 
abandoned tenure was considered an important source of division due to 
the part it played in constituting consumption cleavages. Saunders 
arguing that; 
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"Housing tenure, as one expression of the division between 
privatised and collectivized areas of consumption is 
analytically distinct from the question of class; it is 
neither the basis of class formations - nor the expression 
of them - but rather the single most pertinent factor in 
the determination of consumption cleavages."(l05) 
With consumption cleavages coming to outweigh class alignments as the 
privatisation of welfare proceeds. Hamnett and Randolph agreeing with 
Saunders on the significance of consumption divisions and suggesting 
that; 
"Changes in the structure of both the housing and labour 
~rkets are autonomously constituted processes. It 
follows that there is no direct or necessary 
correspondence between the two markets."(106) 
These statements asserting both the potency of consumption and the 
separation of consumption and production. The importance of home 
ownership for Saunders arising from the fact that capital gains could 
be made at the point of sale generating wealth for the owner occupier 
independent of the wage. But reflecting on Cramlington leads me to 
question a conceptualisation which separates consmnption from 
production. As I have indicated in the previous chapters, public 
sector housing and to a limited extent owner occupied housing was 
necessary for assembling a pool of labour for Cramlington factories. 
Then the constraints of the economic base are felt in a number of 
ways. First in the collapse of manufacturing and mining employment at 
Cramlington and Blyth which produces places like Shankhouse. Second, 
in order to realise any capital gain house sellers require buyers. If 
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an economy experiences generalised depression and job insecurity it 
has an impact on the housing market by shrinking the volume of sales 
and increasing repossessions thus bringing more cheap houses on to an 
already depressed housing market. With a glut of houses and 
relatively few buyers house prices fall from earlier peaks producing 
the phenomenon of negative equity. 
In any case capital gain in the context of class only becomes 
important if the gains are so large and realisable that they free the 
individual from reliance upon a wage as the main source of income. 
For the vast majority of Cramlington home owners capital gains are 
likely to be be relatively small with the wage and hence the necessity 
to work constituting the main means of livelihood~ . In which _case work 
and the wage continues to be of central concern. Meanwhile at the 
level of conceptualisation the splitting of consumption from 
production with consumption an autonomous sphere is unwarranted. In 
practice production location sets limits on consumption while the 
economic base places constraints upon the aggregate level of what is 
consumed. More generally, as Harloe(lO?) points out, Saunders writes 
as if the only basis for consumption was the growth of private incomes 
in the post war years. While this is true as far as it goes it 
neglects the fact that owner occupation, for example, has been 
massively underpined by the alternative welfare state in the form of 
tax relief. Equally Saunders assumes that privatisation is a non 
problematic process and that the great majority of the population will 
meet their needs in a privatised way. As Harloe (lOS) recognises, 
given the increase in the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 
throughout the 90's the continued ability of the State to provide a 
subsidy on home ownership is questionable. Second, income levels 
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place limits on the use of privatised provision. For example I could 
find no one, even in the most expensive of Cramlington's housing, who 
made use of private health care or private schools. This confirms my 
impression, shared by local respondents, that the great majority of 
Cramlington' s home owners still rely upon the wage as their main 
source of income and still look to State health and education 
provision to meet their needs. Indeed it would appear that a fair 
percentage of Cramlington's home owners are also employed within the 
central and local State. 
HOOS~, CLASS AND POLITICS 
I alluded to Dtmleavy's(l09) work at the beginning of this 
chapter. Broadly he tries to indicate the salience of divisions 
arising from consumption by relating consumption to voting patterns 
and to the formation of political constituencies. 
Essentially Dunleavy argues that collective consumption as 
embodied in the Welfare State post 1945 was a key factor constituting 
the political unity of the working class while drawing in elements of 
the middle class in support. With the development of privatised forms 
. . 
of consumption this ·political unity has been broken up. The ability 
of the most privileged layer of the working class to gain access to 
privatised forms of welfare providing a constituency to be mobilised 
by politicians of the right. Dunleavy then finding a correlation 
between tenure and vote and an increasing tendency for those with 
greater access to privatised welfare to vote Conservative. 
Undoubtedly Dunleavy is correct in seeking to put consumption 
questions on the agenda. A major difficulty, however, is deciding how 
much weight, if any, to give consumption as a factor influencing 
either voting or ideology generally. Does consunption location 
-361-
outweigh occupational class as Saunders thinks or are the two 
interrelated. At a more fundamental level correlation does not mean 
cause. Therefore while there is an association between tenure and 
voting behaviour the relationship is a probablistic one rather than of 
the type that says tenure causes you to vote in a particular direction 
or that there is a one to one correspondence between vote and tenure. 
This means that although owner occupiers are more likely to vote 
Conservative and council tenants more likely to vote Labour there are 
Labour home owners and Conservative voting council tenants. 
The other difficulty is that tenure could be a surrogate for 
class or for "lives in the south" so that the supposed tenure effects 
on voting are really occupational class or place effects or the result 
of some unmeasured aspect. Dtmiea:vy. couid therefore be accused of 
reductionism and indeed this is the thrust of Ball' s(llO) criticism 
when he remarks that the determination of voting is complex and that 
there is no universal political ideology arising from owner 
occupation. 
My final remarks in connection with owner occupation and voting 
Conservative are to do with time, contingency and place. In other 
words we are not talking about absolutes rather we are dealing with a 
relationship which is historically specific. The fact that owner 
occupiers tend to vote Conservative is a snapshot of a particular time 
and set of circumstances arid therefore contingent. Just as a number 
of council tenants moving from Labour to Conservative over the issue 
of the right to buy could be a function of momentary interest. 
Moreover, if we add the effect of place then the tendency of home 
owners to vote Conservative varies from region to region. 
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Lastly it should be remembered that Dtmleavy' s work is looking 
at the relationship between tenure and vote rather than tenure and 
values. Duke and Edgell (11l) finding that consumption sector had 
little influence on attitudes to trade unions, strikes, business 
power, nationalization and income distribution. These dimensions 
being much more sharply related to occupational class (using Wright' s·· · 
schema). 
As far as Blyth Valley is concerned the Labour Party majority at 
Parliamentary elections has slumped from over 20,000 in the early 70's 
to less than 1,000 in 1987. However, the major benefactor of this 
drift from Labour has been the Alliance Party, with the Conservatives 
a poor third. Within Cramlington, the wards of Fast Cramlington and 
Cramlington Parks ide (which contains Shankhouse and the owner occupied 
sector of Parkside) were both Labour until 1982. After that the 
Alliance gained Parkside in the Borough elections of 1983 and in the 
County elections of 1984. Going on to increase their majority in the 
Borough elections of 1987. 
Clearly something is happening here but how far tenure in itself 
has anything to do with the shift to the Alliance is debatable 
especially given both Labour and Alliance Party support for owner 
occupation. 
In the final analysis houses do not vote, people do, and if we 
consider Alliance Party support then there is evidence from canvas 
returns that the Alliance vote strengthens as one moves up the housing 
market. Moreover, a high percentage of Alliance activists are 
employed in the public .. sector or are self employed. What this 
suggests is that rather than tenure the Alliance vote is a result of 
relative social mobility and, according to local Alliance Party 
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activists, is pro service but anti high rates and keen on efficiency 
savings. In essence the Alliance Party presents itself as a new 
politics as distinct from the old parties of Labour and the 
Conservatives. As transcending class politics by taking from the best 
of the old parties. It therefore resonates with those who find 
themselves in contradictory class locations. 
CONCUJSION 
This chapter began by indicating that part of the Thatcher 
project was directed at widening the social base of Conservatism while 
simultaneously disorganising labour. It is within this context that 
the privatisation programme has to be set although clearly it also 
opened up new sites for capital and provided windfall funds for the 
Treasury. Some commentators such as Riddle (llZ) playing down the 
novelty of Thatcherism while others maintained that a distinct and new 
accumulation strategy was in the making. My sympathies lying with the 
latter inte~retation. For although the disdain for the poor, the 
holding down of welfare benefits and the 1 on your bike 1 philosophy was 
nothing new it was the combination of these elements together with 
their articulation to other policies which marked a qualitatively 
different strategy. 
Thatcherism therefore strove to create a legal and moral climate 
which legitimated harsh welfare and industrial relations policies. A 
politics of fear was underpinned by a strong State seeking to 
strengthen the hand of capital. Within Cramlington industrial 
managers how felt free to change working practices and pay levels and 
to threaten labour. 
In terms of change at the economic base a number of features 
stand out. First is the decline of manufacturing at Cramlington and 
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Blyth and the elimination of the coal industry as the last pit in 
Blyth Valley was closed. These changes particularly impacting upon 
male employment. Across the country as a whole there was a shift from 
mining to a small manufacturing base and an expanded service sector 
with an increase in women's participation in the workforce and in the 
extent of part-time work. Wage levels for males and females falling 
below the national average and well below the average for the South 
East. 
The County Council identifying the major problem as a lack of 
supply of jobs. However, the strategy adopted to tackle this deficit 
was limited and contradictory. .Amounting to little more than pleading 
with capital to locate in the County and targeting potential "growth 
sectors" such as tourism, pharmaceuticals, food processing and 
clothing. Left out of account was the fact that high capital 
investment projects do not necessarily equal high numbers of jobs. 
Nor was there any real consideration given to whether quality jobs 
could be guaranteed. Instead the emphasis was on providing flexible 
labour for capital and an implicit assumption made that the interests 
of capital and labour were identical. 
I focused on Cramlington in order to highlight the divergence 
between the owner occupied sector of Parkside and the Shankhouse 
estate. The population of Shankhouse consisting of peripheral workers 
and a reserve surplus whereas Parks ide contained central workers. 
These two populations relating to different labour markets so that the 
explanation for the status of Shankhouse rests prirna·tily with the 
contraction of the . manufacturing base at Cramlington and Blyth. 
Unemployment is therefore a supply side problem and explanations which 
attempt to blame the victim are to be rejected as inadequate at the 
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level of cause and suspected as ideological constructs. To quote C.W. 
Mills from a book written thirty-four years ago; 
"When, in a city of 100,000 only one man is rmemployed, 
that is his personal trouble, and for its relief we 
properly look to the character of the man, his skills, and 
his immediate opportunities. But when in a nation of 50 
million employees, 15 million men are unemployed, that is 
an issue, and we may not hope to find its solution within 
the range of opportunities open to any one individual. 
The very structure of opportunities has collapsed.(l13) 
While the underclass thesis threatens· to construct a Chinese 
Wall between the employed and the unemployed the notion of 
dispossession can be deployed to re-establish a connection between 
those in and out of work. The unemployed representing the most 
deprived section of the working class which itself is defined in line 
with Wright's formulation as that class which has oniy its labour 
power to sell and lacks control over the labour process and over the 
labour of others. This relational definition yielding an expanded 
working class as opposed to static conceptions which locate the 
working class in production alone. 
The other set of arguments which while admitting to a working 
class see that class as privatised, home centred, egoistic and 
instrumentalist. However, I would argue that this conceptualisation 
is overdrawn to the point of caricature. The basis for such a 
copception -resting on · ideal type analysis and dualistic thinking. 
Marshall et al finding that work was still important for most people 
although not central while there was no retreat into the home as an 
alternative source of meaning. 
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If we return to Margaret Thatcher's celebrated words about 
creating a property owning democracy and remember that one of the aims 
of privatisation was to extend the social base ·of Conservatism, we can 
easily be led to thinking that home ownership makes you vote 
Conservative. That the right to buy, the extension of mortgage credit 
and the house price boom of the 80's was part and parcel of creating 
an extended labour aristocracy inclined to the Conservatives. Now 
while there is some validity to this argument it can be pushed too 
far. For in regional and place specific terms the gains to be made 
from housing varied enormously with house price inflation in the South 
East after 1983 far outstripping that in the North. 
Equally, it is invalid to view consumption as an autonomous 
sphere. For most people, work and therefore income, place limits on 
consumption and on the extent to which they can gain access to 
privatised forms of meeting needs. In Cramlington Parks ide, while 
housing needs were met through owner occupation, educational and 
health needs still relied massively on State provision with leisure 
needs serviced through mixed forms ranging from "home entertainment" 
to the Concordia Leisure Centre, a local authority facility. 
But once we admit that production location puts limits on 
consumption we also have to acknowledge that there is a strong 
occupational class gradient to tenure (see previous chapter). 
Therefore although owner occupation has increased amongst all socio-
economic groups we may accept, follmving Hanmett, that; 
"class is a reasonably good guide to consumption location 
at an aggregate level. .. (114) 







intensify the underlying 
which shape access to 
So that, for example, wealthy home owners in expensive homes are 
likely to experience a greater degree of house price inflation than 
the more modest or marginal owner occupiers thus widening the gap 
between them and between the peripheral workers and reserve surplus 
population in Shankhouse. 
In addition, while change at the economic base goes a long way 
in explaining the position of Shankhouse, it is worth remembering that 
Cramlington 1 s owner occupiers are also workers even if relatively 
central ones in often contradictory class locations and living up to 
their credit limits. They are, therefore, not imrrnme from economic 
change and the restructuring of the Welfare State. 
Rather then voting Conservative Parkside 1 s residents have 
overwhelmingly SWtiDg to the Alliance Party but the explanation for 
this lies not with tenure as such but with the occupants 1 limited 
social mobility, their contradictory class locations and, I suspect, 
in their perceptions of the Labour Party. 
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TIIE DISPOSSESSED AND TIIE <»>FFRTABLE 
Introduction 
This chapter is based on a limited number of interviews carried 
out in Cramlington at Shankhouse and Parkside in Jrme 1988. Its 
purpose is to flesh out the people behind the labels and to expand on 
some issues touched on in the previous chapter. The interviews have 
been assembled rmder the headings "the dispossessed" and "the 
comfortable" in order to indicate a major line of cleavage, namely 
that the dispossessed are unemployed while the comfortable are able to 
sell their labour or live in a household in which there is an employed 
adult. 
'lhe Dispossessed 
John was 24 years old and single when I met him. He had spent 
four years in the army just after leaving school but when I spoke to 
him he had been unemployed for two years. He had attended numerous 
job interviews without success and complained that the Job Centre kept 
making him apply for security guard jobs because of his army 
background. An option he disliked since the hours were long, the 
money hopeless, there were no paid holidays and it was something he 
did not want to do anyway. Still he had to go through the motions in 
order to demonstrate that he was actively seeking work. 
After two years, John's interview clothes were becoming shabby. 
His hair was clean and long and sometimes worn in a pony tail. He 
would cut it if an employer wanted him to but not for interviews. As 
he said; 
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"They will have to take me as I am although once you're in 
its different." 
Almost none of John's friends had a job. They spent time in each 
other's company drinking tea, watching T.V. or sometimes going sea 
fishing. Jo.t:m explained that; 
"We all support each other and try to keep our spirits up. 
If any of us gets money from a "fiddle job" we treat the 
others to a few pints." 
One of John's mates, Kevin, aged 44, had just cashed his dole 
cheque of £44.2Sp. He had been made redundant from the Parks 
Department of the local authority. He told me; 
"I gan doon the Job Centre and they say you're just too 
old, I mean too old at 44, what have I got to look forward 
to." 
Kevin paused for a moment and continued to reflect upon his 
predicament; 
"When you're working, you sleep better, eat better and 
feel better all round. Now I'm on the dole I wonder what 
I'm going to do from one day to- the next. I just visit 
friends, drink coffee and listen to records seven days a 
week." 
Although my mention of Prime Minister Thatcher brought an edge 
to the conversation. Kevin remarking; 
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"That bloody woman, it's a pity the I.R.A. hadn't 
succeeded. We'd be better off without her and the rest of 
them. What have they ever done for the likes of us?" 
I asked Anne, aged 22, an unemployed single mother with two 
young childr~n, how much she had to live on. Her Supplementary 
Benefit plus family allowance made a total of £57 per week. This was 
how she and her two children existed on £57; 
(a) Rent and rates 
(b) Food and kitchen materials 
(c) Catalogue 
(d) T.V. Rental 






(k) Treats for the children 
Total 











£4. SOp. · 
£57.90p. 
Anne's council house was clean, tidy and furnished with a 
mixture of cheap new furniture and serviceable secondhand items. The 
house was carpeted throughout except for a stair carpet which Anne 
said she could never afford. 
What Anne dreamt of was . being able to buy a joint of meat 
occasionally instead of the usual fish fingers and hamburgers. 
Sometimes things got difficult and when she was short of money she 
would miss a meal or just eat sandwiches so that her children did not 
go without. 
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Anne could not remember when she last bought anything for 
herself or had a night out although she conceded that cigarettes were 
a luxury she could not give up. She did not possess boots or winter 
shoes and was not looking forward to the day when her son would be 
demanding the most expensive trainers available. 
For Arine, holidays were something you saw on T.V. travel 
programmes. Even trips to Newcastle at £3 return by bus were 
prohibitively expensive. Yet despite the grind of existing on a 
meagre income Anne had given her father £2 a week to help him out 
during the miners' strike. She had. always supported Labour but what 
the strike had done was make her think more about politics. Her 
conclusions amounting to scepticism concerning the Labour leadership 
and a suspicion that Labour politicians would say anything to get back 
into government. She could see it was an unequal and unfair society 
and she wanted a decent income on the dole but doubted the Labour 
leaderships's commitment to fundamental change. 
'lbe canfortable (1) 
Michael was married to Diane. She had left school at sixteen and gone 
straight into the North Fast em Electricity Board as an accounts 
clerk. Michael attended Newcastle University, got his degree (a 2:2 
in English) and spent a year unemployed before joining the Civil 
Service. He now worked in the vehicle licensing department and 
described his job .in this way; 
"It's just staff management. The scope for decision 
making is very small. I am responsible for making sure 
that the twenty people under me do their job." 
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Diane and Michael were in their late twenties and early thirties 
respectively. Diane's father trained as a coach builder but now 
worked for Bristol MYers as a machine maintenance engineer. Michael's 
father was an electrical engineer at N.E.I. Diane's mother worked as 
a receptionist for the North Tynes ide Housing Department. 
Diane had bought a house in Chapel Park, Newcastle, in 1979 for 
£19,500 and sold it in 1988 for £29,500, although over the years she 
had spent four thousand ponnds on it. Michael had lived with his 
parents and then moved to private acconnnodation before living with 
Diane at Chapel Park. Their combined income in 1988 came to about 
£30, 000 per year and as Michael said; 
"The salaries we get keep us comfortable up here but we 
couldn't afford to live like this in IA>ndon or the South." 
In Jnne 1987, they reserved a four bedroom detached Bellway home 
costing £58,000 at Cramlington Parkside. Michael explaining that the 
same house was more expensive elsewhere and that it had increased in 
value by £4,000 from when they reserved it to when they moved in in 
May 1988. 
Diane showed me ronnd and estimated that they had spent £5,000 
on the house, excluding furniture, since they moved in. The kitchen 
was fully fitted with a recently installed extractor fan over the 
cooker. Built in wardrobes took up one wall of the master bedroom. A 
new marble fireplace with a coal effect gas fire featured in the 
living room. A Sony T.V. and video had just been bought within the 
last month. Next they plarmed to landscape the back garden and 
purchase garden fumi ture. 
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I noticed a squash racket in the hallway and Michael confirmed 
that both he and Diane were keen squash· payers and that he had also 
joined the local golf club. They played squash once a week and Diane 
also participated in a keep fit class at the local leisure centre. 
Apart from that they dined out in Newcastle at least once a month. 
Otherwise th~y avoided the city centre and preferred to shop at the 
Metro Centre. 
But even though Michael and Diane recognised their comfortable 
set up, this did not mean they had no concerns. Turning again to the 
subject of work Michael made it clear that; 
and 
"In the civil service it's all cost targets. Public 
service has gone out the window. It's reduce your costs 
but you still have to do the same or more work." 
"all I do is implement policy I don't make policy. If the 
legislation is tmpopular it's the local government 
officers and the civil servants like me who the public 
take it out on." 
Moreover, although they were momentarily comfortable Michael 
worried that the squeeze on costs meant that his annual wage increase 
was not keeping up with average wage increases so that he was falling 
further and further behind. He resented the Government's enthusiasm 
for "geographical pay" so that someone in wndon doing the same job as 
himself earned more. Indeed with the holding down of pay increases he 
knew people at work who had overcommitted themselves and consequently 
they; 
"couldn't make ends meet and had to take a night time job 
in a pub." 
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In Diane's case she resented the fact that you had to have a 
degree even to be considered for promotion within the Electricity 
Board. She had a lot of experience but no degree. Experience seemed 
to count for little, an attitude she considered to be "blinkered". 
Both Diane and Michael voted Labour. Their parents voted Labour 
and they felt obliged to continue the tradition. However, it was more 
than a simple non-reflective habit. According to Michael; 
"The Labour Party is about equality so that people who 
haven't a lot get a chance and aren't so disadvantaged. 
Whereas the Conservatives enhance the position of the 
better off so that the rich get rich and the poor get 
poorer." 
As far as Michael was concerned times were changing but not 
necessarily for the better; 
"We seem to be becoming a more and more materialistic 
society and forgetting about fairness. The National 
Health Service and comprehensive education was for all. 
Now it seems that if you can pay you can circumvent the 
whole system. It just doesn't seem fair." 
-'Both of them had watched the inner city riots on television and knew 
that crime was increasing and detection was falling. They had seen 
how the miners' strike was policed and felt a profound unease; 
"Crime seems to be increasing under the Tories and we seem 
to be reaching a stage where we've got a national police 
force which isn't impartial anymore and which the 
Government is using to do their dirty work for them. It's 
getting more like the United States than Britain." 
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They had friends in Hampshire and Potters Bar who they visited 
in 1987, staying in a three bedroom link house in Potters Bar valued 
at £100,000. They had seen the Docklands development and concluded 
that; 
"It's a different way of life in the South. It's another 
world." 
Moreover it was a world which seemed to have been built on the labour 
of the North and which appeared to them to be getting richer as the 
North got poorer; 
"Where I lived in Throckley, you could look out towards 
Blyth and see sixteen pit heaps. Now there's none. At 
one time the coalfields of the North fed the South, if it 
was a bad winter the South froze because they couldn't get 
our coal. Yet they don't appear to be prepared to give us 
anything back. They take time and time again and compared 
to the investment in the South we get a trickle of funds. 
The Charmel Tunnel for instance is going to benefit the 
South even more. Whenever there's any difficulty the 
first place to shut down is somewhere up here that's been 
established in a development area and cost the company 
nothing. Up here we've seen a polarization of the 
conntry. You've got those who have it in the South and 
those who haven't in the North." 
The policies of the Conservatives seemed to them to be widening 
existing divisions and creating new divisions although Diane freely 
admitted that; 
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"Personally I've benefited from Thatcher and 
Conservatives." 
However, she quickly added; 
"But I don't think my family have or lots of other 
people~" 
Michael concluding that he thought the main difference between him and 
a Conservative voter was; 
"They vote for what's in it for themselves whereas I 
consider the connnunity as a whole and not just myself." 
The Canfortable (2) 
David was in his early forties and married with two school age 
children. His father and uncle had worked for N.E.I. and it was 
through his father's guidance that he left school at sixteen and 
joined N.E.I. as an apprentice engineer. At the time engineering 
seemed to offer a secure future and looking back he described his 
training in this way; 
·"The apprenticeship was second to none. N.E.I. had its 
own training workshop where you did electrical and welding 
work. They sen~ you on day release to college. It suited 
me and it helped N.E.I. in the long run because they were 
training you for what they wanted." 
After finishing his apprenticeship, David was employed on the erection 
and repair of generating equipment. In 1977 he left N.E.I. and went 
to work for an American machine tool company (Dole Engineering) as a 
sales engineer. A job which involved working from home as one of the 
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company's North East representatives. His biggest volume customers 
being Caterpiller at Birtley, British Rail Engineering at Shildon and 
N.E.I. itself. But with the contraction of the engineering sector in 
the North East in the 80's, he was made redundant. As David put it; 
"After. the 1980's I could see no future in engineering so 
I asked myself what could I do that would allow me to be 
my own boss. " 
His solution was train as a driving instructor and set up his own 
driving school business with his wife doing the paperwork, answering 
the telephone and organising his appointments. Since he operated from 
home he had few overheads while he saw the value of self-employment 
resting on the fact that; 
"All the decisions you take yourself. You rise and fall 
by your own initiative and don't have to answer to anyone 
but yourself. You are your own man and have no one 
looking over your shoulder." 
At the same time his situation was somewhat precarious since any 
illness in the family disrupted business and moreover he was dependent 
upon a steady flow of customers for a regular income. For David the 
harder you worked the more money you made but the other side of the 
coin was that if you did this you never saw your family~ David 
therefore tried not to give himself over to work. The result being 
that he was earning no more now than when he had been a sales 
engineer. 
David and his wife had moved to Cramlington in 1973 from private 
rented accommodation just off Chillingham Road in Newcastle. They had 
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lived at their current address, a three bedroom semi, since that date 
and as David said; 
"Our life is here ••• we've made a lot of friends. I'm in 
the local cricket club and so are five others in this 
road •. I'm also a school governor. We have friends round 
for meals and often we go out for meals. Our wives get 
together and play badminton on Thursdays and go out for a 
drink on Tuesday nights • • • In fact we mix more here than 
we did in Heaton which I suppose is because there were a 
lot more elderly people in Heaton whereas here everyone's 
our age or yormger. " 
David knew some friends who had got on the housing ladder and he 
wished them well but as far as he was concerned he was happy where he 
was since; 
"I've put down roots here, I've got friends, we've got a 
reasonable standard and what more out of life do you 
want." 
Our conversation turned to family backgrormd and political outlook. 
David's father had been chairman of the Gateshead Branch of the A.E.U. 
and secretary of the Jarrow Labour Party. David had been a trade 
union member most of his working life and voted for the Labour Party 
until 1985 when he changed to the Alliance Party. As he explained it 
a number of factors had precipitated his shift of political 
allegiance; 
"The Labour Party Conference of 1985 was the last straw. 
I was horrified to see people being shouted down from the 
floor." 
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But even before that David had had doubts about Labour Party 
democracy, the legitimacy of the trade union block vote and about the 
wisdom of pushing for wage claims which he felt companies could not 
afford; 
"The block vote means that it's a few who are taking 
decisions since only a small minority attend . branch 
meetings to elect delegates who then vote on behalf of 
everyone. It's ftmdamentally undemocratic. That's why I 
agree with the Tories on secret ballots for the election 
of union officials and to decide over strike action. A 
lot of clout inside the Labour Party is held by a few 
people and it's not right." 
Having switched to the Alliance Party it was not so much that he had 
changed as the Labour Party that had changed; 
"I've always thought like this, it's the Labour Party 
that's moved to the left. If Labour moves back to the 
centre, which it's starting to do, I'd think about voting 
Labour again. " 
Moreover, although David had changed his vote, his family had stayed 
with Labour while other friends in Cramlington Parkside had, like him, 
moved from Labour to Alliance. In practice he could see little 
difference between himself and his Labour friends rather it was inter 
Party antagonism which he viewed as sterile; 
"What I believe is getting away from a situation where 
whatever the Tories did Labour said was bad and whatever 
Labour did the Tories deplored. That attitude is rubbish, 
-386-
total tripe. The country's got to be run and you've got 
to have consensus. There's good in Labour and Tory 
policies so why can' t we take the best of both. " 
What worried David though was the impact of Conservative policies and 
the underfunding of the National Health Service and the education 
system; 
"It appears that the well off are getting even better off 
and the less well off are always going to be less well 
off. The tax cut's for the rich are innnoral when people 
need hip replacements, when thousands are in bed and 
breakfast acconnnodation and when people are sleeping in 
cardboard boxes in London. That money could have been 
spent where it was most needed." 
Yet experience told David that it was a tough world out there. He had 
been made redundant once and had watched the engineering sector 
collapse around him. He now hoped that his children would be; 
"Sufficiently well educated to make their way in the 
world." 
He had considered private education so that they would get what he 
believed would be a head start and also because; 
"If there are two children and all other things are equal 
the employer will choose the one educated privately." 
However, the cost of going private was out of the question, so it was 
a matter of fighting to ensure a highly resourced state education 
system not just for his children but for others as well. 
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David still thought of himself as working class since he had to 
work for a living and did not have an independent source of income. 
He felt that the; 
"vast majority of people around here consider themselves 
workin~ class." 
Although he acknowledged; 
"a class of unemployed people and people on Government 
schemes who have to grovel around to make ends meet." 
Ideally David wanted to see a society in which; 
"The harder you worked the more you get but with no one 
neglected and the unemployed receiving a decent income." 
While at an international level David hoped for; 
"a non-nuclear world and a shift towards alternative power 
sources in order to give a boost to the engineering 
industry. " 
In this context, he thought it was beyond belief that; 
"a nuclear power station was planned at Druridge Bay when 
millions of tons of recoverable coal reserves lay beneath 
the ground. " 
Observations fran Interviews 
The two populations of Shankhouse and Parkside can be divided 
along a number of dimensions. I categorised one as the dispossessed 
and the other as the comfortable although you could equally well use 
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1/' 
designations such as the excluded and the included in terms of access 
to consumption. 
As consumers we are constantly exhorted to buy and reminded that 
there's plenty to do, places to go and experiences to enjoy. But it 
is not just egoistic consumption for in so far as consumption is the 
final stage of a productive circuit we can take comfort in doing our 
bit to boost a faltering economy or so it would seem at first glance. 
We are free to buy in the marketplace except that not everyone 
has the same opportmri. ty to consume. In which case how real is our so 
called freedom. People such as Anne, John and Kevin are doubly 
disadvantaged. Denied regular work and disposable income they are 
relatively excluded from consumption, from the "leisure lifestyle" of 
the Sunday colour supplements and from a whole range of possibilities 
open to those with money in their pockets. 
The world of Anne, John and Kevin is severely circumscribed. 
Not for them the regular meals out, the weekly buying trips to the 
Metro Centre, the annual or twice annual holiday in the .stm or the 
regular night out at the pub. They are relatively unable to 
participate in the spree of consumption whether it be in or outside 
the home. 
I noted, for example, that Michael and Diane played squash. But 
buying the kit, racket, shoes, balls and paying fees costs money and 
is premised on adequate disposable income. You are talking about £150 
before you even step on to the squash court. These leisure 
possibilities are not options which are open to everyone. 
But while Anne and John and millions like them are excluded they 
can see the spectacle of consumption going on around them. Be it in 
the material form of £80,000 Bellway houses or in the Mecca of the 
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Metro Centre or through advertising. Consumption as a presence 
constantly reminds you of the things you have not got and the world 
you cannot participate in and for many it just does not seem fair. 
At another level consumption is a sign of participation and of 
being part of society with Thatcherite ideology attempting to go one 
. . 
step further by associating consumption with virtue. From this 
perspective the greater your conspicuous consumption the greater your 
virtue. At this point, however, a massive contradiction appears since 
the wider the gap between the dispossessed and the comfortable then 
the more the dispossessed become aware of their marginal status and 
the harder it is to maintain the myth of "one nation". 
If we think of the comfortable it soon becomes clear that 
· consumption does not exist in a vacuum. When they go to the Metro 
Centre, Michael and Diane might consume a "Big Mac" served by an 
underpaid hireling of a multi-national fast food chain. A low paid 
waitress will present them with a bill at the end of an evening in a 
restaurant. Invisible labourers will clean up the refuse of 
consumption. Consumption then is dependent upon a pool of service 
labour constituted as peripheral labour in places like Shankhouse. 
Secondly, Michael and Diane are illustrative of a couple who 
have made modest gains from owner occupation. They have been able to 
equip and furnish their new home but it is on the basis of credit as 
well as the outright purchase of goods. Moreover, the sourcing of 
what was bought was instructive. Japanese T.V. and audio technology, 
a German made fitted kitchen, a Scandinavian fridge/freezer assembled 
in Italy, a South Korean micro-wave oven, all reflecting the fact that 
on a wider canvas the boom of the late 80's was a credit led import 
based one. 
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Turning once again to the politics of Shankhouse and Parkside. 
What struck me was the lack of popularity of and attachment to the 
Conservative Party in both localities even if some of their policies 
were agreed with. Amongst the unemployed and the peripheral 
workforce, Labour was the party that was most often looked to but it 
was with a weary disenchantment and a fatalism that nothing much would 
change. 
Amongst the comfortable some stayed with Labour while most had 
shifted to the Alliance. But whatever the Party label, there was much 
talk of a North/South divide, of people becoming worse off, of the 
collapse of manufacturing industry and the fact that the recovery was 
not that apparent in the North. From my conversations I felt that the 
Conservatives were seen as a Party of the South and that they would 
favour the South over the North. 
Uniting Labour and Alliance voters that I talked to in Parkside 
was a pro-public service attitude. Privatisation was sometimes 
objected to in principle but more often the worry was that 
privatisation would benefit the few at the expense of the many reliant 
upon State services for meeting needs. David finding no objection to 
private schooling in principle and even .considering it for his own 
children but also wanting a highly resourced State education system to 
be provided. 
Lastly, it is worth remembering that Alliance Party support had 
only recently been formed and comprises in part a block of ex Labour 
voters. While this block objected to the leftward drift of the Labour 
Party they also objected to the "extremism" of the Thatcher 
Government. 
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So much for politics what about class? If we take someone like 
Michael then although he is in charge of twenty people he had 
relatively little influence over resources or over the aims and 
direction of the organisation which employs him. Working as a State 
employee his is not employed by capital but he clearly feels subject 
to pressures dictating that he increase his workload and achieve more 
with less resources. He regrets what he sees as the assault on the 
ethic of public service and accuses his employer, the Conservative 
Government, as not looking after its employees by holding down wage 
increases. Therefore he supports his union's efforts to defend wages 
and service conditions. As a manager he might have been expected to 
support the Conservatives, however his location as a State employee 
with circumscribed authority and power at a time when "value for 
money" was replacing the· public service ethic had prompted him to vote 
Labour. 
As an accounts clerk working for the Northern Electricity Board, 
Michael's wife Diane had no directive powers over the labour of others 
nor much discretion in her own work. In fact as I talked to her it 
became obvious that she felt undervalued and capable of better things 
but stuck in her position since "you had to have a degree to get on". 
What was significant was that although she thought that she had 
benefited from Conservative policy she felt that her family and many 
others had not. Clearly her vote was determined by more than 
immediate self interest. 
David represents a former skilled worker who is now self-
employed. In Wright's terms he is part of the petty bourgeoisie or in 
everyday language he is his own boss. The pace and scheduling of work 
and the "means of production" are all under his direct control. But 
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unlike the small employer he does not hire or. direct labour. However, 
his business is very much dependent upon the unpaid labour of his 
wife. Significantly David still thinks of himself as working class 
since he has to work for a living and has no other independent source 
of income. His family backgrmmd shows a strong attachment to the 
Labour Party·although he has switched his allegiance to the Alliance 
Party. However, we should not conclude that this shift of allegiance 
was the result of a value change for as David reported it was not him 
that had changed, it was the Labour Party. In essence David could see 
no alternative to the market as the main organising principle of 
society. A view shared by a majority of his Labour friends. Indeed 
as we have seen he considered private provision to meet his children's 
needs. Yet the limiting factor here was basal. Namely that as a 
driving instructor working a forty hour week he could not afford 
private education for his children and was thrown back on relying upon 
State provision. Likewise experience had taught him that the market 
was a hard task master and that you needed State intervention to 
maintain and develop particular economic sectors and mitigate the 
dysfunctions of the free market. 
Finally, a consideration of these interviews allows reflection 
on the validity of notions such as privatism, self interest and the 
break up of community. On the one hand David is "his own boss", he is 
no longer part of a collectivity of workers nor is he any longer a 
trade union member. On the other hand he has lived in the same house 
for 15 years and has an extensive network of friends in the locality. 
He is a school governor and active in the local cricket club. His 
wife regularly socialises outside the house. 
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In Michael and Diane's case their home is important to them. 
However, this cannot be read as home centredness since it has not 
stopped Michael joining the local golf club or maintaining his work 
friendships outside work. 
What all this suggests is that we should modify the 
characterisation of Cramlington as a transit camp. Certainly some may 
buy into owner occupation, stay a short time and move on. Others have 
become more firmly rooted and established local friendship networks 
sustained through involvement in leisure, educational and other 
associations. Rather than a once and for all dissolution of community 
it is more the case of an ongoing process of disruption and re-
establishment of friendship networks and interests. 
As the interviews proceeded it was impossible to fit the 
respondents' connnents with a one dimensional model of self seeking 
materialistic individuals. All the respondents had limited 
aspirations for themselves and measured themselves from where they had 
come from. In these terms they felt comfortable with their lot. All 
objected to what they saw as the harmful effects of Conservative 
policy on others. It simply was not a case of "I'm all right, Jack, 
bugger the rest". 
However, the implications for the Labour Party, if the 
respondents' sentiments are generalisable, are severe. Michael, for 
example, although voting Labour, saw the Party as primarily for the 
disadvantaged. Anne and John, both unemployed, were fatalistic and 
sceptical that Labour would change anything. David no longer 
identified with Labour in part because of the influence of the trade 
unions inside the Party. Now this is not an argument for Labour 
moving to the right and dissolving its links with the trade unions. 
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It is, however, to suggest that Labour is failing to articulate the 
needs of Michael, David, Anne and Diane into a radical programme and 
organisational form that has meaning for them. 
Conclusion 
The content of the interviews is interesting not only for what 
was said but also for what was not said. Nobody, for example, offered 
a consistent and comprehensive analysis of capitalism and a model of a 
ready alternative. But such an analysis and alternative was not to be 
expected. For the point is that the workings of capitalist society 
are not obvious nor are the alternatives. Indeed the ideological 
complexes represented by the three main political parties accept to 
one degree or another the framework of capitalist society and deny the 
possibility of fundamental change. It is not surprising then that 
individuals express partial and contradictory views. 
What is apparent is a deep vein of social reformism and a 
suspicion that Thatcherite policies had negative consequences. Hardly 
a revealing finding given the strength and longevity of Labourism and 
Liberalism in the North East. 
Those in owner occupation have accepted that their housing needs 
are met in a privatised way. However, many of these same people are 
limited by their income, which in turn is a ftmction of. their 
occupation, from gaining access to privatised forms of education and 
health services. 
The formation of the National Health Service, State Education 
post 1945 and the Nationalised Industries represented forms of meeting 
need based on principles distinct from market provision. In the case 
of health and education it was on the basis of need rather than the 
ability to pay. The very material existence of these forms signalling 
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that an alternative to the market was possible and workable. 
Moreover, despite complaints about waiting lists and l.IDSYIDpathetic 
service no one questioned the moral superiority of a needs based 
welfare system. 
Yet the spread of privatised provision on an extensive scale 
represents the domination of a particular form and the triumph of 
market principles. The very extent and materiality of. private 
provision if it persists over time making it difficult to think of 




The subject of this thesis has been social and economic change 
in the South East Northumberland Coalfield from the early 18th century 
to the near present. Inevitably this has involved the use of 
historical sources but has also drawn upon survey and interview 
material. 
At the end of the day the aim of the researcher is to produce an 
accmmt and in order to do this source material is filtered through 
the concerns and categories of the researcher. My principle interest 
being change in the economy and social structure. 
If we go back to the beginning of the 18th century it is 
possible to identify the decline in influence of the landed gentry and 
the rise of a new ruling class. The Ridley family with its interests 
in trade and coal mining epi tomising this new class. Moreover it was 
class which in its conspicuous consumption and lifestyle consciously 
sought to imitate the landed aristocracy. 
Without labour no production can take place therefore throughout 
the 18th and 19th centuries labour is assembled in particular 
localities in order to work coal reserves. The major problems facing 
capital in this early period being the regulation of the coal trade in 
order to maintain profits and the subordination of labour. Various 
modes of controlling labour are therefore practiced ranging from the 
use of the bond system to truck, eviction and the importation of 
blackleg labour. The coal owners, in the last instance, relying on 
the forces of the State to maintain discipline. 
But despite harsh and pervasive systems of control mining labour 
periodically resisted both oversight and attempts to hold down and cut 
-397-
wages. The inherent tendency of capital however is to reduce labour 
to a base commodity with minimal rights in the workplace compared to 
the mutual obligations existing under feudalism. Significantly though 
this early phase of capitalist development witnesses the bringing 
together of individuals as workers. As Marx connnents; 
"Economic conditions had in the first place transformed 
the mass of people into workers. The domination of 
capital created the common situation and common interests 
of this class. Thus this mass is already a class in 
relation to capital, but not yet a class for itself."(l) 
We then see a twofold process at work whereby labour, acting as 
a class for itself, forms organisations of defence and self help and 
begins to articulate political demands reflected in the Chartist 
movement. Faced with pressure from below, capital and the State react 
with repression before yielding what can be conceded in order that 
essentials remain the same. Indeed it is this capacity of capital for 
flexibility and concession which gives leaders such as Burt and the 
Liberal Party their legitimacy. 
While I would want to acknowledge socialist and revolutionary 
currents within the working class Anderson and Nairn accurately convey 
the trajectory of the class when they speak of it evolving separately 
but subordinately. Thompson also recognising the long process of 
containment and absorption of the class into the institutional order 
of capitalism. 
By the end of the 19th century coal combines dominated 
production throughout the Northern coalfield and were integrated into 
iron, steel and coal by-products manufacture. A complex pattern of 
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inter-locking directorships reflecting the multi-layered interests of 
the directors. 
With the major European empires hovering on the brink of the 
First World War the rush to re-arm produced a buoyant economy in the 
North East. However, this apparent upturn masked the fact of under-
investment in the industries of the region as capital sought higher 
returns in the new consumer goods industries of the South East, in the 
colonies and in the U.S.A. 
With the ending of the war the national economy experienced a 
short boom followed by slump and a deep over-production crisis 
starting in 1921. By June 1925 unemployment in the Northumberland 
Colliery area had reached 33.7% and was to remain high until another 
bout of re-armament boosted the regional economy. 
The response of the Government and capital to the inter-war 
crisis was illustrated by the evidence and recommendations from the 
Sankey Commission of 1919 and the Samual Commission of 1925. Sankey 
proposed what in effect was a collaborative arrangement Whereby 
nationalisation is sweetened with statutory conciliation and no strike 
agreements. These recommendations proving unacceptable to capital and 
to the government of the day with the government instead deciding to 
buy the miners off with a wage increase and shorter working hours. 
By 1926 the solution proposed by capital to the crisis was to 
call for wage cuts and the intensification of labour by the 
lengthening of the working day. Coal nationalisation was again 
rejected and punitive and restrictive welfare policies enacted. 
Rather than bringing jobs to the "distressed areas" the solution was 
to encourage surplus labour to transfer to other regions or emigrate 
to the colonies. 
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The defeat of the general strike strengthened reformist elements 
within the working class and the T.U.C. thus providing an opening for 
dialogue between capital and labour. At a regional level significant 
fractions within capital sought to escape from the dead end of nee-
liberal policies by elaborating a modernisation strategy which called 
for the strengthening of traditional industries, the attraction of new 
manufacturing plants and a halt to labour transference. The 
establishment of regional organisations such as the North East 
Development Board, the Northern Industrial Group and the North East 
Development Association reflecting this shift to interventionism 
together with a willingness to incorporate leading trade unionists 
under the umbrella of modernisation. 
By the onset of the Second World War family members of the coal 
dynasties such as the Ridleys were taking up wider interests in areas 
such as banking, insurance and finance. An aspect of the fact that 
the regional bourgeoisie were positioning themselves to take advantage 
of the modernisation policies they had played a central part in 
fonnulating. 
Towards the end of the war years the Reid Conuni t tee reported 
that the coal industry lacked investment, had a poorly trained 
workforce and lower output per man shift than competitor countries. 
The Coomrlttee going on to criticise the coal owners for "short 
termism" and, in an implicit recognition of the failure of previous 
voluntary attempts at rationalisation, recommended compulsory 
amalgamation of the coal companies. However, with principle of 
compulsion conceded and popular pressure from the working class firmly 
behind State intervention, nationalisation of the industry was finally 
won in 1947. 
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But I have argued that nationalisation, although it provided the 
basis for safer working and national wage bargaining, cannot be read 
as a straightforward victory for the forces of labour. The form of 
nationalisation tieing the coal industry to the State, limiting its 
autonomy and imposing financial constraints while necessitating that 
the Board operate within a commercial framework. Despite 
nationalisation the miners remained wage labour while insofar as 
nationalisation was a pre-condition for efficiency and modernisation 
it was also a cause of labour shedding. For the coal owners on the 
other hand, the pain of expropriation was sweetened with generous 
compensation payments with over £164 million paid out to private 
shareholders and family trusts, who were then free to invest in other 
areas. 
The period after World War II was a time of reconstruction and 
energy shortage with the Coal Board aiming to keep labour in the pits 
until such time as the modernisation of the collieries was completed. 
The emphasis was therefore on maximising coal production with the 1950 
Plan for Coal and the 1956 Review setting an output target of 240Mt 
for 1961-5. The centrality of coal is then reflected in the North 
East Development Area Plan and the 1952 Northumberland County Plan 
both of which recommended that employers of male labour be located 
away from the coalfields. The County Plan underlining its opposition 
to competing male employment by objecting to Holywell as a new town 
site while supporting Killingworth., 
By 1956 coal began to be substituted by cheap oil and the 
beginnings of nuclear power forcing the Coal Board to revise its 
output targets downwards. Coal production was to be concentrated in 
modernised pits with economic criteria replacing physical reserves as 
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the sign of a viable pit. The Board announcing its intention to reduce 
mining employment in the Seaton Valley area over the years to 1971. 
This retreat from the past policy of retainiTig male labour creating an 
employment crisis and providing the basis for establishing Cramlington 
New Town. 
At this point the question arises of why the New Town should 
have been located at Cramlington rather than elsewhere in Seaton 
Valley? Here the matter of land ownership, land banking by the house 
building firms and networks of interest became central. My claim 
being that Lord Ridley because of his land interests, his director-
ships and his position of Northumberland County Council was a key 
gatekeeping figure able to influence the location of the town to his 
advantage. 
In a regional development context Cramlington was presented as a 
growth point within a wider growth zone. The effects of this policy 
producing uneven development rather than economic growth radiating out 
across the sub region. 
From the outset Cramlington was intended to regenerate the 
economy of a declining coal field while the county planners spoke of a 
declining coal field while the county planners spoke of the town as 
developing into a "self contained" and "balanced community". However, 
the extent to which regeneration and self containment would occur 
depended on the scale of incoming manufacturing plant and on a 
sufficient range and quality of jobs becoming locally available to 
allow Cramlington home buyers to live and work in the town. The 
frequent adjustment downwards of projected population figures together 
with a high level of conunuting to work on Tyneside suggesting that the 
pre-condtions for self containment had not been met. 
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Unlike other New Towns in the North East Cramlington was private 
sector led although very much dependent upon the national and local 
State for the provision of infrastructure, public buildings and 
services and for co-ordination and planning. However, the emphasis on 
private sector house building for owner occupation created a 
disjunction between the labour market and the housing market. At 
times a slump in demand for housing led to a slowdown in new house 
building with factories constructed ahead of housing. But in any case 
the attraction of the town for many lay in the chance it provided to 
enter owner occupation rather than in any employment opportunities it 
had to offer. Therefore the construction of council housing took on 
added significance since it provided a mechanism whereby labour could 
be assembled to work in Cramlington's factories. 
On the other hand if we go back to the 1966 and 1968 surveys 
there already was a substantial pool of labour at Cramlington and in 
the surrounding area. Here of course I am referring to female labour. 
What was noticeable though was the difference between the availability 
for work and the type of work required by the women in the old mining 
areas and in the New Town's private and public housing estates. 
Undoubtedly the existence of these reserves of female labour 
influenced companies considering setting up in Cramlington. 
In general, survey evidence indicated that although there was 
some overlap, the two populations of private sector and public sector 
housing residents related to different labour markets. The majority 
of private sector residents working away from Cramlington while the 
local authority council house tenants were more locally committed. We 
would therefore expect a fall in manufacturing employment on 
Cramlington' s industrial estates to impact more on Cramlington' s 
council tenants than on its private housing sector residents. 
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From the mid 60 1 s Cramlington 1 s ·industrial estates were the 
location for branch plants of multi-national companies with 
headquarters in America or London. Compared to the inter-war years 
when capital was relatively tied to the region much of the area 1 s 
economy was now controlled from outside. Equally, competition was no 
longer national but international. The impact of competition 
producing crisi~ (see 0 1Connor)(Z) which in turn forced individual 
capitals to adopt restructuring strategies in order to restore 
profitability or strengthen their competitive position. 
In the context of economic change at the base the significant 
feature has been the decline of manufacturing employment at 
Cramlington and Blyth and the collapse of mining employment with the 
closure of Bates pit. These aspects of change posing a m.nnber of 
important questions. First, the demise of manufacturing raises the 
issue of the nature of the relationship between a manufacturing 
interest and the class interest under which it is subsumed. In other 
words the collapse of British manufacturing is not only a symptom of 
"capital logic" but also to do with the; 
"more general problem of the subordinate, non hegemonic 
character of British manufacturing interest the 
parallel absence of a coherent manufacturing interest and 
consequently their subordinate role within the power bloc 
resulting from the special circumstances in which Britain 
industrialized."(3) 
Second, the reliance upon "footloose" Multi-National 
Corporations, although meeting with some success, has not proved a 
secure basis for long term employment yet the County development 
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strategy amounts to little more than begging capital to locate in the 
County. What we then find is a situation where countries, regions 
within countries and localities within regions compete against each 
other for the privilege of capital's presence. However, the 
limitations of this strategy become quickly apparent when it is 
recognised that the pace of new companies and branch plants setting up 
in Cramlington has.slowed down to a trickle from the peak of the early 
and mid 70's. It therefore seems that regions are competing for a 
diminishing flow of mobile investment. The new developments such as 
Boots Pharmaceuticals representing capital intensive processes 
employing relatively few people compared to the investment involved. 
Third, the focus on restructuring the plant closure has 
highlighted the relative weakness of the trade unions in preventing 
job loss. A weakness made even more apparent by the ability of 
certain capitals to move production to new sites in order to take 
advantage of cheaper labour (see Frobel, Heinrichs and Kreye). (4) In 
the face of job loss the response of many trade unions has been to 
offer wage or conditions concessions or agree to rationalisation 
schemes in the hope of keeping or attracting companies in order to 
maintain their membership base. 
Lastly, the closure of Bates has to be understood in the context 
of the wider strategic goals of the Thatcher government of 
disciplining labour and strengthening the "right to manage" as well as 
being a pre-condition for the privatisation of the coal industry. The 
form of nationalisation allowing the Prime Minister and the then 
Energy Secretary Nigel Lawson to appoint the N.C.B. Chairman Ian 
MacGregor for the purpose of restJ;Ucturing the industry and re-
organising Coal Board Management (see MacGregor) • ( 5) 
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Another theme running through this thesis has been concerned 
with class structure and political orientation. With regard to class 
structure, Cramlington, because of its emphasis on building for owner 
occupation, can be viewed as changing the class composition of what 
was a mining area by attracting professional and white collar workers. 
However, rather than relying upon Registrar General categories, I have 
referred to the work of Wright and Bravennan which when applied to 
Cramlington would be likely to produce an expanded working class and a 
bloc of individuals in contradictory class locations. This seems to 
me a more valuable way into understanding the processes at work rather 
than designating a varied collectivity of white collar workers as 
middle class or as a professional managerial class (see B. and J. 
Ehrenreich).(6) 
However, class analysis in its Marxist mode is based first and 
foremost on relations within work. Those not in work I have 
categorised as a reserve surplus population but I have also deployed 
the notion of dispossession in order to highlight the fact that work 
has been taken away. Within Cramlington the Shankhouse Estate is the 
location for a reserve surplus and for peripheral workers while 
Parks ide can be thought of as containing central workers. However, 
given the inadequacy of benefit levels the ability of the reserve 
surplus to participate in social life and to consume is heavily 
circumscribed (see Townsend).{7) 
If we return again to the central workers in Parkside one 
argument has it that these workers are privatised, home centred and 
egoistic. I have objected to this characterisation as a one sided 
caricature. 
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On the other hand Dunleavy and Saunders argue that consumption 
cleavages are coming to outweigh class alignments as privatisation 
proceeds. Following Harloe I have suggested that class and 
consumption should not be seen as separate spheres. In fact 
production location sets limits on consumption and this is highlighted 
by the clear· occupational class gradient across tenures. Moreover the 
majority of Cramlington residents in owner occupation are still 
dependent upon State provision for meeting educational and health 
needs. 
What has happened though has been a shift to the Alliance Party 
amongst Parkside's private sector residents rather than to the 
Conservatives. This could be seen as the re-emergence of Burt type 
politics under another name but which was previously contained with 
the Labour Party. While it is important to recognise that this is not 
Conservatism the split in the anti-Tory vote has allowed the 
Conservative Party to govern uninterrupted for the last fourteen 
years. How to change this situation is a concern to both Parkside and 
Shankhouse residents but no obvious answer is apparent. It is a 
question I have not addressed here but an answer is urgently required 
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